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                             Abstract 
With increasing numbers of veterans returning to both the United States of America 
(US) and United Kingdom (UK) from recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq who go on to 
commit offences, the question of whether their status as veterans, or for those to whom the 
diagnosis applies, veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) ought to affect their 
interactions with the criminal law is a pressing and timely one.  
This thesis sets out to examine the position of war veterans with PTSD with respect to 
the criminal law, in general, and criminal responsibility, in particular. The question is how 
ought a liberal democratic state treat war veterans with PTSD who commit crimes as a result 
of their PTSD? This question is addressed in three steps. First, it examines the claim that war 
veterans are owed gratitude in some way or other and that this argument explains why war 
veterans ought to be in some special category of defendants. In light of this, second, the thesis 
then looks at whether war veterans with PTSD who commit crimes are able to offer a defence 
such as insanity, automatism, self-defence, and diminished responsibility. Third, and finally, 
it looks at whether war veterans with PTSD ought to be able to appeal for mitigation. 
In addressing this question, the thesis draws on examples from the USA and England 
and on the philosophy of criminal law. The goal of this thesis is to present evidence, and 
clarification regarding philosophical issues of criminal responsibility with respect to veterans 
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   Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1. Problem Statement 
In 2009, the US Supreme Court upheld a claim of ineffective counsel, locating the 
problem with the defence lawyer failing to present his client’s military service as mitigating 
evidence, despite ‘a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their 
service.’1 This statement, put in such stark terms, is puzzling. On the one hand, criminal law 
generally does not take into account any past “good works” when assessing the culpability of 
any defendants. On the other hand, if the claim is directed at some veterans possibly having 
any various deficits, such as PTSD for example, then the argument ought to be that the 
lawyer has failed to raise the issue of his client’s mental state, rather than his status as a 
veteran. 
 Initially, PTSD was officially introduced in 1980, in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), due to its prevalence among war veterans from the 
Vietnam War.2 Even then, however, PTSD was not new, but rather its symptoms were well-
established among soldiers during the First World War.3 The problem here is two-fold. First, 
the prevalence of PTSD among war veterans is high.4 Secondly, the prevalence of 
underdiagnosis and undertreatment is also high among war veterans with PTSD.5 
 This is problematic because any individuals suffering from PTSD are more likely to 
be at a greater risk of criminal activity and other legal problems.6 This is because PTSD is 
commonly linked to violence, as well as substance abuse disorders, which increase the risk of 
                                                          
1  Porter v McCollum [2009] USSC 130-447. 
2 Andrea Friel, Tom White and Alastair Hull, ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Criminal 
Responsibility ̕ (2008) 19 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 64-65. 
3  ibid 64. 
4 Matthew J. Friedman, Paula P. Schnurr and Annmarie McDonagh-Coyle, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder in the Military Veteran’ (1994) 17 Psychiatric Clinics of North America 265, 266. 
5  ibid 266-267. 
6 Jenna L. McCauley and others, ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Co-Occurring Substance Use 




violence.7 Furthermore, alcohol use disorder appears to be quite common among war veterans 
with PTSD.8 The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) reports that more than 
two out of every ten veterans with PTSD also have substance abuse disorder issues.9 A study 
carried out among a sample population of English war veterans with PTSD showed that 
treatment can be less effective when the sufferer also has a substance abuse disorder.10 
 However, a study carried out on a sample of English war veterans with PTSD also 
showed that treatment is very important because without treatment, war veterans with PTSD 
are at an increased risk of malfunctioning both socially and psychologically.11 In fact, Sean 
Duggan, Director of Prisons and Criminal Justice at the Sainsbury Centre in England, asserts 
that treatment of the mentally ill is necessary for reducing re-offending rates.12 
 In an evaluation of war veterans charged with crimes, William Brown found that a 
vast majority of these defendants have little or no criminal record prior to post-deployment.13 
All indications are, therefore, that war veterans with PTSD are at a high risk of becoming 
involved with crime due to PTSD in response to the trauma of war. 
 Moreover, these war veterans are typically injured by the trauma that has caused their 
PTSD, and the state, as in the case of R v Sutherland, has no difficulty providing welfare 
assistance on the basis of a disability for the physically ill and traumatised war veteran.14 
                                                          
7  ibid. 
8  Ismene L. Petrakis and Tracy L. Simpson, ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Alcohol Use Disorder: 
A Critical Review of Pharmacologic Treatments’ (2017) 41 Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental 
Research 226, 227. 
9  US Department of Veterans Affairs, ‘PTSD and Substance Abuse in Veterans’ (VA National Center 
for PTSD, 2019) <https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/related/substance_abuse_vet.asp> accessed 10 
September 2019. 
10 Dominic Murphy and others, ‘Long-Term Responses to Treatment in UK Veterans with Military-
Related PTSD: An Observational Study’ (2016) 6 British Medical Journal 1.  
11 Dominic Murphy and Walter Busuttil, ‘Exploring Outcome Predictors in UK Veterans Treated for 
PTSD’ (2015) 5 Psychology Research 441. 
12 Veronica Cowan, ‘An Interview with Sean Duggan’ (2010) 174 Criminal Law & Justice Weekly 1, 
2. 
13 William B. Brown, ‘From War Zones to Jail: Veteran Reintegration Problems’ (2011) 8 Justice 
Policy Journal 1, 5. 
14 R v Sutherland (David) [2016] EWCA 398. 
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There is no doubt that experience of war is very “traumatic,”15 therefore, questions of state 
complicity and societal gratitude bear down on the extent to which criminal responsibility is 
compromised where a war veteran with PTSD is concerned.  
 In 2014, the English and Welsh government commissioned a report on war veterans’ 
interactions in the criminal justice system. The subsequent report stressed that it was 
necessary to identify and respond to veterans’ needs when they come into contact with the 
criminal justice system.16 31% of all veterans in prison in the US have been diagnosed with 
PTSD, compared to only 15% of ordinary citizens in US prisons.17  
 For this reason, PTSD has been used as a means of enabling treatment, as opposed to 
punishment, for war veterans.18 Legislation in some US states, and the veterans treatment 
courts (VTCs), have opened up avenues for this approach, but qualifying for leniency under 
both is limited in certain ways, which could be usefully expanded.19 PTSD has been used as a 
defence on the basis of insanity, automatism/unconsciousness, self-defence, and diminished 
responsibility/capacity, as well as a mitigating factor during sentencing.20 For the most part, 
PTSD will not usually be considered as a factor to discharge the legal standard for insanity, 
and much more awareness of the mental infractions associated with PTSD is needed for 
greater success with other defences.21 
                                                          
15 Vito Zepinic, ‘Defining a War-Related Psychological Trauma: Is that One Impossible Task?’ (2010) 
3 International Journal of Medicine 376. 
16 Roxanna Short and others, ‘Offending Behaviour, Health and Wellbeing of Military Veterans in the 
Criminal Justice System’ (2018) 13 PLoS one 1. 
17 Jennifer Bronson and others, ‘Veterans in Prison and Jail, 201-12’ (2015) US Department of Justice, 
Special Report NCJ 249144, 8 <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vpj1112.pdf> accessed 31 
August 2019. 
18 Erinn Gansel, ‘Military Service-Related PTSD and the Criminal Justice System: Treatment as an 
Alternative to Incarceration’ (2014) 23 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 147, 149. 
19 ibid. 
20 Erin M. Gover, ‘Iraq as a Psychological Quagmire: the Implications of Using Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder as a Defense for Iraq War Veterans’ (2008) 28 Pace Law Review 561, 562. 
21 Thomas L. Hafemeister and Nicole A. Stockey, ‘Last Stand? The Criminal Responsibility of War 
Veterans Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’ (2010) 85 Indiana 
Law Journal 87, 123. 
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 At the present time, there is no real means by which to predict how effective war-
related PTSD can be used as a defence, nor as a mitigating factor. This research study hopes 
to identify and critically assess the ways in which war veterans with PTSD have been treated 
in two related criminal justice systems. This chapter introduces the study by establishing the 
problem statement (as discussed above), the scope of the study, the research aims and 
objectives, and the organisation of the study. 
1.2. Scope of the Study 
The scope of this study is limited to the criminal responsibility of war veterans who 
contracted PTSD in service, and who commit offences as a result of their PTSD. The thesis 
asks a normative or philosophical question of how the state ought to treat war veterans with 
PTSD, with respect to criminal responsibility, in light of how states have treated war veterans 
with PTSD. In this regard, this study examines both philosophical and practical arguments on 
how the combined effect of war-related PTSD and military service can negate or reduce 
criminal responsibility. As a result, this study forces the researcher to examine the complicity 
of the state that recruited veterans to serve in wars, that benefits the entire state at the risk of 
life and/or limb to the veteran. The veteran’s military service and war-related PTSD 
complicates their resettlement upon “post-deployment,” and may lead to criminal behaviour.  
The thesis is not doctrinal in the strict sense in that it does not examine in any great 
detail particular legal rules or the question of whether a given war veteran with PTSD ought 
to succeed or not with respect to some specific legal test. However, it does examine legal 
rules and doctrine. Having established (in Chapter Four) that war veterans with PTSD are 
owed some special regard, the thesis examines the ways in which states do (and do not) allow 
war veterans with PTSD access to defences such as insanity, automatism, and so on. These 




This research study examines just how the lack of antecedents, military training, as 
well as war-related PTSD, points towards the state and society’s debt to war veterans with 
PTSD who come into contact with the criminal justice system. This information, and 
discussion, is important for laying the groundwork for arguing that war veterans with PTSD 
belong to a special category of defendants, and therefore should be afforded some degree of 
leniency.  
Of particular concern is the means and methods by which states can make up for their 
complicity in the life altering circumstances of war for veterans, and society can discharge a 
debt of gratitude via the criminal justice system. In England, PTSD is regarded as “nervous 
shock,” which is a psychiatric injury that can be the basis of a demand for compensation in 
cases where the claimant can prove that his psychiatric injury was caused by the defendant.22 
It is also noted that in order to prove that PTSD is worthy of consideration in court, the 
defendant must treat it as a civil claim, and in doing so, the war veteran must produce 
evidence of the actual trauma that caused PTSD. For example, if the claim is for damages due 
to injuries sustained in a car accident, the claimant’s lawyer will not just produce evidence of 
the injuries, but also evidence of the car accident which occurred.23 In other words, the war 
veteran must prove that PTSD was caused by their war experience. This study, therefore, 
examines the appropriate defences and sentence mitigation factors that provide the best 
chance for war veterans to avoid incarceration and to receive treatment instead. After all, the 
connection between PTSD and criminal conduct is readily accepted among war veterans.24 
The social-cognitive theory of PTSD argues that PTSD suffered by war veterans is 
actually a moral injury caused by traumatic events that alter an individual’s beliefs and values 
                                                          
22 Marios C. Adamou and Anthony S. Hale, ‘PTSD and the Law of Psychiatric Injury in England and 
Wales: Finally Coming Closer?’ (2003) 31 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the 
Law 327, 328. 
23 Gover (n20) 568-569. 




about the world around them, and their safety.25 It therefore makes sense that the state and 
society owe the war veteran with PTSD some measure of aid for readjusting into society. 
When society and state fail to do so, they are not relieved of that responsibility. Therefore, 
when the war veteran commits a crime due to war-related PTSD, society and the state 
continue to owe some measure of reparation. Thus, it might be argued that punishing war 
veterans with PTSD is tantamount to punishing the war veteran for even going to war for 
their country. 
In seeking to identify the means and methods by which war veterans with PTSD can 
obtain alternatives to incarceration and/or mitigation in sentencing, this study evaluates 
insanity, automatism, self-defence, and diminished responsibility. These defences can 
properly result in orders for treatment with partial or absolute acquittal, or they may serve as 
mitigating factors for a reduced sentence for war veterans with PTSD. Therefore, this study 
has limited its scope of defences and mitigation possibilities to insanity, automatism, self-
defence, and diminished responsibility, and to the applicability and chance of acceptance for 
war veterans with PTSD who have committed crimes. 
The scope of this study is also limited to war veterans in the US and England. In other 
words, this study focuses on the status of war veterans in the US and England (the choice of 
these countries is largely dictated by the literature, which is dominated by discussions of, and 
from, the USA, and by their shared common law heritage). In examining the status of war 
veterans in the US and England, this study looks at the prevalence of PTSD and crime among 
these war veterans. It also looks at the extent to which war veterans with PTSD are 
imprisoned in the US and England, and how this can possibly be decreased, or even avoided, 
in order to enable the recovery of war veterans from combat-related trauma such as PTSD. 
This study, therefore, examines the interpretation and application of insanity, automatism, 
                                                          
25 Brett T. Litz and others ‘Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and 
Intervention Strategy’ (2009) 29 Clinical Psychology Review 695, 698. 
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self-defence, and diminished responsibility, in both the US and England. This study looks at 
how these defences can be used to promulgate treatment rather than punishment for war 
veterans with PTSD. It also examines how these defences can be used to act as mitigating 
factors for reducing sentences for war veterans with PTSD. 
1.3. Research Aims and Objectives 
First of all, it should be noted that for the purpose of this research the term “he” refers 
to all veterans and is not gender specific. The term “he” is selected because the vast majority 
of war veterans are, in fact, male. Also, the term “England” refers to England and Wales 
throughout the thesis. The decision to use the term England was made to eliminate repetition 
of the well-known fact that the word “England” is commonly used when referencing the law 
of England and Wales in everyday parlance. Again, the question is, how ought a liberal 
democratic society treat war veterans with PTSD who commit crimes as a result of their 
PTSD? In considering this question, the answer: “no differently from any other defendant, or 
any other defendant with PTSD” is addressed and rebutted. 
The contribution to knowledge of this thesis lies in the normative or philosophical 
study of the status of war veterans with PTSD and criminal responsibility, and in relation to 
other arguments around that status, such as the argument around “gratitude.” There is, of 
course, extensive literatures on legal defences, mitigation in sentencing, and on criminal 
responsibility generally, and with respect to personality disorders in particular. There are also 
less extensive literatures on veteran treatment courts and on the treatment of veterans in the 
criminal justice system. However, the focus in the literature is primarily on the USA. This 
study includes, and draws examples from, England.  
The aim of this research is to identify and explain how war veterans with PTSD who 
commit offences as a result of their disorder ought to be treated by the criminal justice 
system. The argument is, in part, that war veterans with PTSD ought to be offered treatment-
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based options rather than punishment and incarceration. This is when, and because, the war 
veteran with PTSD has incurred it during military service, and therefore belongs in a special 
category of defendants.  
This study’s aim is based on the perception that war veterans with PTSD are in the 
category of a growing number of casualties of war, and society’s concern for the welfare of 
these casualties has also increased.26 This aim is also motivated by the fact that studies have 
increasingly shown that PTSD is a mental issue which deserves to be considered when 
looking at defences found in criminal law.27 
In order to accomplish the aim of this research, the following objectives were 
compiled: 
1- To gain insight into what criminal responsibility is by definition and by 
conceptualisation. Insight is very important because criminal responsibility refers 
to “accountability” which reflects criminal intent, which can in turn be excused or 
mitigated on the basis of a mental disorder that negatively impacts criminal 
intent.28 This objective will therefore review the literature on the meaning and 
conceptualisation of criminal responsibility in criminal law, via both theory and 
practice in the US and England. By increasing our understanding of criminal 
responsibility, we are in a better position to understand and explain how and why 
war veterans with PTSD may not always be correctly held accountable. 
2- To determine the effect of PTSD, and in particular, war-related PTSD on criminal 
responsibility. Therefore, this objective is directed toward determining the level to 
which criminal liability can be affected by PTSD in the defences of insanity, 
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automatism, self-defence, and diminished responsibility among war veterans in 
the US and England. Ultimately, this objective aims to explain how criminal 
responsibility is altered by the special mental circumstances of war veterans with 
PTSD.  
3- To discover the contours of state complicity in the realm of criminal responsibility 
of war veterans with PTSD. This objective seeks to determine whether the states 
that organise and invoke war decisions, either directly or indirectly, are somehow 
responsible for all of the outcomes, including PTSD and the resulting criminal 
conduct of war veterans. In dividing the criminal responsibility fairly, this 
objective seeks to determine whether the state should discharge its share of 
criminal responsibility by passing legislation and improving or implementing 
VTCs, so that war veterans with PTSD can be treated rather than punished. 
4- To decide the extent to which society’s debt of gratitude towards war veterans 
with PTSD can support options for treatment rather than punishment for this 
category of criminals. This objective is directed toward identifying and building 
on the philosophical argument that war veterans who contract PTSD have done so 
during the course of a service that has benefited, and continues to benefit, society 
in the exercise of civil liberty and privilege. In the course of carrying out these 
services, war veterans have suffered both physical and emotional/moral damages 
that have impacted their post-deployment behaviour. Therefore, society has 
benefitted, to the detriment of the soldier who has returned to civilian life a broken 
human being. It is therefore right for society to demand and support leniency 




5- To verify the extent to which objectives 3 and 4 can be met through insanity, 
automatism, self-defence, and diminished responsibility as criminal defence, or as 
pleas in the mitigation of sentence for war veterans with PTSD. In attempting to 
satisfy these objectives, this research will examine and analyse these defences as a 
means of determining whether they are acceptable or unacceptable as defences 
and/or the basis for pleas of mitigation for war veterans with PTSD. 
6- To identify methods for improving the chances of war veterans with PTSD being 
given non-custodial sentences, which can be linked to their criminal offences. 
Ultimately, this objective will make recommendations for improving the extent to 
which VTCs may be used for ordering the treatment of war veterans with PTSD. 
This study will look at how these courts can be expanded and used in the criminal 
justice system. This objective will also look at how legislators in the US and 
England can focus attention on the implementation of appropriate laws for 
improving the powers of the courts in both jurisdictions when it comes to ordering 
treatment of war veterans with PTSD who come into contact with the criminal 
justice system. 
7- To illustrate through discussion and analysis that war veterans with PTSD are 
entitled to a special status when they come into contact with the criminal justice 
system due to war or service-related PTSD. This discussion is founded on the 
factual situation of war veterans with PTSD and the reality of post-deployment 







1.4. Organisation of the Study 
Following the introduction in Chapter One, this study will be organised and presented 
as follows: 
Chapter Two (War Veterans with PTSD): This chapter provides a definition of PTSD 
and focuses on the symptoms of this mental disorder. This chapter also looks at criteria and 
the impact of treatment for PTSD among military service members. The consequences of 
PTSD and the prevalence and themes of PTSD among war veterans are also included in this 
chapter. Finally, a review of the literature on war veterans with PTSD is also presented. 
Chapter Three (Criminal Responsibility): This chapter focuses on the literature on the 
theoretical and practical aspects of criminal responsibility and criminal law in general. 
Therefore, the purpose of criminal law is explained and analysed. Furthermore, criminal 
responsibility is defined and discussed in terms of not just what it means theoretically, but 
also how it is used in practice. This chapter also examines the nature of defences in criminal, 
law as these relate to the purposes of that law in a liberal democratic society. Through this 
chapter, the thesis sheds light on just how criminal intent is normally required for criminal 
responsibility, and just how criminal intent is compromised by mental disorders, such as 
PTSD.  
Chapter Four (Special Status of War Veterans with PTSD): This chapter examines the 
status of war veterans and what this means for societal gratitude, social debt, state complicity, 
and the special position of war veterans within the criminal justice system. This chapter 
builds a case for the special treatment of war veterans with PTSD, when their PTSD was a 
result of active military service, especially war zone activities. Given that an argument can be 
made for treating war veterans with PTSD differently from other offenders, Chapters Five 
through Nine then examine the ways in which the actual practices of defences and sentencing 
reflect, or more often fail to reflect, the special status of war veterans with PTSD. 
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Chapter Five (Insanity): This chapter describes insanity as a defence used in courts. 
The case law and statutes that are relevant to an insanity defence, and its expected outcomes, 
are defined and explained. This chapter also identifies the relevant symptoms of PTSD and 
how they may be used in order to help war veterans effectively seek a proper verdict and 
obtain a treatment order, as opposed to incarceration. The focus is always on how insanity 
can be used to defend war veterans with PTSD. 
Chapter Six (Automatism): This chapter looks at case law and also defines and 
describes automatism as a defence in a court of law. In explaining and describing 
automatism, this chapter identifies the relevant symptoms of PTSD. Ultimately, this chapter 
seeks to demonstrate how PTSD can give rise to the elements of automatism and can, 
therefore, serve as a defence for war veterans with PTSD. Through theory and practice, this 
chapter analyses automatism as a viable defence for war veterans with PTSD.  
Chapter Seven (Self-Defence): This chapter describes the meaning of self-defence as 
well as the elements that make it up. The statutory and common law definitions are described 
and explained. This chapter then moves on to demonstrate how the symptoms of PTSD can 
be consistent with the parameters of self-defence. In particular, case law is used to prove that 
some war veterans with PTSD might be able to claim self-defence in particular situations, 
and then the facts and circumstances necessary for claiming self-defence on the part of war 
veterans with PTSD are described. This chapter also analyses self-defence and uses theory to 
justify its use as a defence for war veterans with PTSD. 
Chapter Eight (Diminished Responsibility): This chapter defines and describes 
diminished responsibility as a defence. It falls back on both theory and practice in order to 
describe what diminished responsibility means in the courts. This chapter also points out the 
relevant symptoms of PTSD and how they can be consistent with the elements for 
establishing diminished responsibility. Diminished responsibility is also analysed, both 
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theoretically and practically, with a view to determining the degree to which it is an 
appropriate defence for war veterans with PTSD.  
Chapter Nine (Mitigating Sentence): This chapter is concerned with the manner in 
which PTSD can and has been able to mitigate a criminal sentence. Laws that facilitate 
sentencing mitigation, and how PTSD fits into those laws, are examined with a view to 
arguing in favour of permitting PTSD to serve as a mitigating factor for war veterans. In the 
last two sections, the use of mitigation legislations and VTCs in the US for war veterans with 
PTSD are examined. 
Chapter Ten (Conclusion): This is the final chapter of this research study, where the 
research findings and conclusions are discussed. The recommendations based on the research 
findings and conclusions will be set out. Implications for future research will also be 















Chapter Two: Overview and Literature 
Review of Issues of War Veterans with 
PTSD 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter examines PTSD, its symptoms and treatment options. It also looks at 
war-related PTSD in particular, and how this impacts the lives of returning veterans. Insight 
is gained from a review of the literature consisting of studies and theories presented by 
scholars who specialise in PTSD as a criminal defence, and in war veterans with PTSD who 
have come into contact with the criminal justice system. This chapter is a necessary part of 
the thesis because it sheds light on what PTSD actually is. By shedding light on what PTSD 
is, the writer is able to place the impact of PTSD on returning war veterans in the proper 
perspective, meaning that arguments for a PTSD defence can then be better understood by the 
reader. 
 The contents of this chapter will also help to pave the way for arguing that war 
veterans with war-related PTSD fall into a special category of defendants who deserve 
special consideration. In other words, the point of this chapter is to establish the background 
information necessary for arguing in favour of considering alternatives to incarceration for 
returning war veterans with PTSD. 
2.2. Understanding PTSD and its Impact on the Lives of 
Returning Veterans  
 
2.2.1. Definition of PTSD 
An inquiry into PTSD and criminal responsibility as it relates to war veterans, 
requires an understanding of what PTSD actually is. PTSD can be defined as a “mental health 
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condition” which is “triggered” as a result of a “terrifying event.”29 Any individual who 
experiences or witnesses a terrifying event can be affected for an indefinite period of time, if 
the individual is left untreated.30 The VA of the National Centre for PTSD describes PTSD as 
an “anxiety disorder” that occurs after exposure to traumatic incidents.31 The National Health 
Service (NHS) in the UK similarly defines PTSD as an anxiety disorder resulting from ‘very 
stressful, frightening or distressing events.’32  
          Mendelson refers to PTSD as a “syndrome.”33 Although PTSD is commonly linked to 
armed conflict, other forms of trauma, such as natural disasters, serious accidents, assaults, 
and so on, can result in PTSD. Therefore, both military personnel and civilians are vulnerable 
to PTSD following exposure to trauma.34 The traumas that are reported to most commonly 
result in PTSD are life threatening events, and events that threaten one’s ‘safety or security, 
or physical integrity.’35 Military war is highly traumatic due to soldiers being exposed to 
ongoing confrontations with death and with the problems of identifying the difference 




                                                          
29 Robert H. Friis, Occupational Health and Safety for the 21st Century (Jones & Bartlett  Learning 
2015) 356. 
30 Diane England, The Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Relationship: How to Support your Partner 
and Keep your Relationship Healthy (Adam Media 2009) 5. 
31 US Department of Veterans Affairs, ‘What is PTSD?’ (VA National Center for PTSD, February 
2010) 1 <https://www.mirecc.va.gov/cih-
visn2/Documents/Patient_Education_Handouts/Handout_What_is_PTSD.pdf> accessed 14 August 
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32 ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)’ (NHS, 6 September 2015) 
<http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Post-traumatic-stress-disorder/Pages/Introduction.aspx> accessed 21 
August 2017. 
33 George Mendelson, ‘The Concept of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Review’ (1987) 10 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 45, 46. 
34 US Department of Veterans Affairs, ‘What is PTSD?’ (n31) 1. 
35 Christopher H. Warner and others, ‘Identifying and Managing Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’ 
(2013) 88 American Family Physician 827. 
36 Raquel Andres-Hyman and Scott M. Hyman, ‘An Overview of Combat-Related Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD)’ (2012-2013) 37 Nova Law Review 617, 620. 
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2.2.2. PTSD with other Mental Disorders 
         To resolve the controversies over whether or not PTSD can be grounds for viable 
defences in criminal law requires a full understanding of the range of mental problems linked 
to PTSD. Although defined as an anxiety disorder, PTSD is also linked to depression. For 
example, a study conducted by Shalev, Freedman, Peri, Brandes, Sahar, Orr and Pitman, 
found that holocaust survivors diagnosed with PTSD were more likely to suffer depression 
than survivors who did not have PTSD,37 and it is common for veterans of war with PTSD to 
also have major depressive disorder.38 Other mental disorders that co-occur with PTSD 
include mental numbing, anhedonia, fatigue, sleep disorders, irritability, numbed emotions, 
anger management issues, pessimism, and fractured social relationships.39 Moreover, a study 
of Vietnam veterans with PTSD revealed comorbidities, particularly in relation to heart and 
respiratory problems.40  
  According to Foa, roughly 80% of individuals suffering from PTSD also suffer from 
at least one other psychiatric disorder.41 This is referred to as comorbidity and refers to 
“overlapping symptoms” in two or more disorders.42 A number of PTSD symptoms, for 
example, hyper-arousal, numbing, and avoidance tend to co-occur with mental disorders such 
as disorder, anxiety, depression, and panic disorders.43 
                                                          
37 Arieh Y. Shalev and others, ‘Prospective Study of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Depression 
Following Trauma’ (1998) 155 American Journal of Psychiatry 630. 
38 Leo Sher, ‘A Model of Suicidal Behavior in War Veterans with Posttraumatic Mood Disorder’ 
(2009) 73 Medical Hypotheses 215. 
39 Margaret A. Gates and others, ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Veterans and Military Personnel: 
Epidemiology, Screening and Case Recognition’ (2012) 9 Psychological Services 361. 
40 Lee Hyer, Trauma Victim: Theoretical Issues and Practical Suggestions (Accelerated Development 
Publishers 1994) 57. 
41 Edna B. Foa and others (eds), Effective Treatments for PTSD: Practice Guidelines from the 
International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (2nd edn, Guilford Press 2008) 630. 
42 Janine D. Flory and Rachel Yehuda, ‘Comorbidity between Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and 
Major Depressive Disorder: Alternative Explanations and Treatment Considerations’ (2015) 17 
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 141. 
43 Jitender Sareen, ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Adults: Impact, Comorbidity, Risk Factors, and 
Treatment’ (2014) 59 Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 460. 
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          PTSD was also found to have a high co-occurrence rate with substance abuse 
disorder.44 Another study revealed that between 60% and 80% of Vietnam veterans with 
PTSD also suffered from substance abuse disorder.45 This increases the risk of physical 
health difficulties, contributes to fractured socialisation, increases suicide ideation and 
attempts, increases the propensity for violent behaviour, increases legal problems, decreases 
commitment to treatment, and renders ongoing treatment less effective.46 
          Rice, Tree and Boykin found that individuals with PTSD, especially males in active 
military service, are susceptible to somatisation, which is a mental disorder that results in 
physical problems, especially physical pain.47 Another study also found that between 90% 
and 100% of Vietnam veterans with PTSD suffered from insomnia, with 92% reporting 
“significant insomnia.”48 Their insomnia was likely related to an attempt to avoid the 
nightmare symptoms of PTSD. 
          Studies have shown that both anger management and anti-social personality disorders 
are comorbid with PTSD, especially among veterans.49 There are two elements involved in 
anti-social personality disorder. On the one hand, there is the anti-social or criminal element 
involving impulsive behaviour, reckless behaviour, aggression, assault, theft, and so on, and 
on the other hand, there are the psychopathic personality elements involving false charm, 
manipulation, externalising blame, lack of guilty conscience, lack of empathy, and anxiety.50 
More than half of a sample of 26 Vietnam veterans admitted for PTSD treatment at a hospital 
                                                          
44 McCauley and others (n6) 283. 
45 Andrew W. Meisler, ‘Trauma, PTSD, and Substance Abuse’ (1996) 7 PTSD Research Quarterly 1. 
46 McCauley and others (n6) 283. 
47 Valerie Rice, Rebekah Tree and Gary Boykin, ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Somatization 
among U.S. Service Members and Military Veterans’ (2015) 3 Procedia Manufacturing 5342-5349. 
48 Philip Gehrman, Gerlinde Harb and Richard Ross, ‘PTSD and Sleep’ (2016) 27 PTSD Research 
Quarterly 1. 
49 Amy D. Marshall and others, ‘The Impact of Antisocial Personality Characteristics on Anger 
Management Treatment for Veterans with PTSD’ (2010) 2 Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, 
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50 ibid 225. 
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were found to also have drug dependence, anti-social disorder, somatisation disorder, 
alcoholism, and organic mental syndrome.51  
2.2.3. Causes of PTSD 
           To make a case for PTSD to function as a defence or mitigating factor in the 
sentencing of offenders, particularly with war veterans, the causes of PTSD are significant. 
PTSD is caused by an individual’s confrontation with trauma involving ‘actual or threatened 
death, or injury’ and ‘produces intense fear, helplessness, or horror.’52 Exposure to armed 
conflict is perhaps the most prominent cause of PTSD. This is because those both directly and 
indirectly exposed to armed conflict are confronted with repetitious and continuous stressors 
(war and PTSD will be discussed in the forthcoming sections).53           
A contributory factor to PTSD is the individual’s biological, cognitive, genetic and 
emotional traits prior to exposure to trauma.54 In other words, some individuals are more 
vulnerable to developing PTSD than others, and this can explain why some individuals 
develop PTSD while others do not, even though they are exposed to the same traumatic 
episodes. Moreover, non-combatants can of course develop PTSD, as in the example of a 
caregiver exposed to trauma.55  
            Halligan and Yehuda report that an individual who has previously experienced a 
traumatic event, is more likely to develop PTSD compared to an individual experiencing 
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trauma for the first time.56 In addition, women have been found to be more susceptible to 
developing PTSD.57 Individuals with a prior psychiatric or psychological problem are more 
likely to develop PTSD after exposure to trauma.58 Also, a tendency towards disassociation 
causes delayed PTSD.59 For example, the veteran who disassociates during combat can 
develop PTSD months after returning home. According to Halligan and Yehuda, 
disassociation is a coping mechanism.60 In simple terms, PTSD is caused by exposure to life-
threatening trauma; it is also more likely to develop where individual characteristics and 
factors exist. 
2.2.4. Signs and Symptoms of PTSD 
Someone who suffers with symptoms resulting from a traumatic event might become 
better in time and with good care. However, if these symptoms continue for a longer period 
of time, this would indicate that the person is suffering PTSD.61 The signs and symptoms of 
PTSD provide insight into its debilitating impact on the mind and body. As such, the signs 
and symptoms can add to the discussion of how far this should serve as a defence with 
respect to criminal responsibility, and a mitigating factor in the sentencing of offenders, 
especially with war veterans. 
          Veterans suffering from PTSD can have symptoms such as flashbacks, severe anxiety, 
and nightmares about the situations that they faced during their time in war torn states, such 
as Afghanistan or Iraq.62 The Australian Centre for Post-traumatic Mental Health’s PTSD 
fact sheet states that individuals with PTSD typically relive the feelings of fear and/or panic 
                                                          
56 Sarah L. Halligan and Rachel Yehuda, ‘Risk Factors for PTSD’ (2000) 11 PTSD Research 
Quarterly 1. 
57 Vieweg and others (n55) 386. 
58 Halligan and Yehuda (n56) 2. 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
61 Matthew J. Friedman, Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Disorders (6th edn, Springer 2015) 32. 
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that they experienced during the traumatic event that caused their disorder.63 There are four 
main symptoms and signs associated with the reliving of the traumatic event: 
avoidance/numbing, re-experiencing, hyper-arousal, and negative thoughts and beliefs.64 
Essentially, the symptoms of PTSD act to alter the individual’s cognition, which in turn alters 
vigilance and perceptions of threats, which can result in impulsive and violent conduct.65 
 2.2.4.1. Avoidance Symptoms 
          Although avoidance and numbing are linked symptoms of PTSD, they are different. 
According to Monson, Price, Rodriguez, Ripley, and Warner, avoidance involves strategising 
and working to avoid incidents, articles, people, places, and so on, that may stimulate 
recollections and feelings connected to the PTSD inducing trauma.66 Numbing is a 
conditioned process in which the individual is able to block out feelings based on repeated 
exposure. Thus, numbing is described as an “emotional deficit,” and has been found to be a 
prominent symptom among veterans with PTSD.67 In fact, a study by Ray and Vanstone 
revealed that numbness and anger among veterans not only impacts interpersonal familial 
relationships, but also the ability to heal properly.68 
          Avoidance and numbing are both detrimental conditions as they can co-exist with 
major depression.69 Avoidance and numbing are methods that traumatised individuals use to 
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prevent re-experiencing or reliving trauma. This can lead to a state of emotionlessness and in 
turn, anti-social or criminal behaviour.70 Booth-Kewley, Larson, Highfill-McRoy, Garland, 
and Gaskin conducted a study on 1,543 marines on active duty in Afghanistan and Iraq 
between 2002 and 2007. The findings revealed that there were five main causes of anti-social 
behaviour, although PTSD was the most significant cause.71  
2.2.4.2. Re-experiencing Symptoms 
          Re-experiencing trauma may occur in one or more of the following ways: 
– Invasive and persistent “distressing recollections” 
– Persistent nightmares 
– Behaving or perceiving in a way that the trauma is happening again 
– Serious psychological reactions to stimuli 
– Physical reactions to stimuli.72 
          Re-experiencing symptoms can be, and usually is, manifested in flashbacks, invasive 
memories and “dissociative experiences.”73 Flashbacks were significant problems for 
veterans after the Gulf War of 1991.74 For combat soldiers with PTSD, there is a risk of 
hallucination and delusive re-experiencing.75 Other symptoms include, low concentration 
levels, sleep disorders, and irritability.76 
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2.2.4.3. Hyper-Arousal Symptoms 
          Hyper-arousal is defined as a ‘state of high psychological and physical tension.’77 The 
body is alert to an imminent threat even where none exists.78 In fact, both the mind and the 
body of the individual with PTSD are in a heightened state of danger expectancy. Compared 
to other symptoms of PTSD, hyper-arousal has been more strongly linked to aggression, 
especially among combat veterans with PTSD.79 At the same time, hyper-arousal can be 
detrimental to the soldier in combat as this symptom can arise suddenly and can have a 
paralysing effect.80 
2.2.4.4. Negative Thoughts and Beliefs Symptoms   
          A study conducted by Moser, Hajcak, Simons, and Foa revealed that individuals with 
PTSD generally exhibit negative thoughts about the self.81 In addition, individuals with PTSD 
tend to dwell on the trauma and its outcome.82 Negative thoughts and beliefs about the world 
and the self in the immediate aftermath of a trauma, are signs that the individual will develop 
PTSD.83 If an individual has negative beliefs about the self and the world prior to the trauma, 
the trauma is more likely to induce PTSD because the individual will form negative beliefs 
that the event was meant to happen to them.84 
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2.2.5. PTSD-Physical and Psychological Impact   
          The psychological symptoms of PTSD can be accompanied by physical symptoms. 
Psychological problems such as anxiety, depression, and substance abuse can lead to 
diabetes, cancer, and heart disease.85 PTSD victims have been found to have poorer physical 
health and higher mortality rates than individuals without PTSD.86 Veterans with PTSD were 
also found to have lower stamina with regard to injuries and diseases.87 Combat-related 
PTSD is particularly difficult. Veterans often return physically wounded, and this is 
exacerbated by PTSD.88 According to the Centers for Disease Control, all PTSD victims are 
susceptible to physical symptoms such as dizzy spells, nausea, insomnia, disturbed sleep, and 
irregular appetite.89 PTSD victims are also prone to contracting chronic fatigue syndrome, as 
both conditions are caused by stress.90 
2.2.6. Criteria for PTSD from DSM-III to DSM-5 
          The criteria for PTSD from DSM-III to DSM-5 helps to explain the research and 
development of PTSD as a mental disorder and the elements required for establishing a 
defence. The criteria for PTSD in DSM-III, and subsequently DSM-III-R, centre on three 
categories – re-experiencing the PTSD induced trauma, avoidance/numbing of reactions to 
stimuli, and a “collection of miscellaneous symptoms.”91 Previously, under DSM-III, Criteria 
A required that the PTSD inducing trauma be ‘life-threatening’ and ‘so intense that it was 
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outside the range of normal human experience,’ which limited PTSD to extreme events such 
as military combat, natural disasters, and rape.92 
In 2013, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) modified PTSD criteria in 
DSM-5.93 The most significant change was the relocation of PTSD as an anxiety disorder to a 
“Trauma and Stressor-related Disorders.”94 Criteria A under the DSM-5 relaxes the previous 
criteria listed by DSM-III. This leaves open the possibility of many PTSD qualifying 
traumas.95 Thus, DSM-5 was intended to clarify Criteria A, and to solve problems where 
symptoms of PTSD were intertwined with other mental health disorders.96 
          DSM-5 also made changes to the symptoms criteria for PTSD. Firstly, avoidance and 
numbing were separated into two categories. Avoidance was paired with negative changes in 
mood and cognition.97 Self-blame or the blaming of others, negative cognition and mood 
changes, together with recklessness and self-destructive behaviour, are now sub-categories of 
hyper-arousal.98 The four-factor model of re-experiencing, avoidance, negative changes in 
mood and cognition, and hyper-arousal, remains the same while symptoms are clarified.99 
Clarification is necessary as a safeguard against malingering. As a psychological disorder, the 
risk of malingering is a concern.100 
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2.2.7. Possible Treatment of PTSD 
Treatment for PTSD is important because it lays the framework for the appropriate 
sentencing of convicted individuals who successfully claim to have PTSD. This is especially 
true for war veterans who contract PTSD as a result of their service. The VA has reported that 
there are two treatment options for individuals with PTSD: psychotherapy and/or 
medication.101 The UK’s NHS also identifies medication and psychotherapy as treatments of 
PTSD.102 Internet or technologically enabled treatment, such as clinical video 
teleconferencing, is also available for the treatment of individuals with PTSD.103 
2.2.7.1. Psychotherapy  
          Guidelines setting out treatment options for individuals with PTSD establish that 
psychotherapy is the most satisfactory treatment for this condition.104 67% of PTSD patients 
that complete psychotherapy fully recover. In addition, 56% of PTSD patients that fail to 
complete psychotherapy also fully recover, or show marked improvement.105 Studies have 
shown that psychodynamic therapy, desensitisation, and hypnotherapy are efficient cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) methods for the reduction of invasive and avoidance 
symptoms.106 
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          In general, CBT has been found to be both safe and effective for the treatment of 
PTSD.107 CBT includes many counselling techniques including exposure therapy, stress 
inoculation therapy, cognitive processing, relaxation therapy, acceptance and commitment 
therapy, and dialectical behaviour therapy.108 Eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing 
is also a safe and effective therapy treatment option for individuals with PTSD.109 
2.2.7.2. Medications 
          Medication treatment options for PTSD include selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, 
monoamine oxidase inhibitors, tricyclic antidepressants, diazepam and propranolol.110 
Studies have found that the most effective medicines for the treatment of PTSD symptoms 
are fluoxetine, sertraline, paroxetine, venlafaxine and topiramate.111 
2.2.7.3. Internet-Based Treatments 
          Internet-based treatments are technologically driven methods of psychotherapy. For 
example, Knaevelsrd and Maercker reported the success of CBT for PTSD patients over the 
Internet.112 According to Lee, internet-based CBT can reduce the symptoms of PTSD and can 
have lasting effects.113 Approximately 41% of veterans accessing health care provided by the 
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VA in the USA live in remote areas. Mobile health care assistance is provided, which 
includes wireless technologies for counselling.114 
  2.2.8. Association between PTSD and Combat Experience (PTSD-Military Conflict)  
          In making the case for mitigation of sentence and for the treatment of war veterans 
with PTSD, it is important to understand military combat-related PTSD. PTSD has been 
linked to war veterans for hundreds of years.115 It was associated with war, even before it 
became an official diagnosis. Veterans displaying signs of PTSD from the impact of the 
American Civil War were said to have a condition referred to as “soldier’s heart,” and 
veterans impacted by the two World Wars were said to be suffering from “shell shock” and 
“battle fatigue” respectively.116 In fact, PTSD was originally identified as a natural 
consequence of war.117 
The acceptance of PTSD began with returning war veterans who reportedly suffered 
from the now widely known symptoms of PTSD.118 However, throughout most of the 1980s, 
PTSD was regarded as a relatively new mental disorder.119 The general acceptance of PTSD 
as a valid mental disorder is evidenced by the fact that a number of test instruments are 
available for diagnosing it.120 The general acceptance of PTSD is owed to returning war 
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veterans. As Grant and Coons explained, PTSD is accepted by both the public and 
practitioners as a result of participation in war.121 
          Studies in the literature explain why and how PTSD is accepted. Studies have found 
that the higher the degree of trauma, the higher the propensity for violence. Therefore, the 
current status of PTSD has been elevated through the number of returning veterans from Iraq 
and Afghanistan with its symptoms. Lawyers representing these veterans have earned the 
status of “first responders” because they are normally responsible for suggesting a diagnosis 
in preparing their clients with PTSD for civil and criminal trial.122  
The risk of military combat-related PTSD has been studied for over three decades and 
remains a significant issue.123 Gates, Holowka, Vasterling, Keane, Marx, and Rosen report 
that in the US, approximately 7-8% of Americans have suffered, or will suffer from, PTSD at 
some time in their lives.124 While this is a high rate of PTSD, the patterns among military 
staff and veterans are much higher. In fact, Gates et al.’s literature review revealed that PTSD 
among veterans and military staff is ranked between 14% and 16%.125 Historically, military 
combat-related trauma has been recognised as a cause of serious psychological stress.126 
Therefore, the focus on veterans and military conflict in the literature on PTSD is 
understandable.  
                                                          
121 Brian L. Grant and David J. Coons, ‘Guilty Verdict in a Murder Committed by a Veteran with Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder’ (1983) 11 Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 355. 
122 Evan R. Seamone, ‘Attorneys as First-Responders: Recognizing the Destructive Nature of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat Veteran’s Legal Decision-Making Process’ (2009) 202 
Military Law Review 144, 145-146. 
123 Chen Xue and others, ‘A Meta-Analysis of Risk Factors for Combat-Related PTSD among Military 
Personnel and Veterans’ (2015) 10 PLoS one 1, 2. 
124  Gates and others (n39) 361. 
125 ibid. 
126 Judith A. Lyons and others, ‘Multidemensional Assessment of Combat-related PTSD: 
Phenomenological, Psychometric, and Psychophysiological Considerations’ (1988) 1 Journal of 
Traumatic Stress 373. 
46 
 
          Writer, Meyer, and Schillerstrom report that ‘military combat is a common trauma 
experience associated with posttraumatic stress disorder.’127 The higher the soldier’s 
exposure to combat, the higher the risk of developing PTSD.128 Moreover, PTSD has been 
found to have a more “disruptive” impact on returning veterans than on other individuals with 
PTSD.129  
Xue, Ge, Tang, Liu, Kang, Wang, and Zhang carried out a study to identify the factors 
that contribute to combat-related PTSD.130 The study found that in addition to factors that are 
external to war, such as education levels, other factors such as the length of deployment, the 
length of combat, the severity of combat, frontline exposure, using weapons, and witnessing 
the use of weapons against others, can increase the risk of developing PTSD.131 The link 
between PTSD and combat experience comes down to “resilience” versus “vulnerability.”132 
  Even the aftermath of combat experience can impact the psychological welfare of war 
veterans and the risk of contracting PTSD. For example, Cozza’s review of the relevant 
literature revealed that upon reintegration into civilian life, “sociological factors” and the 
“nature of combat” together with “social factors” can expose the veteran to PTSD upon 
return.133 Regardless, it is clear from the literature that stress associated with combat alone 
renders soldiers vulnerable to PTSD. For example, Lee, Goudarzi, Baldwin, Rosenfield, and 
Telch surveyed literature on the relationship between combat stressors and participants’ 
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responses to it. The study’s results indicated a high risk for PTSD among soldiers involved in 
the actual war zone.134 
          The war zone includes conventional actions on the part of the soldier in terms of using 
fatal weapons against enemies and in defence of allies.135 Combatants are also exposed to 
other stressors, however brief, that can be described as “atrocities” and “abusive violence” 
which can include the killing, wounding, or terrorising of civilians.136 Exposure to war itself, 
whether as a civilian or a soldier, is traumatic, and explains why studies on PTSD tend to 
highlight the link between war and PTSD.137 To demonstrate through analysis, the frequency 
and severity of PTSD among returning veterans, two sections have been created in this 
chapter – veterans with PTSD returning from Vietnam, and veterans with PTSD returning 
from Iraq and Afghanistan.  
2.2.8.1. Vietnam War and PTSD 
Within ten years of the Vietnam War, Congress requested the National Vietnam 
Veterans’ Readjustment Study. The study revealed that 15.2% of male Vietnam veterans and 
8.5% of female Vietnam veterans were suffering from PTSD, and approximately 30% of both 
male and female Vietnam veterans would suffer PTSD at some point throughout the rest of 
their lives.138 The Vietnam War ended in 1975 and the impact was felt for decades due to the 
prevalence of combat-related PTSD.139 Studies have shown a high suicide rate among 
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Vietnam veterans with PTSD.140 Furthermore, Vietnam veterans were subjected to extra-
ordinary levels of brutality from their own side, as well as from their opposing combatants.141 
          Decades later, Vietnam veterans were still experiencing the ravages of war. Corry, 
Kulka, Fairbank, and Schlenger indicated that out of the 1,377 Vietnam veterans participating 
in a longitudinal study, 11.8% suffered from serious PTSD symptoms in 1984 with 10.5% 
still suffering from PTSD in 1998.142 This study reveals how prolonged combat-related PTSD 
lasts, and the grave sacrifices made by veterans. Even 30 years after returning from the 
Vietnam War, many veterans were still suffering from the effects of PTSD. 
2.2.8.2. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and PTSD                 
          One out of every six soldiers returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 
Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has PTSD, as well as other mental health 
disorders, including substance abuse.143 The prevalence of PTSD is expected. The National 
Center for PTSD reported that OEF and OIF exposed soldiers to significant risks of harm 
and/or death.144 They not only witnessed injuries to, and/or the death of others, they were 
required to be vigilant and to injure or kill others themselves.145 Moreover, a study involving 
OEF and OIF veterans with PTSD showed that the greater the level of combat exposure, the 
more serious the PTSD symptoms.146  
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          In a study involving 2,077 veterans form OEF and OIF receiving treatment for PTSD, 
the results indicated that there was a high occurrence of major depressive illness and anger 
management deficits.147 Another study revealed that the prevalence of PTSD was higher for 
soldiers serving in Iraq as opposed to Afghanistan. Moreover, PTSD was more common 
among soldiers serving the UK, the US, and the Canadian navy, marines and army.148  
2.2.9. Relationship between War-Related PTSD and Crime 
Given that PTSD is associated with violent behaviour, it is understandable that some 
defendants attempt to decrease the seriousness of their criminal responsibility by invoking 
this as evidence against criminal charges. There is little doubt about the link between PTSD 
and crime. This suggests that offenders tend to commit crimes due to PTSD. The paper 
written by Andrea Friel, Tom White, and Alastair Hull in 2008 considers the correlation 
between PTSD and violence committed by veterans.149 Sadeh and McNiel studied 771 adult 
detainees with mental health disorders. The data revealed that those suffering from PTSD 
were at a higher risk of arrest in respect of new charges and recidivism within one year of 
arrest.150 Moreover, Ardino suggests that recidivism among PTSD offenders is expected, 
since prison is not only a place where triggers are unavoidable, but a place where PTSD 
sufferers forego appropriate treatment.151 
          In the present research, the objective is to analyse the military personnel and veteran 
violence relationship with PTSD. During the research, a thorough analysis of the literature 
was made using a systematic procedure. Research studies were assessed along with inclusion 
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and exclusion criteria and quality valuation. The results of all research studies have indicated 
that violence and PTSD have a positive relationship. This means that there is ‘a relationship 
between PTSD and violence.’ An analysis was conducted to attain the research results and 
present variables integrated with violence and PTSD. These variables are substance misuse, 
relationship issues, affective states, comorbid disorders, demographics, combat exposure, and 
in-patient status.152 
          Criminal behaviour is especially high among returning war veterans. This is because 
returning war veterans with PTSD also suffer many other problems associated with criminal 
behaviour, including unemployment, family difficulties, and the perception of committing 
harm, and even homicide, as normal.153 Furthermore, higher incidents of substance abuse 
have been found among PTSD patients, especially war veterans.154  
The link between crime and substance abuse is undisputed. For example, Deitch, 
Koutsenok and Ruiz reported that in areas where alcohol is readily available, the rates of 
crime are higher, especially violence.155 Another study also revealed that substance abuse, as 
a co-occurring disorder with PTSD, has been found to increase incidents of domestic violence 
and violence in general, especially among returning veterans.156 
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          A study of PTSD offenders found that those with more symptoms had a higher risk of 
committing violent and sexual assaults.157 Numbing and avoidance are particularly 
accommodating as veterans develop anti-social behaviour, and this often includes criminal 
behaviour. A study on a group of UK combat personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq discovered a 
link between violent criminal behaviour and hyper-arousal among personnel with PTSD.158  
         The prevalence of criminal behaviour is not limited to veterans with PTSD. This trend 
is found among civilian members of the population.159 Donley, Habib, Jovanovic, et al., 
found that there is an increased risk of violent crimes among both civilians and veterans with 
PTSD.160 The studies in the literature generally explain that there is a link between PTSD and 
crime, especially violence. However, the studies are not so helpful in that they generally do 
not identify why this link exists. It can be assumed, however, that untreated PTSD leaves the 
individual vulnerable to the symptoms which result in reckless, impulsive, and emotionless 
behaviour. When co-occurring with substance abuse disorder, the link between PTSD and 
crime is clear. 
          When PTSD is comorbid with other mental health disorders the risk of violent 
behaviour is also a co-occurring issue.161 With regards to Vietnam veterans, studies have 
found higher incidents of violence within the families of Vietnam veterans with PTSD as 
compared to families where the returning Vietnam veteran does not have PTSD.162 
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          A review of literature therefore suggests that crime and PTSD are linked due to either 
coping symptoms such as avoidance or numbing, or comorbid mental conditions such as 
substance abuse disorder or other conditions linked to violent behaviour. In addition, PTSD 
victims find that they tend to abuse illicit substances or alcohol as a means of coping with 
their PTSD symptoms. In the meantime, returning veterans or incarcerated individuals who 
are suffering from PTSD are highly likely to forego the appropriate treatment for PTSD, and 
end up re-offending, or even offending for the first time. 
2.3. Literature Review  
2.3.1. PTSD as a Criminal Defence 
This section of Chapter Two looks into how PTSD can be used as a criminal defence, 
and in doing so, then analyses its historic and current progression as a criminal defence. The 
scope of this section is broad, and its purpose is to lay the groundwork for Chapters Five to 
Nine which examine war veterans with PTSD and particular defences. 
After being added to the DSM in 1980, PTSD has frequently been used for both 
criminal responsibility and civil liability defences or mitigations.163 For example, a veteran 
might seek to reduce or eliminate criminal responsibility on the grounds that he committed 
the act leading to a criminal charge during the course of a flashback/PTSD symptom.164 
However, despite the scientific foundations for founding insanity, unconsciousness, self-
defence, diminished capacity, and mitigation, the courts have been inconsistent in accepting 
defences based on PTSD.165 In fact, it has been reported that since its formal inception in 
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1980, PTSD, including “war-induced PTSD,” as grounding self-defence or insanity has been 
overwhelmingly rejected by appeals courts.166 
Omri Berger, McNiel and Binder performed a study devoted to the analysis of PTSD 
as a legal basis for criminal defence, and considered the grounds of when the usage of PTSD 
is considered justified and legitimate.167 Gover point outs that ‘PTSD can be used to prove a 
defense of insanity, diminished capacity, unconsciousness/automatism, or self-defense and 
can also be used as a mitigating factor in sentencing proceedings.’168 However, some courts 
dismiss PTSD as a defence as its reliability is not regarded as sufficient particularly with 
respect to insanity. 
In 1980, PTSD was presented for the first time as a defence in criminal cases for a 
range of crimes.169 Some scholars believe that the availability of the PTSD defence poses a 
risk to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system, as some individuals may resort 
to misrepresentation of PTSD in order to avoid responsibility.170 In contrast, the presence of 
PTSD is crucial for veterans suffering from the consequences of war. However, close 
analysis of the case law shows that there is a low level of abuse of the diagnosis in criminal 
proceedings.171 Namely, about 47 cases are available in the US in which consideration was 
given to PTSD as a criminal defence.172 Out of the 47 cases, only three had jurisdiction in 
California, while most of the others fell under federal jurisdiction.173  
In the first case, Doe v Superior Court, the appellate court should have reversed the 
decision of the lower court, and considered testimony on the existence of the mental disorder 
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on the grounds that it is an individual’s fundamental right to have a fair trial.174 The other 
case, Houston v State, confirmed that the courts are obliged to consider substantial evidence 
on the insanity defence before rendering judgment on the guilt of the person for the particular 
crime.175 Therefore, the dissociative state of the person falls within the meaning of the 
insanity defence that should be examined in relation to the actions of the traumatic neurosis 
of war veterans.176  
The significant breakthrough in case law was made with the judgment in New Jersey v 
Cocuzza. Based on the merits of this case, and the evidence provided to excuse the behaviour 
of Cocuzza, a former Vietnam veteran, the court decided on a not guilty verdict due to 
insanity.177 This case presents evidence in favour of the maintenance of PTSD as a legal 
defence in criminal cases as war veterans with PTSD should not be “blamed” for their 
actions. There are certainly situations when people are guilty of violence, or of other offences 
(however, the court should consider such behaviour on a case-by-case principle, as the 
peculiarities of the behaviour differ, as well as the state of mind). 
Attorneys and academics alike have argued for the ‘use of PTSD related to military 
service both as a defense to criminal charges and as an argument’ for the reduction of 
sentences for veterans who are convicted of criminal behaviour.178 However, courts are more 
likely to accept a plea of PTSD as a mitigating factor during the sentencing phase of the trial, 
as opposed to as an insanity defence during the substantive phase of the trial.179 As Gansel 
argues, PTSD is generally difficult to use as a complete insanity defence. Rather, it is 
typically accepted as a mitigating factor for “lesser crimes.”180  
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In addition, Delgado reminds us that despite acceptance, PTSD still struggles to 
successfully support an insanity plea.181 Still, the mere fact that it is an available defence for 
serious crimes, and can be acceptably used to mitigate sentences, and to reduce criminal 
responsibility, speaks to its acceptance by the psychiatric profession and the criminal justice 
system. 
          Sentence reduction is the least that can be expected in many cases. Returning veterans 
with PTSD are confronted with a mental health system for veterans that is ill-prepared to 
offer treatment.182 For example, Burman, Meredith, Tanielian, and Jaycox conducted a study 
that found that returning veterans, including those with PTSD, are reluctant to “seek care” 
and at the same time, health care services for returning veterans are inadequate.183 Still, 
Giardino argues that any returning veteran who has PTSD at the time of committing a capital 
offence, should be spared the death penalty.184 
          Earlier reports in the literature tend to view acceptance optimistically. For example, in 
1993, Stone reported that PTSD is now a credible psychiatric illness and is accepted in the 
courts as a viable defence to a criminal charge.185 This optimism is obviously associated with 
the empirical evidence establishing PTSD as a valid psychiatric condition and its validity as a 
defence to criminal behaviour.       
          Although accepted as a valid illness, and defence to a criminal charge, there are 
challenges when presenting the defence of PTSD. As reported in the literature, prosecutors in 
the US have been known to mock the disease, and have been especially critical of 
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flashbacks.186 Yet, flashbacks are among the leading symptoms of PTSD, and one of the 
symptoms that requires treatment. 
2.3.2. PTSD as Controversial Evidence 
The uncertainty of the acceptance of a PTSD defence has been played out by 
returning veterans suffering from PTSD.187 Returning veterans with PTSD who commit 
violent or aggressive acts are unlikely to successfully offer an insanity defence based on their 
mental disorder.188 One of the main problems with the acceptance of the use of PTSD as 
diminishing criminal responsibility is its well-known symptoms, and the ease by which they 
can be emulated by a defendant.189 Delgado suggests greater attention by lawmakers and the 
courts in balancing awareness of the seriousness of PTSD, getting treatment for those 
inflicted, and measures for ensuring that it is not manufactured in court in order to escape 
criminal responsibility.190 
 The issue of PTSD being effectively raised with respect to veterans in criminal 
proceedings has been assessed by Ann Auberry.191 Her study is advantageous for the 
evaluation of the flaws in the acceptance of evidence in criminal trials in judging the 
behaviour of veterans.192 For the confirmation of the results of the study, the author included 
real stories and cases of Vietnam veterans who suffered from the imperfections of the 
criminal justice system based on previous research.193 According to the author and her 
references, about one million veterans have various forms of PTSD, while it has been 
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established that the PTSD is closely related to criminal activity among Vietnam veterans.194 
With that, the author draws attention to the fact that the majority of lawyers do not have 
sufficient knowledge in the submission of proper evidence confirming the fact of the 
presence of PTSD excusing the actions of the defendant.195 At the same time, legal 
professionals should rely on the symptoms developed by the APA in identifying PTSD.196 
Therefore, it is up to the legal professionals to assist such veterans with identifying the initial 
signs of the disorder. In addition, this study provides a detailed overview of the strategy that 
should be followed by lawyers in the protection of the veteran during the criminal 
proceedings at different stages, such as pre-trial and trial.197  
          Sparr also argues that PTSD is a “controversial diagnosis,” since its symptoms are 
consistent with a number of other mental illnesses.198 Moreover, criminal responsibility may 
be difficult to evade where PTSD is argued since it relies on “self-reported symptoms,” and is 
frequently linked to outcomes associated with “alcohol or drug abuse,” and thus blurs the 
lines between criminal responsibility and other causative factors.199 Pittman and Sparr explain 
that PTSD is infrequently used as a method of eliminating criminal responsibility. Instead, it 
is used as a sentencing mitigating factor, and in turn a factor for establishing diminished 
responsibility.200 
Michael Davidson considers why Vietnam veterans suffer from mental disorders at a 
higher rate than the combatants of other conflicts.201 Before the inclusion of PTSD as a 
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recognised mental disorder, its specific symptoms were not evident. As we saw previously, 
given the fact that several veterans suffer from flashbacks, their actions in their day to day 
life are close to the violent nature of their former experiences. Through studies, it is stated 
that victims of PTSD manage a range of feelings since their mental disorder explains their 
defence viability.202 An individual’s condition could escalate if he is imprisoned and remains 
in isolation within a restricted area. Hence, it is quite possible that he would continue to 
commit crime in the future. There are two perceptions that have been included by the 
researcher. At first, the PTSD veteran would be guilty of committing a crime, and secondly if 
punishing him would lead to any conclusion or purpose.203 Some scholars may think that the 
availability of the PTSD diagnosis cannot be regarded as evidence in cases of murder, 
attempted murder, kidnapping, etc., as these actions are serious in their effect and 
consequence to the normal living pattern of the society. 
          In contrast, society cannot disregard the fact that veterans should have the legal 
opportunity to present legal evidence as to their liability in criminal proceedings. For the 
purposes of the confirmation of insanity or unconsciousness, it is highly important to consider 
the judgments in cases such as State v Wood,204 State v Heads,205 and People v Lisnow.206 
These are discussed in sections 5.5, 5.4.1, and 6.4.2, respectively. 
It is possible to state that people in developed countries, including the USA and 
England, have established the importance of recognising severe mental disorders in the health 
of veterans. PTSD gains its credibility and power in criminal proceedings where cases of 
violence are adjudicated for the benefit of veterans. In consideration of this, it should be said 
that PTSD is not likely to be abused by medical experts, as legal rules require sufficient and 
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extensive evidence with respect to the mental states of defendants (attitudes towards PTSD in 
different criminal justice systems have their own peculiarities).  
2.3.3. Protection of War Veterans with PTSD 
The purpose of this section is to pave the way for arguing that war veterans with 
PTSD are in a special category of criminal defendants and should be treated differently. This 
section sets out the background information necessary for making this argument. It is, 
arguably, the “state’s responsibility” to protect veterans returning from war with PTSD. 
According to Brown, the term “veteran” alone denotes the changed life of the soldier upon 
return to civilian life.207 For many of these veterans, the most significant change is being left 
with PTSD, a psychological consequence of war.208 It can be argued that due to the state’s 
part in the situation that created PTSD, the veteran defendant deserves the state’s aid in either 
foregoing prosecution, or allowing PTSD to act as a mitigating factor in sentencing (the 
state’s responsibility will be examined in Chapter Four). 
In fact, the state’s responsibility is manifested by Lee’s argument, in that the state 
should not be permitted to punish a veteran with PTSD who commits a crime as a result of 
his illness. This is because the state itself must assume some measure of criminal 
responsibility for creating and enforcing the conditions that caused the PTSD.209 Such an 
argument speaks to the serious nature of PTSD, and how a case can be made for expanding 
the acceptance of the illness through an enhanced defence on the grounds of PTSD. 
Re-entering civilian life alone is therefore a struggle for returning war veterans. The 
implications of PTSD go further to suggest that returning veterans, at the very least, deserve 
some form of protection from prosecution, or some form of reduced punishment. During and 
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immediately after the Vietnam War, PTSD was virtually disregarded by the public.210 
Returning veterans were confronted with a public who were opposed to the war, and 
decidedly opposed to the veterans who had put their lives at risk. Friedman informs us that 
returning veterans were confronted with challenges when re-entering civilian life. The 
hostility confronting veterans upon their return promoted “the development of PTSD.”211 
Still, Friedman points out that due to the Vietnam War experience, and its impact on the 
mental health of veterans, many gains have been made in our understanding of PTSD and its 
connection with the experiences of war.212  
One returning veteran with PTSD described his post-deployment experience. He was 
stubbornly silent when asked questions about his war experience. Moreover, the sight of 
tomatoes made him cry. He was triggered by news and television, had difficulty sleeping, and 
was incapable of having sexual relations.213 Veterans are traumatised to the point of acquiring 
PTSD because they sacrifice their “lives” and “humanity” by going to war. Therefore, the 
way the state and its citizens treat returning veterans is important in terms of accurately 
responding to the risk of PTSD. 
          Stein states that although research and interest in PTSD has improved our 
understanding of the disorder, the current treatment offered by the state for returning veterans 
with PTSD, is inconsistent with this current understanding.214 This is a significant 
development. The correct treatment of returning veterans with PTSD is not only imperative 
for protecting those who have contracted this disorder in the execution of duties for the state 
and its civilians, but for the protection of their families, as well as other members of society. 
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          Tramontin points out that since the ‘damaging psychological and moral impact of battle 
is now well documented,’ it is important that we comprehend and minimise the damages 
incurred by returning veterans and society as a whole.215 The end result of war is the 
returning veteran whose life has been altered by their war experience, and who is now 
reunited with a family that has been changed by the absence of a loved one.216 These life 
altering experiences are a direct result of war, and therefore impose a duty on the state to 
protect the lives and health of the returning veterans and their families, who have become 
casualties of war. In doing so, society is protected. In order to provide adequate protection of 
returning veterans with PTSD, it is necessary to improve our understanding of their war 
experiences.217 
          Arguably, if PTSD goes undetected and in turn, untreated, the returning veteran with 
PTSD, his family, and society as a whole will go unprotected. As previously examined, the 
extent of the problems associated with PTSD among returning veterans range from self-
directed harm, such as suicide, to violence against others. Conventional wisdom, therefore, 
dictates that returning veterans should be protected from themselves, and that society should 
be protected from returning war veterans. 
Any defence lawyer is obliged to seek relief for his client, a veteran with PTSD, in 
order to diminish or substitute possible sentencing. Thus, the problem with the high level of 
mental disorders among veterans shows the imperfections of the US in the delivery of 
necessary care for people returning from military zones. This statement implies that the 
authorities rely on the assistance that should be given by family members. In turn, the 
symptoms of the married combatants in relation to PTSD are less exposed than those of 
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unmarried people.218 Thus, it is seen that family support should be in place jointly with any 
state assistance programmes. If the state takes action for the restoration of veterans to normal 
life in society, it is possible to foresee the reduction of the mental disorders linked to criminal 
activity among veterans. 
Based on the physical and mental suffering of returning veterans, it is not enough to 
provide treatment for these combatants, who have risked their lives and freedom for the state 
sponsored war. In order to offer adequate protection for returning veterans, their families, and 
society in general, a mandatory screening process should be implemented.219 It is entirely 
possible that those with higher levels of PTSD and the most severe symptoms are less likely 
to voluntarily present for treatment and screening. 
2.3.4. Treatment of Convicted War Veterans with PTSD 
The haunting effect of war, as evidenced by PTSD, calls attention to the proper and 
just treatment of returning war veterans exposed to the traumas of war. As seen in section 
2.2.4.2, memories, together with nightmares and flashbacks, are the most common symptoms 
experienced by those returning veterans with PTSD. Thus, condemned to the memories of the 
trauma of war, veterans with PTSD are susceptible to a number of reactions that will include 
criminal behaviours. This raises the question of whether or not these returning veterans 
should face punishment or rehabilitative treatment. 
This is an important issue, given the nature of PTSD, and the fact that this condition is 
incurred by veterans who put their lives, limbs, and freedom on the line in state sponsored 
wars. As Lommers-Johnson pointed out, ‘PTSD is a mental disorder that functions to reduce 
culpability because its sufferers cannot control their reactions to certain stimuli as a result of 
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the trauma.’220 In arguing against the death penalty for returning war veterans, Lommers-
Johnson stated that it is entirely immoral to hold veterans to such high standards when they 
suffer from PTSD as a result of sacrificial service to their countries.221 The state, therefore, 
faces a moral dilemma. States are confronted with how to appropriately treat returning war 
veterans who commit crimes.222 The main issue for the state, however, is considering and 
determining the proper responses to veterans with PTSD when this condition is a direct result 
of the person’s participation in state sponsored conflict.  
The acceptance of PTSD as a valid psychiatric illness and as a valid defence is more 
accepted among military officers. Accepting that one out of five returning veterans from 
Afghanistan will suffer from a myriad of mental disorders, including PTSD, state courts have 
been set up to rehabilitate, intervene, and meet the special needs of returning war veterans.223 
By June 2012, there were 104 jurisdictions in 28 US states with special criminal courts 
specifically for veterans, for treating rather than punishing veteran offenders.224  
The VTCs, which are a part of the civilian court’s landscape, recognise the special 
conditions of returning war veterans. Seamone notes that for returning war veterans, the 
symptoms of PTSD are often revealed in criminal behaviour.225 Recognising this fact, VTCs 
have developed a sentencing process that takes a rehabilitative approach to veterans with 
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PTSD convicted of crimes, and imposes a sentence inclusive of treatment for PTSD.226 Under 
the rehabilitative process of the VTCs, convicted returning war veteran with PTSD will have 
their sentence discharged if they successfully complete treatment for PTSD.227  
          In the States of California and Minnesota, veterans with PTSD are accorded greater 
leniency than ordinary citizens with PTSD.228 In these two states, returning war veterans with 
PTSD convicted of crimes will, in most cases, be involuntarily submitted for PTSD treatment 
in lieu of incarceration.229 
VTCs have taken on a rehabilitative approach to veterans with PTSD and other 
mental disorders who have been charged with crimes.230 Schwartz described a restorative 
justice programme (restorative justice is a process between defendant and victim to reach to a 
solution regarding reparation of harm) operated in San Francisco. The programme offers 
restoration for victims, offenders, and the community. This means veterans with PTSD are 
treated for their condition.231 Still, there is some debate over whether or not the rehabilitative 
justice accorded to veterans with PTSD is an unfair shift away from retributive justice for 
their victims.232 The emphasis on the protection and treatment of war veterans with PTSD 
therefore creates tensions between retributive justice for victims and rehabilitative justice for 
veterans. 
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These tensions were delineated in the trial of Vietnam veteran Eugene de Kock, where 
an expert pointed that the veteran was able to plan and control the events.233 Another expert 
witness, a criminologist ‘considered de Kock a first offender,’ and recommended therapeutic 
treatment (or therapeutic jurisprudence which means to treat/rehabilitate the offender to reach 
proper consequences) for de Kock in relation to his PTSD symptoms.234 Thus, the issue in 
regard to criminal responsibility for PTSD patients is whether or not it is fair to forego the 
interests of retributive justice for victims or to focus on rehabilitative justice for PTSD 
patients. The question is more controversial for veterans who arguably deserve some measure 
of protection and treatment due to the fact that their condition was caused in the course of 
service to their country. 
How we treat returning veterans is important for encouraging these veterans to 
voluntarily submit to screening and treatment of PTSD. Usually, the appropriate diagnosis of 
PTSD for the crimes committed by veterans as a result of their mental illness is not carried 
out.235 The issue is usually extracted when they are subjected to the criminal justice 
system.236 Shein reports that the conditions under which returning Vietnam veterans were 
exposed to in the US contributed to their contraction of PTSD.237 In other words, due to their 
sacrificial and life threatening service, returning war veterans have “special circumstances” 
and should therefore receive “special treatment,” rather than being punished for exhibiting 
the symptoms of a mental disorder contracted while in service for their country (the reasons 
that veterans with PTSD should receive special treatment will be examined more fully in 
Chapter Four). 
          However, retributive justice has also been advocated. Retributive justice arguably 
requires that returning war veterans who commit crimes due to PTSD must face both 
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punishment and treatment if they are to be successfully integrated back into society.238 The 
civilian courts have vacillated between rehabilitative and retributive approaches.239 The 
retributive approach is desirable since civilians suffering from PTSD have also been exposed 
to serious trauma, and are no less susceptible to the disorder than returning war veterans. As 
noted by Jordan, Howe, Gelsomino, and Lockert, PTSD is not specific to war veterans.240 
          What distinguishes war veterans from civilians, however, is that military service is a 
voluntary risk taken on behalf of the state. The military does not consider the issue of PTSD 
as something unique and they also believe that the military forces are much more likely to 
suffer from this issue compared to civilians.241 Soldiers go into war knowing that it is a 
frightening and traumatic experience, and that PTSD is a likely outcome since ‘PTSD is a 
debilitating condition that follows a terrifying event.’242 
2.3.5. Use of PTSD in both the USA and England 
This section helps to heighten awareness of when and how the US and England have 
come to accept and allow PTSD to be a medically and legally recognised condition. The 
number of cases that have used this form of defence in England are very few. However, the 
US has seen PTSD used as a legal defence in many criminal cases, including cases that have 
fallen under the jurisdiction of California State such as, People v Lisnow and In re Nunez.243  
In the 1978 People v Lisnow case, the defendant appealed a conviction to the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles after the jury trial denied him due process of law, because it did not 
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permit him to prove a defence of unconsciousness due to mental illness. The superior court 
agreed and reversed the judgment.244 Thus, the superior court accepted the use of PTSD as a 
legal defence in the criminal case.  
According to a report by Shute in the Telegraph, the use of PTSD in criminal cases is 
increasingly being adopted in England, and was recently used in the case of Jonathan Dunne 
who had punched his victim. Dunne had been dismissed from the army because of PTSD 
after serving twice in Afghanistan. The court accepted his claim and he was spared prison 
sentence.245 
In a similar case involving a war veteran, David James was convicted for stamping on 
a woman’s head. He had been discharged from the army after developing PTSD while on 
duty as an army officer in Afghanistan.246 While delivering his decision, Judge Peter 
Heywood said that it was sad to see that criminal cases involving war veterans who have been 
affected by PTSD had become more regular, and suggested increased psychological help be 
offered to the members of the UK armed forces.247 Thus, the admission of PTSD as evidence 
in criminal cases in England depends significantly on other factors surrounding the case. For 
example, the defence in James’s case argued that he could not directly link the PTSD events 
that the suspect had gone through in the battlefield with the crime that he committed. He was 
said to have resorted to drugs and alcohol, and that was the primary reason for committing 
the crime.248 
          In the case of John Hinckley in 1982, a jury in Washington declared that the suspect of 
the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan was not guilty, due to insanity.249 
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Even though a majority of the population did not agree with that decision, the court 
reintroduced the debate of the use of insanity as legal defence in criminal cases.250 The 
pressure from the public after the verdict led to the introduction of law reforms, both in 
Congress and in various states, in order to guide the use of the insanity defence, and most 
made it more difficult to use insanity as a legal defence.251 Therefore, the use of PTSD as a 
defence in criminal cases became indirectly strenuous in the US after the acquittal of Hinkley 
because of public outcry. 
          Friel, White, and Hull state that the use of PTSD has caused controversy in the US 
because of the subjective nature of the symptoms and the danger of malingering.252 Hence, it 
is possible for suspects to fake PTSD in order to avoid responsibility for their criminal acts. 
Savla agrees with this argument and warns the courts in England to be aware of possible 
fraudulent and exaggerated use of PTSD as a legal defence for criminal acts.253 He argues 
that suspects can fake the symptoms of psychiatric conditions, and exploit legitimate 
variations in medical opinions.254 
          The US and England differ in the use of PTSD as evidence in criminal cases because 
the former has had more cases than the latter, particularly after the Vietnam War.255 Some 
states in the US have a defence known as “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI), which acts as a 
compromise and recognises that the defendant is guilty although not mentally stable, and the 
court is left to decide on the most appropriate sentence.256 England does not have such a law, 
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although it could, of course, bring it in by legislation, especially at this time when cases 
involving war veterans suffering from PTSD are growing. 
Generally speaking, it is possible to say that the application of PTSD as a defence in 
the US is much more established. In England, the issue of PTSD as a defence for the violent 
actions of veterans has not yet been properly addressed. PTSD raises several concerns among 
legal experts.257 Lawyers may argue that it is hard to prove insanity and persuade juries of 
such, because the main problem here is establishing the direct linkage between the committed 
crime and the PTSD of the client accused of the offence. With that, the breakthrough in the 
legislation of California in relation to PTSD should be noted (this is examined in Chapter 
Nine). In particular, in 1982 California required PTSD to be considered (where relevant) in 
decisions over the duration of non-violent crimes. In this regard, veterans should be provided 
with the opportunity to receive treatment for their PTSD.258  
2.4. Conclusion 
A review of the literature as analysed and reported in this chapter, reveals that war 
veterans with PTSD seem to have a particularly difficult time adjusting to civilian life upon 
returning from war. PTSD complicates what is already a very difficult readjustment 
experience. War veterans with PTSD have serious difficulties coping with their symptoms 
and adjusting to life at home with this condition, and as a result, many self-medicate with 
drugs and/or alcohol. 
  Thus, the fate of the untreated and undiagnosed war veteran with PTSD is uncertain. 
A review of the literature presented in this chapter demonstrates that PTSD is an especially 
significant criminal defence for the war veteran with PTSD, and therefore, establishes that 
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war veterans may fall into a special category of criminal defendants who deserve to be treated 


























Chapter Three: Responsibility  
and Defences in Criminal Law  
 
3.1. Introduction    
Criminal responsibility refers to being accountable for one’s criminal activities.259 
Unless one is criminally responsible, ones punishment would not be justified, and therefore, 
ultimately, criminal responsibility is strictly a question of law.260 The question for 
consideration here is whether or not there are defences that may render the defendant 
unaccountable, and in turn, outside of the reach of criminal responsibility. The insanity 
defence comes to mind immediately because insanity can exonerate an offender based on his 
defective reasoning.261 Yet, it is important to bear in mind that not all mental illnesses will 
form the basis of exoneration from criminal responsibility.262 Still, there are times when 
mental illnesses may be used to provide a partial escape from criminal responsibility. For 
instance, the defendant may suffer from a mental/emotional disturbance that does not reach 
the degree of insanity, but may be such that it can act as a mitigating factor in sentencing.263 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of criminal responsibility, and in doing so, 
lays out the background for discussing and analysing the criminal responsibility of veterans 
with PTSD. In order to understand how this process works, this chapter focuses on explaining 
and describing the concept of the normal person (or reasonable man). This concept serves as 
a foundation upon which all defences available in criminal law to justify, excuse, mitigate, or 
aggravate criminal behaviour are anchored. Thus, the question to be asked is – would a 
normal person behave in the way that the accused has behaved under the same 
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circumstances? However, this chapter also presents situations in which the test of a normal 
person obviously cannot be used in cases of persons suffering from some form of disability 
that renders normal functioning useless. 
3.2. Nature of Criminal Law  
This section addresses the nature of criminal law as a means of setting the stage for 
analysing how and why veterans with PTSD may have a suitable defence. Criminal law is 
defined as a set of limits and responses to behaviour with the intention of maintaining ‘public 
order and decency,’ and for protecting people ‘from what is offensive or injurious,’ and to 
establish protection against exploitive conduct.264 However, this applies to the regulation of 
people who are capable of acting responsibly in relation to certain kinds of conduct (non-
responsible persons may be regulated by, for example, mental health acts and non-criminal 
conduct by other forms of control). According to criminal law, at least in its core offences, 
one must be able to freely choose between acting and not acting to incur responsibility, 
because criminal law starts out with the presumption that the individual has free choice. It is 
up to the offender to argue that he did not have free choice, or that he had no choice at all.  
It is also important to note that criminal law is different from civil law, mainly 
because the complainant in criminal cases is the government, while the complainant in civil 
cases can be anyone from the government to individual citizens. To this end, limits are set in 
which a duty is imposed upon ordinary citizens to refrain from those activities that are 
properly criminalised. In fact, in England there are approximately 9,000 criminal offences.265 
Offences are consistent with the communitarian argument which assumes that communities 
must set limits for achieving ‘moral homogeneity backed by a sense of intuitive outrage.’266 
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The original goal of criminal law is to assist with the protection of society by 
punishing people who commit crimes. It manifests society’s act of condemning those who 
have offended against its members, aside from ensuring that offenders are prevented from 
committing further acts that endanger public order. For conviction, it is important that the 
court is sure of the defendant’s culpability.267 The defendant has to be blameworthy in order 
to be punished by the law, and the punishment should reflect the crime of which the 
defendant is found guilty.  
It is expected that when individuals commit offences, they will be punished for their 
crimes, in accordance with criminal law. However, much goes into the appropriate 
punishment, and it is not merely confined to the response of the criminal act itself. The 
offender’s own personal responsibility must be examined. Such an assessment will also 
include ‘a review of the broad array of forces operating upon’ him to determine the “extent” 
of his criminal responsibility.268 
In other words, the commission of a crime is not enough by itself to establish criminal 
responsibility. The court looks inward to determine whether there were any internal factors 
operating that may negate the necessary actus reus or mens rea. The offender may have been 
acting in self-defence, based on a correct or misconceived perception that his life or property 
was in danger. Here the offender may have felt threatened and as though he had no choice, 
other than to strike out to protect himself. The offender may also have felt compelled to 
commit the crime under duress, and therefore did not act voluntarily. The offender may have 
been suffering from a mental disorder that left him with defective reasoning. Again, in these 
cases, the offender did not have the ability to rationalise or reason as to what he might or 
might not choose to do.  
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Ultimately, theories of liability take two positions which stand in opposition to one 
another. On the one hand, the first of these theories suggest that society is entitled to punish 
offenders due to the offender’s “dangerousness or wickedness.”269 On the other hand, 
criminal liability theories suggest that society is entitled to punish offenders because of the 
problems that they cause in society.270 In both cases, punishment may not be an option unless 
the information necessary for determining the degree of danger, or problems caused to 
society, is available.271 In other words, liability theory relies on information that can be 
difficult to calculate and analyse, for example, an individual may commit a serious crime, but 
may not be a threat to society. There is no real way to accurately predict this outcome, 
therefore, in this regard, the liability theory fails. 
3.3. Criminal Law’s Conception of the Person as a Choosing Being who is Capable of 
Responding to Reasons  
This section establishes the background (in theory) for arguing when and how a 
defence can be founded on a claim of PTSD by a war veteran. Rational choice theory forms a 
basis for justifying the formation and enforcement of criminal law. According to rational 
choice theory, individuals take action after deliberating over outcomes.272 Ultimately, 
individuals only act when there is a pay off or to avoid unpleasant consequences.273 Thus, in 
accordance with rational choice theory, criminal law is intended to interrupt deliberative 
thinking about committing crimes, and therefore, an individual will think about the 
punishment for the crime, and, ideally, make the decision to not commit the crime after all. 
In other words, the thought is that a rational human being will usually take the 
position that the commission of a crime will have unpleasant consequences, and will, 
                                                          
269  Lawrence Crocker, ‘Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing Harmless Attempts’ (1992) 53 
Ohio State Law Journal 1057.  
270 ibid 1058. 
271 ibid 1057-1058. 
272 Thomas S. Ulen, ‘Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics’ (1999) Encyclopedia of Law 
and Economics 790, 791. 
273 ibid 792. 
75 
 
therefore, decide not to commit the offence. The difficulty with this theory when applied to 
the criminal law is that one might assume that unless the punishment is particularly 
unpleasant to the individual, the crime defined by criminal law and its punishment will not 
deter criminal behaviour. Similarly, if the putative offender is of the opinion that he might get 
away with the crime, the putative offender might foresee greater pleasure, which will then 
outweigh the risk of unpleasant consequences. 
Still, the theory of rational choice is tied to utility and deterrence theories which hold 
that human behaviour is predicated on rational choices.274 This means that the individual is 
more likely to be driven to act based on the likely consequences of his actions. Deterrence 
theory argues that the purpose of criminal law and of punishment is to deter criminal 
behaviour, because individuals will make the choice that involves lower costs and higher 
rewards.275 
Rational choice theory obviously assumes that human beings are rational.276 The law, 
likewise, assumes that human beings will reason prior to taking action. Hence, the law tells us 
what we may and may not do, and what we are and are not entitled to.277 The law proceeds on 
the basis that individuals are capable of responding to reasons, otherwise rules and laws 
would be meaningless, as the law depends on compliance.278 At the same time, morality and 
responsibility are individualised, so that the decision to take any course of action is personal, 
albeit influenced by social environments at times.279 
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The question is whether criminal behaviour is only ever carried out by non-rational or 
irrational human beings. It is difficult to come to this conclusion because individuals are 
guided by very different experiences, expectations and resources. What might amount to a 
greater degree of pain and pleasure for one individual may not be the same for another. Much 
will depend on the circumstances surrounding each individual, and so what might, therefore, 
appear to be an irrational or non-rational choice for one individual, will be an entirely rational 
choice for someone else under very different circumstances.  
A good example is the wealthy human being who might end up in a jail cell if he 
makes the decision to steal food, when he can afford to pay for it, whereas, a poor or 
homeless person may feel that they really have nothing to lose. If they steal food and get 
caught, the worse that could happen is that they might end up with a warm bed for the night if 
they are locked up in a jail cell, and will even be fed. Getting away with the theft of food will 
not have a better pay off. In fact, they would end up with food, but would remain homeless. 
Thus, rational choice theory might explain why criminal law is created, but will not 
adequately explain how criminal law acts to achieve its purpose of securing law and order. 
Ultimately, despite the fact that many human beings are driven by rational choices, 
the factors behind human behaviour most likely relate to the individual’s own social and 
personal environment.280 Thus, rational choice theory alone does not explain criminal law, 
nor will rational choice theory alone explain why people decide to commit crimes, or not.  
3.4. Legal Standards of Liability  
Before we can analyse how and when a war veteran may succeed in a criminal 
defence based on war-related PTSD, it is necessary to understand what the legal standards are 
for founding liability. This section discusses the legal standards accordingly. The reasonable 
doubt doctrine originated from a criminal trial before the Old Bailey court in London in 1784. 
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In this trial, Richard Corbett was on trial for arson (he was found not guilty). The presiding 
judge instructed the jury that if they had a “reasonable doubt,” it must be resolved “in favour 
of the prisoner.”281 This standard of liability has transcended through the times, and is 
commonly referred to in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. Still, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt (abbreviated to BRD) is prefaced by a degree of scepticism where the 
defendant must be presumed innocent until the reasonable doubt burden is discharged by the 
prosecutor.282 
No individual shall be held criminally responsible unless, or until, he is adjudicated 
guilty BRD.283 BRD is a very high standard, and typically places a significantly onerous 
burden of proof on the prosecutor, unless the defendant decides to plead guilty.  
The reason for this high standard is that prior to the administration of justice, the 
defendant’s guilt must be as certain as possible about the facts and evidence presented in 
court.284 It is important to note that the defendant’s punishment is captured by constitutional 
law where an individual shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process. 
Therefore, establishing the defendant’s guilt BRD goes hand in hand with these tenets of 
constitutional law and practice.  
 Based on the reasonable doubt standard, it can be concluded that unless an 
individual’s guilt is established BRD, he will not have to take criminal responsibility for his 
behaviour. What often makes this burden more difficult to discharge is that the reasonable 
doubt doctrine is usually coupled with the right to remain silent and the presumption of 
innocence. This means that the prosecutor begins a trial with the jury instructed to assume 
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that the defendant is innocent until such time as his guilt is proven BRD. In the meantime, the 
defendant does not have to say anything in his defence because the burden is on the 
prosecutor to prove the defendant’s guilt (although the precise rules with respect to the right 
to silence depends on the legal rules of particular jurisdictions).   
          In criminal law, the normal person or reasonable man test was established to set a 
standard and understand how a person charged with the violation of the law has deviated 
from that standard.285 This is generally the purpose of standardised tests: to compare a specific 
person with a “norm,” or an average of a group of persons ‒ a principle that obviously finds 
universal application.  
However, while trying to conceptualise the responsible subjects of criminal law, 
Lacey notes that the criminality of an act is directly relative to the laws governing a given 
jurisdiction, and also the importance of one being able to understand what one is doing just 
before committing the criminal act.286 Therefore, in the case where the defence is able to 
prove that the suspect has acted without an understanding of what they were about to do, this 
then means that the person is not criminally guilty.  
            According to Covlin, an individual who has been accused of a crime should only be 
gauged against standards that are within his grasp if the principle of criminal liability is to be 
followed.287 On the basis of that principle, a universal application of standards, thus, becomes 
unjust when a person against whom it is gauged is incapable of meeting those standards for, 
say, concentration or memory problems, among others. Therefore, the standards that are used 
to assess the culpability of one person ought not to be the same as those used to assess 
another unless they share characteristics, and the crimes they have committed are similar. It 
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is also in this context that the word “normal” should be considered with regard to the 
tendencies of the individual, compared to the rest of society.288  
Duff brings up an important point in stating that criminal liability is often focused on 
the issues of causation. In particular liability rests on the harm caused and the actor’s 
responsibility for the harm. According to Duff, this is insufficient for finding criminal 
liability. The law should instead offer greater emphasis on ‘the way, the context and the spirit 
in which harm is done.’289 
3.5. Concept of Criminal Responsibility  
The notion of criminal responsibility is thus at the core of criminal law. This chapter, 
thus, extensively explains the concept, its usage and relevance in criminal law, the 
importance not of only the physical act involved, but also the state of mind of the person 
committing a criminal act. This chapter underscores the notion that criminal responsibility 
can be attached only when the person committing a criminal act has the pre-requisite state of 
mind capable not only of comprehending his actions, but also of controlling them.  
The concept behind criminal responsibility rulings involves the differing mental states 
that are related to the crimes committed, while also considering the evaluations that 
determine the mental states that are related to these crimes, as well as to commonly 
associated legal defences.290 Criminal responsibility refers to the ability of an individual to 
understand his conduct at the time when a crime occurs or is committed.291 It basically 
concerns a person’s manner of thinking when he commits a particular crime. For example, if 
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when the defendant killed person X, did he know that he was going to kill him? Did he plan 
to kill him? Also, did he know that he was killing X? A guilty or culpable mental state has an 
essential element in most so-called “core” crimes, such as assault and murder (so-called 
“strict liability” crimes do not require a particular mental state and, for that reason, are 
controversial). 
As Duff puts it, the term “criminal responsibility” frequently invokes discussions of 
control and knowledge. For instance, if an individual walks down a hall and knocks over a 
vase and breaks it, he is not morally responsible, unless he was in a position to control the 
knocking over of the vase, and was aware that the actions he took would end with a broken 
vase, and proceeded to act nevertheless.292 
          Responsibility in criminal law is an essential element when deciding whether or not 
someone is fit to stand trial, and also whether that individual was sane or insane during the 
commission of the crime. We begin with the assumption that everyone is responsible. 
However, we do recognise that while this is the general rule, there are exceptions. An 
individual may be too young to be responsible or may have some defect in reasoning or 
mentality that precludes responsibility.293 
           The term “criminal responsibility,” it is said, is a purely legal question.294 The 
implication of this is that criminal responsibility is determined by the law of the land. It 
makes sense, thus, that in England and Wales, the age of criminal liability is set at ten years 
old, in Scotland it was at eight (however, the Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scotland) Act 
2019 raised it to twelve), and in Northern Ireland at ten.295 The concept, however, is not 
associated with age for the sake of technicality, but because of deeper reasons. Age and 
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mental competence, or sanity, both presuppose that a person understands his actions and their 
consequences.296 A very young child or an insane person lacks this capacity. Since mens rea, 
which refers to states such as intention and recklessness, requires a mature level of thinking, 
criminal responsibility does not attach to those whose minds are too young or too ill to grasp 
the gravity of their actions.297  
          Criminal responsibility is, thus, closely associated with mens rea, therefore, the 
criminal justice system does not attach criminal responsibility to children who are too young 
to understand criminal law, and persons who may be of mature age but suffer from a severe 
disorder of the mind resulting in lacking the ability to rationally grasp the law.298 Such an 
individual is not a free choosing human being, and is not capable of identifying or making a 
rational choice. 
3.6. General Requirements for Criminal Responsibility 
This chapter focuses in detail on the elements of actus reus and mens rea, and relative 
to the latter, the concept of strict liability. As will be seen, the concept of strict liability can be 
very disadvantageous to people suffering from some form of mental disability that hinders 
them from fully understanding or controlling their actions. 
          The execution of criminal law is carried out in a way that reasonable judgments are 
made to rebuff those individuals who have committed violations of the law.299 Warranted, that 
is justifiable actions or excused acts, are not considered crimes.300 Blameworthiness, and in 
contrast praiseworthiness, underscores the moral element of criminal law, as emphasised by 
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Harry Kalven in 1955.301 In being blameworthy, the accused must be to blame with respect to 
the charges that the prosecution has presented before the court.302 Blameworthiness, and even 
praiseworthiness, its opposite concept, however, do not have a single meaning or connotation, 
but may be interpreted in various ways, depending on their use and under the circumstances 
of the case.303   
          With regard to intention and capacity, it is important to consider whether the individual 
is disabled in a legal capacity. The mental condition of the suspect is assessed with respect to 
the crime that they have committed. As noted by Morse, the question of why a person has 
committed a crime can be answered in two ways; either referring to the offender’s intentions, 
or by an explanation of the natural factors behind the crime.304 
Of central importance in the study of criminal responsibility is the line drawn between 
the concepts of mens rea and actus reus. Actus reus, as a criminal liability requirement, refers 
to the actual or physical act of committing the crime. The implication of the actus reus 
concept is that criminal liability is absent unless there is a voluntary act, and that such an act 
is objective and external (causation must exist between the individual’s act and criminal 
conduct). 
Mens rea, in short, refers to the “guilty mind,” which most often relates to 
intentionality (or sometimes recklessness). This means that the individual is capable of 
making a rational choice and intends to act as he did. Criminal responsibility usually requires 
evidence of a guilty mind.305 Criminal law is traditionally anchored on the principle that 
human beings are capable of acting on reasons, understanding values, and distinguishing 
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between right and wrong.306 A person who commits an act of sufficient seriousness as to be 
criminalised, voluntarily, and with the knowledge that it will cause harm, is thus a candidate 
for criminal liability.307 According to this definition, there are several instances in which some 
wrongful acts will not pass as crimes in legal parlance. This is because although acts may 
cause harm to others, without the wrongdoer’s intent to cause that harm criminal liability is 
not attached. A wrongful act must usually be accompanied by criminal intent or mens rea in 
order to qualify as a crime.308  
          Mens rea is fundamental in proving that a crime was committed, as it helps to ensure 
that the mental culpability of the defendant is proportional to the provided punishment.309 
Actus rea and mens rea are both necessary constituents of a crime.310 This is actually based on 
a maxim “actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” – an act by a person cannot be judged 
to be guilty if the mind of the person is not also guilty.311 According to the US Supreme Court, 
the necessity of intent as a requirement in criminal liability is not a “provincial or transient 
notion,” but is founded and anchored on more mature systems of rule.312 Indeed, a physical act 
alone is insufficient to convict crime.313 However, this is true most of the time, but not all of 
the time, because of the strict liability offences.  
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Strict liability offences skip the mens rea requirement of criminal liability.314 In this 
type of criminal offence, a specific actus reus is a prerequisite to conviction without the 
necessity of proving mens rea. This is why retributivists argue that criminal strict liability is 
about “punishing the blameless.”315 Ultimately, criminal strict liability is not concerned with 
the offender’s morality in terms of criminal responsibility.316 As a result, strict liability will 
not involve the submission of evidence demonstrative of the defendant’s state of mind, 
motives, or intentions at the time of the commission of the offence.317 
3.7. Criminal Responsibility: Contextual Issues 
This section discusses the circumstances regarding who, what, why, and when, 
criminal responsibility applies. This discussion requires an examination of the contexts in 
which criminal responsibility may apply or may be excluded. Criminal responsibility flows 
from what Dworkin refers to as a “second class” of moral responsibility.318 According to 
Dworkin, there are two types of moral responsibility. The first is based on personal values 
and beliefs and cannot be forced on others. The second can be forced on others for the 
protection of society as a whole.319 Thus, when we speak of secondary moral responsibility 
we are thinking of criminal law, and therefore, criminal responsibility.  
Criminal responsibility assumes that we are all potentially ‘criminally responsible’ to 
‘our fellow citizens,’ and when we commit crimes we are required to assume responsibility or 
to ‘answer to them, through the criminal courts, for our alleged criminal wrongs.’320 Even so, 
criminal responsibility in the context of calling to account, requires an understanding of what 
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constitutes responsibility. Criminal law distributes blame and only when responsibility is 
established through capacity, voluntariness, mens rea and actus reus, can one be called to 
account. The question, therefore, centres on who can be called to account? 
Criminal responsibility assumes that only those human beings capable of responding 
to reasons can be called to account.321 Therefore, capacity, voluntariness, mens rea and actus 
reus are the requirements of criminal responsibility. The concept of the normal person as a 
responsible agent in criminal law is the individual who does not fit the criteria for “insanity,” 
“diminished” or “partial responsibility.”322 Unless it is a crime of strict liability, criminal 
responsibility and culpability require consideration of the mental state, including the ability to 
form “purpose,” have “knowledge,” intention, or just recklessness as to the consequences of 
one’s act.323 Still, questions of criminal responsibility and culpability do not end at the 
intersection of mental normalcy and abnormality. 
A test is applied for determining whether criminal responsibility or culpability is 
appropriate in a particular case. This requires the application of a test which determines 
whether the human agent was acting within “reason” or responding to “reason.”324 The result 
is a reasonable man standard for culpability and responsibility in criminal law systems 
globally.325 An individual will not incur responsibility if he is found to be incapable of acting 
rationally, which usually applies in cases where the individual successfully pleads insanity.326 
Responsibility is intricately tied to concepts of justice: distributive justice (rewards 
and non-penal forms of justice) and retributive justice (penal responses to misconduct).327 In 
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criminal law, individual justice is applicable to those found responsible for their criminal 
behaviour. Determining satisfactory justice typically involves an assessment of the 
consequences of behaviour and of culpability, the seriousness of the crime, the correct 
punishment, and matching the crime with the punishment.328 Consequences and culpability 
are only considered when responsibility is determined, which means assessing 
“responsibility” and therefore, determining whether or not the acts alleged were within the 
“knowledge” and “control” of the accused.329 
Knowledge and control within the context of criminal responsibility are founded on 
the basis of ascertaining whether or not the accused has acted in a way that “an ordinary 
reasonable man” would have behaved in the same set of circumstances, and would have 
reasonably foreseen the consequences of that behaviour.330 In H. L. A. Hart’s general doctrine 
of responsibility, the elements of knowledge, reasonable foresight, and mens rea, are coupled 
with voluntary action and omission.331 Therefore, criminal responsibility is constructed around 
the idea of the person who is capable of thinking and acting rationally, but for one reason or 
another does not.332 
The first step in establishing responsibility is volition or voluntariness, and this 
usually means establishing that the accused has acted deliberately, rather than inadvertently, 
with knowledge or foresight of consequences.333 One example is the individual who 
voluntarily becomes intoxicated and drives which results in a road traffic accident, causing 
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the death of another.334 The voluntary act of drinking, aware of the dangers of doing so while 
driving, establishes responsibility. 
Voluntariness therefore enables the individual human agent to acquire criminal 
responsibility.335 This is because if an individual lacks the ability to make rational choices, his 
actions are involuntary.336 By implication, if irrational choices are made voluntarily by a 
rational actor, and those actions amount to criminal behaviour, criminal responsibility is 
attached to the actor. Basically, rationality requires that criminal responsibility occurs when 
the individual is rational and has made a voluntary and reasoned choice to commit the crime 
or crimes in question.337 
   In all cases, blameworthiness or criminal responsibility will be established where the 
actus reus is present and the defendant was not acting in response to a hard choice or acting 
because of a pre-existing or a concurrent non-culpable irrational state of mind.338 The hard 
choice standard refers to a scenario where the individual is forced to choose to commit a 
criminal act.339 The implications are that the defendant is not exercising free choice. 
Therefore, unless the individual with the requisite mental capacity is acting under duress, or, 
in some jurisdictions, necessity – where the choice is one that a reasonable person would 
make – there is an absence of hard choice and, given rational capacities, criminal 
responsibility will exist.340  
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Irrationality usually refers to a mental disorder which prohibits reasoning. Mental 
disorders can be used in criminal law in order to counter the requirement of voluntary and 
intentional criminal conduct. The lack of rationality or a “defect of reason” has been 
described by the UK’s House of Lords as a “disease of the mind,” and certainly not a 
condition that would permit the defendant to simply be acquitted and resume his life as if 
nothing had happened.341 Generally, the lack of rationality is required to be bad enough to 
warrant post-acquittal mental health treatment as a finding of insanity, and a disease of the 
mind does not entitle the defendant to an unqualified acquittal.342 Not just any mental illness 
will qualify as a lack of understanding of the nature of the act, or of what is right and what is 
wrong (see Chapter Five).343 
          This section discusses the contextual issues relative to establishing criminal 
responsibility. Two exculpatory conditions were discovered and discussed: hard choice 
(duress and necessity), and insanity/lack of mental capacity. The next section briefly 
examines the available defences in relation to criminal responsibility. 
3.8. Operation of Defences in Criminal Law 
Although a person may be adjudged as criminally liable for his actions, the law still 
presents him with the opportunity to escape punishment by offering evidence that could 
justify, excuse, and exculpate him. These are called defences and this section will discuss the 
role and nature of defences in the criminal justice system. However, it is also important to 
provide an outline as to how defences operate in criminal law, and at what stage of the 
proceeding they are relevant.  
As previously mentioned in this chapter, the Law Reform Commission confirms that 
the role of criminal law is the protection of society and its members from harmful and 
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dangerous behaviour, as well as the preservation of basic social values.344 It is not supposed to 
be an instrument of vengeance.345 To this end, criminal law has incorporated defences that 
could be used by persons or entities whose actions do not really merit a conviction.346 
Moreover, the availability of defences in criminal law is a manifestation of a fair, equitable 
and balanced mechanism, by which the state, on one hand, employs its resources to prove the 
guilt of an accused in the pursuit of its role, which is the maintenance of peace and order in 
society; and the accused, on the other, is given the opportunity to present legally recognised 
reasons for his behaviour, so that the law can adjudge him as criminally blameworthy, or 
not.347 In fact, many defences are nothing more than resistance to criminal responsibility and 
these defences include insanity, automatism and infancy.348 
In order to convict a criminal defendant, the prosecutor has the task of proving that 
the respondent has committed the crime without any reasonable doubt, where the probability 
of the judgment being right is very high.349 In other words, crimes are composed of a criminal 
act, a criminal intent (and the shortage of lawful justification or excuse). The quantum of 
proof required for the purpose of conviction in a criminal case is BRD (as previously stated).  
Aside from the beyond reasonable standard of proof, the criminal justice system 
allows the accused to mount a defence based on various other legal principles in criminal law. 
There are criminal law defences to criminal liability in civilised legal systems such as 
affirmative defences, necessity, self-defence, intoxication, error of law, mistake of fact, and 
so forth.  
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Insanity is a form of defence that is used in criminal cases where the defendant seeks 
to prove that he was not acting rationally when he committed the criminal act.350 Morse 
argues that since the law is a system of rules that guides and governs how people interact, the 
people expected to follow it must be able to use it practically in their deliberations.351 Clearly, 
insane persons lack the capacity to think rationally (see Chapter Five). 
The insanity defence prevents people with certain mental disorders from being 
criminally punished if the occurrence of the criminal act is directly related to the state of 
mind of the defendant during the commission of the crime.352 A defendant who suffers from a 
mental disorder can, therefore, defend himself by arguing that the sole reason for the 
commission of the specific crime was because he was not in his right mind (although the 
precise legal rules and definition of insanity will differ by jurisdiction).353 Gulayets notes that 
for the insanity defence to stand, there is a need to for a consensus to be agreed between 
psychiatrists who often do not understand jurisprudence, and the judge and prosecution who 
are more likely to misunderstand the psychiatric discourse.354  
Insanity as a defence may have a two-fold function. One is to prevent non-dangerous 
persons from being punished, and the other is to prevent the punishment of morally innocent 
persons.355 The philosophy behind the insanity defence rests on the notion that there is a basic 
difference between a person who is mentally equipped with the ability to fully understand the 
wrongness of their actions, and the person who cannot comprehend the nature of his actions 
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or has no control over them.356 In the first, it is only fair that he suffers the consequences of 
his action – which is to be punished in accordance with the law. In the second, it is neither 
fair nor equitable to impose sanctions under the law.357 Such a person cannot be subjected to 
aversive measures, such as incarceration, but only measures where the goal of which is to 
keep him isolated in order to keep society safe.358     
          Automatism is another defence in criminal law (see Chapter Six). Under English law, a 
thin line is drawn between automatism and insanity, so that the reform of one usually entails 
the reform of the other.359 Automatism can either take the form of insane automatism or non-
insane automatism. Also, the related defence of intoxication, which may be defined as a 
condition in which a person loses control of his physical or mental faculties due to the 
consumption of intoxicants, such as liquor or drugs.360 It has been acknowledged that the use 
of alcohol or drugs temporarily impairs such faculties.361 The defence of intoxication, 
however, has no statutory law basis under English law.362 It may, however, be used by a party 
when his intoxication has substantially affected him and deprived him of subjective fault in 
committing an act. 363 The potential for the use of intoxication is dependent on the type of 
intoxication.364 
Self-defence is another defence that is allowed under the criminal justice system that 
bars criminal liability (see Chapter Seven). An important aspect of self-defence in a criminal 
case is the degree of the force used in effecting it. The force employed must be reasonable 
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and its reasonableness is anchored on necessity under the circumstances, and reasonableness 
under the circumstances.  
Diminished responsibility, which is referred to as diminished capacity in many US 
jurisdictions, is an important factor when it comes to any form of defence in criminal cases 
(see Chapter Eight). In the case of R v Bunch,365 the defendant was charged with murder, but 
notwithstanding overwhelming evidence against him, he pleaded not guilty to the charge. 
Instead, he offered the following line of defence: absence of premeditation or malice as he 
had consumed too much alcohol with some cocaine on the day in question. This defence is 
built on the principle of diminished responsibility. The court rejected this defence, however, 
although the fact that diminished responsibility is an acceptable defence in criminal law, it 
must be established first with sufficient evidence.366 The different factors that can support 
defence based on diminished responsibility includes medical records, witnesses and extreme 
scrutiny of the evidence presented to prove that the defendant committed a criminal act, 
because he was not in his right mind.367 It is important to note that mental disease is not 
defined in law, but is vaguely described as “abnormal conditions of the mind.”368    
          The remaining sections of the chapter present the various available defences (in detail) 
that PTSD sufferers (especially war veterans with PTSD) can resort to as their defence in the 
event that they are accused of a crime.  
3.9. Factors Undermining Criminal Responsibility  
For the purpose of building a case for war veterans using PTSD as a criminal defence, 
this section discusses the factors that might defeat criminal responsibility claims. According 
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to Morse, criminal responsibility and punishment are predicated on “free will, personhood, 
and action.”369 Ultimately, this means that the individual must have free will in deciding, and 
in taking a particular course of action, in order to have the requisite criminal responsibility. In 
fact, as Morse states ‘it is a commonplace that the assumption of free will is foundational for 
our criminal law responsibility doctrines and practices.’370 In other words, if an individual 
fails to have the requisite free will, he will not usually have the requisite mens rea necessary 
for finding criminal responsibility. 
Free will for finding criminal responsibility is founded on choice theorists’ 
presumption that human beings are ultimately responsible for the consequences of their free 
choices.371 Choice theorists take that position that defences can fall into two realms for 
reducing criminal responsibility – first, the individual may have decided to take certain action 
based on justification in the surrounding circumstances, which is typically a welfare reason, 
and secondly, the individual may have taken action based on the lack of free choice.372 
Relative to the subject of defences, there are factors that criminal law takes into 
consideration. This section is devoted to the discussion of these factors, which are usually a 
physical or mental condition that hampers the individual from fully grasping the nature of 
their act and its consequences.  
Perhaps the most commonly debated item is the mental condition of the individual 
that robs him of free will. The inability to tell the difference between right and wrong is well-
established in insanity defences, however, less commonly, other defences such as diminished 
responsibility can aid in partial defence. For instance, Dan White, who was charged with the 
murder of Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk (San Francisco-1978), was 
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able to escape a first-degree murder conviction on the basis of diminished responsibility. 
Accordingly, it was determined that White could not tell the difference between right and 
wrong because of “a major mood disturbance.”373 
Essentially, if the defendant has a mental condition that makes it impossible to say 
with a degree of certainty that he was fully aware of the action he was taking and of its 
consequences, then it is not possible to conclude that he acted with free choice and free will. 
The question for the court will then be whether or not the defendant should be held criminally 
responsible and to what degree.  
As discussed previously, a person suffering from insanity is not criminally responsible 
for his actions. This is based on the notion that an insane person does not have the capacity to 
understand or distinguish between right and wrong, and therefore is unable to exercise free 
will and to make a competent choice of actions. A mental illness that is so severe that it 
interferes with free will cannot, therefore, ground responsibility.374 However, it is not insanity 
itself, whether temporary or permanent, but the symptoms of insanity that may determine 
whether criminal responsibility attaches.375 
There are several factors that can undermine responsibility. One of the factors 
discussed by Feld is the age of the suspect, arguing that juvenile criminal offenders should be 
recognised as normal criminals in the justice system, and not be taken to juvenile courts.376  
He argues that the difference between underage offenders and adult offenders is experience, 
maturity of judgment, and exposure to peer influence, but he notes that most of these factors 
are generic.377 
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Automatism is one of the conditions that negates criminal responsibility. 
Characterised by unconscious behaviour or a lack of awareness that he is acting in a certain 
way. Criminal responsibility is negated in automatism because it impairs the voluntary aspect 
of the actus reus manifested in the loss of total voluntary control, and more importantly, the 
lack of consciousness which affects the ability of the mind to competently understand or 
grasp the body’s actions.378 
Diminished capacity, therefore, undermines criminal responsibility because the 
defendant lacks complete control of his mental functioning due to the presence of a medical 
condition.379 The factor affecting criminal responsibility is the mindset of the accused during 
the time he committed the act. 
3.10. Justification Defences that Negate Criminal Responsibility 
This section discusses the concept of justification as used in criminal law, particularly 
in the area of defence. All of the defences discussed earlier fall within the ambit, or umbrella, 
of a larger category of defence, which are differentiated by the focus of the defence, and the 
manner in which liability is evaded.  
The accused, or the defendant, still has a way out to escape liability in the form of the 
defences discussed earlier. Not all defences have the same impact on the case.380 A group of 
defences are called justification defences, and the effect of these defences is to justify the 
actions of the actor, so that even if the elements of the crime have been established, the actor 
still escapes liability because the action, although criminal, was the right thing to do under 
the circumstances.381 Thus, the circumstances in themselves have made the otherwise 
criminal act acceptable.  
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Justification defences essentially work by having the defendant accept the 
commission of the offence, but then offer evidence to prove that the action was justified 
because he had a right to do so, or had a duty or obligation to do so.382 Thus, according to 
Greenwalt, the core of a justification, as used in criminal law, is warranted action.383 
However, George Fletcher provoked much interest in the subject of justification and its 
central distinguishing character through his extensive discussion of the subject. Among the 
factors attached by Fletcher to the notion of justification is association to morally right and 
good conduct, but not to tolerable or permissible ones. He also made the following claims in 
relation to justification: in two contending parties, only one party can be justified; it 
implicates conduct that is objectively right; and justifications are universalised.384 An 
implication of these claims, among others, is that justification exists, not from the perspective 
of individuals, but from an established fact.  
Justification defences based on rights are self-defence, defence of others, and defence 
of property and necessity. Under English common law, these rights have long been embedded 
in the system. On the one hand, so long as the elements of these defences are fully met, a 
person who has committed an otherwise criminal action is deemed not guilty of it.385 On the 
other hand, justification defences based on obligation or duty usually refer to actions taken by 
a person who is obliged under law to perform a certain act, and in the course of performing 
the duty commits an act that otherwise would be criminal.386 An example of this would be a 
police officer shooting a suspect in order to prevent him from killing another person. 
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3.11. Excuse Defences that Negate Criminal Responsibility 
Specific defences will be covered and discussed in later chapters. This section 
discusses the concept of excuse defences; their nature, moral underpinnings, and their 
philosophy, and will briefly explain the differences between the concepts of excuse defences 
and justification defences. 
   Excuse defences, like justifications, have elements that are both objective and also 
subjective. The distinction between these elements is while the former is the triggering 
element, the latter is the particular mental state that the actor must have in order for the 
excuse defence to be acceptable. In an insanity defence, for example, the triggering element 
is a confirmable medical diagnosis, showing that the actor suffers from a mental illness that 
should excuse him from the responsibility of carrying out the criminal act.387 On the other 
hand, the subjective element of the insanity defence is the mental state of the actor at the time 
that the criminal act was committed.388 
While justification defences zero in on facts and circumstances to negate the criminal 
liability of the accused, excuse defences take into account the personality of the accused.389 
Reznek puts it aptly when he suggests that in justification, the action is shown to be not evil, 
but in excuse, it is the person who is shown as not evil.390 This nature of excuse, as 
distinguished from justification, is perhaps the reason that there is a common understanding 
that morally speaking, excuse is not on the same level as justification.391 In justification, the 
actor has the right to act in the manner that they did, which was right under the 
circumstances, but in an excuse defence, the actor has no right to do what he has done, except 
                                                          
387 Lawrie Reznek, Evil or Ill?: Justifying the Insanity Defence (Routledge 1997) 11. 
388 Neal R. Bevans, Criminal Law and Procedure for the Paralegal (2nd edn, Cengage Learning 
2014) 377. 
389 Stanley Yeo (ed), Partial Excuses to Murder (Federation Press 1990) 262. 
390 Onder Bakircioglu, Self-Defence in International and Criminal Law: The Doctrine of Imminence 
(Routledge 2011) 25. 




that he cannot be blamed for it because of a particular condition or circumstance that pertains 
to him specifically.392 
Thus, in excuse defences a person is rendered not liable for his action because he has 
a condition that is disabling, which interferes with the person’s exercise of his free will, or the 
ability to control his conduct.393 This disabling condition stops the actor from being 
blameworthy and, therefore, he should not be punished.394 The defendant accepts and admits 
the charges, but is not blameworthy.395 
          Excuse defences can be divided into two categories. On one hand, there are those 
defences that are anchored on the inability of the actor to do the right thing because the 
situation precludes him from doing so. On the other hand, there are defences in which the 
actor suffers from a particular condition that impedes him from acting in accordance with the 
law.396 Nonetheless, there are excuse defences that can also be categorised as justification, 
which makes them straddle the line between justification and excuse. An example of this is 
the defence of provocation, which has elements of both categories of defences. Another 
problematic defence is duress, which seems to have a split personality in that most often it is 
categorised as an excuse, but sometimes a justification.397 
3.12. War Veterans with PTSD in the Realm of Criminal Law  
This section is necessary in order to establish how war veterans contract PTSD, and 
how it affects them, and thus, it begins the discussion of why war veterans with PTSD might 
be entitled to a defence in general in criminal courts. This section therefore introduces the 
specific issue of war veterans with PTSD that is then continued throughout the rest of the 
dissertation.  
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As we have seen, PTSD is an anxiety disorder that impairs both cognitive and 
behavioural functions.398  Considering that the APA recommends the use of antidepressants, 
such as selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors, clearly shows that PTSD is a mental 
condition.399 Most traumatic occurrences that cause people to suffer with PTSD are out of the 
hands of the defendants, and therefore, there is an argument that these people do not need to 
be condemned to prison sentences, but rather need help to get back to their normal lives.400 
PTSD in a combat population is likely to make them lapse and commit violent crimes with 
no self-control.401 For this purpose, it is important to understand how those persons with 
PTSD can think when acting. War veterans with PTSD must be allowed to present their 
defences so that the jury and the courts will understand the underpinnings of their actions.  
War veterans with PTSD arguably deserve less punishment because they have 
contracted PTSD during their service in the military. This kind of condition, and the 
circumstances in which it is acquired, automatically brings to mind the issue of the choosing 
human being. Obviously, the war veteran did not choose to have PTSD and the lack of 
control that comes with it. This alone leaves open the question of culpability. Just how 
culpable is an individual who incurs an illness while serving his country and his fellow 
citizens, and the illness causes criminal behaviour? Indeed, it is an established norm in some 
jurisdictions that military background alone is usually capable of supporting a plea or claim 
in mitigation.402 Still, when the war veteran is coupling military service with PTSD, it must 
be clear that the service in the military is linked to the trauma that brought about PTSD 
(absolute culpability is tenuous when the war veteran’s crime is a result of war-related 
PTSD). 
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An important issue that may emerge from this discussion is determining whether 
having a PTSD condition can be grounds for excusing criminal action. The obvious starting 
point is that the defendant’s violence is directly linked to PTSD, and without PTSD the 
violent behaviour would not have occurred. In other words, the defendant might successfully 
argue that his criminal behaviour is due to his mental disorder.  
The acquisition of PTSD while serving one’s country should be automatically 
considered as a defence and in mitigation in sentencing. There are two primary reasons for 
this suggestion. First, there is an established correlation between PTSD and crime which is 
prominent among war veterans.403 Clearly, some war veterans with PTSD would not turn to 
criminal activity if they did not have PTSD, and most likely they would not have PTSD had 
they not been exposed to the trauma of war.  
Secondly, lawyers and scholars equally are increasingly requesting changes that will 
permit war veterans with PTSD to receive special treatment in terms of defence and 
sentencing in criminal courts.404 This is very different from requesting that the status of war 
veterans alone should be permitted as a mitigating factor in sentencing. When we accept that 
there is a link between PTSD and military service, and that there is a further link between 
PTSD and criminal behaviour, an argument can be made for “less punishment” for war 
veterans with PTSD. However, our expectations are increased when the war veteran has 
contracted PTSD as a mental disorder that is linked to criminal behaviour. 
Reed points out that criminal responsibility is also a question of morality, as opposed 
to pure science. This is because criminal responsibility looks at the link between the offender 
and “the state,” the allocation of blameworthiness, and whether it is appropriate to publicly 
                                                          




condemn this individual.405 Thus, in considering the criminal responsibility of war veterans 
with PTSD, one must determine whether it is appropriate for the public to condemn them. 
War veterans with PTSD are hard cases. A hard case is a situation where the issues 
have not been determined by a strict set of rules, laws, practices, and policies.406 Thus, 
whether PTSD in a war veteran is a mitigating factor remains to be settled by the law and 
practice. Once the contexts in which criminal responsibility may apply, or may be excluded, 
are understood, it will be possible to gain greater insight into the circumstances under which 
PTSD may be exculpatory, or rather, a viable defence to criminal charges. At this stage, there 
is no doubt that PTSD is linked to violence and aggression. 
When we hear of war veterans with PTSD who have committed violent crimes, we 
hope to see results such as those achieved by war veteran Jessie Bratcher. Bratcher 
committed a killing while experiencing a flashback of the war (Oregon, in 2008, found him 
guilty of murder, but legally insane, and sent him to get treatment in hospital instead of 
prison). The court accepted the extenuating and mitigating circumstances (insanity defence 
based on PTSD). In an ordinary case, Bratcher would have stood trial for premeditated 
murder and his defence would not have been accepted.407 As a result, he received treatment 
rather than punishment via imprisonment. 
Alternatives to incarceration are necessary because an individual with a severe 
untreated mental condition cannot be expected to assume criminal responsibility for his 
actions. Many war veterans with PTSD do not receive treatment. This is also due to what 
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Duff refers to as “overcriminalization,” where far too many people are convicted when they 
should not be criminally responsible.408  
Taking into consideration the previous factors that have described a normal person, 
those suffering from PTSD, a condition known to render sufferers irrational at certain times, 
cannot be included within the ambit of “normal.” According to Steven Woodward et al., 
PTSD can be described as a ubiquitous psychological condition that causes functional 
impairment, especially when one is exposed to trauma reminders.409 Clearly, in the case of the 
commission of a criminal act by someone suffering from PTSD, it is crucial to consider on a 
case-by-case basis whether there had been an instance that provoked or “triggered” the 
accused. 
It is evident, however, that from the medical description of PTSD, the standard 
conditions set under the normal person, or a reasonable man, test cannot always apply 
without inflicting injustice and unfairness. An individual with PTSD who is hyper-vigilant 
and therefore prone to misperceiving threats and respond accordingly, is not acting as one 
would expect a reasonable man to act.  
Understanding the concept of criminal responsibility (as previously discussed) is 
important in understanding how PTSD sufferers should be treated under the criminal justice 
system. Is this individual a choosing human being? Is he capable of making a rational and 
reasoned choice when labouring under the symptoms of PTSD? The individual with PTSD 
cannot always be expected to act like the ordinary man, and as such should not always be 
treated as the ordinary man when considering and determining criminal responsibility. This 
brings up the point made by Fischer about moral responsibility including a historical 
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element.410 For example, a drunk driver who was involuntarily intoxicated and one that was 
voluntarily intoxicated may be assumed to have the same responsibility at the time of their 
respective accidents, since they are both driving under the influence when the accidents 
occur. However, when you go back in history, you will discover that one driver’s intoxication 
was forced.411 This argument also shows that when we go back into the history of some 
veterans with PTSD, we will discover that their criminal behaviour, although similar to other 
criminals, is different because of their PTSD; a condition acquired prior to the commission of 
the crime, and separate and apart from it. 
In a bid to understand the use of PTSD as a criminal defence, and whether it is a 
viable option, the critical question is whether PTSD is an excuse, or a cause of a behaviour. 
According to Morse, the only way that a cause can be used as an excuse is if the cause made 
the individual lose their ability to act rationally.412  
The war veteran defendant with PTSD will strive to persuade the court that he was not 
acting out of choice, and therefore is not criminally liable for the offence. Obviously, the 
individual’s argument rests on the presumption that while suffering from the symptoms of 
PTSD, he was not a choosing human being. For example, that he was in a state of fugue in 
which he was segregated from reality, to the point that he really believed he was confronting 
a threat. Most of these fugue states arise out of reliving the trauma that caused PTSD. In line 
with these factors, an extensive discussion of the nature of PTSD was undertaken in Chapter 
Two in order to align its symptoms with some of the factors undermining criminal 
responsibility. The following chapters will also locate PTSD within the context of these 
defences.  
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In conclusion, it is evident that PTSD sufferers have to choose between the categories 
of defences, and that in the main, they seek refuge under the excuse defences. This is because 
in most cases, the inability of PTSD sufferers to comply with the law stems not from the facts 
or circumstances, but from emotional and mental disturbance brought about by the 
experience of a traumatic event in the past. 
It has been established in this study that PTSD is empirically linked to criminal 
behaviour (PTSD drives individuals’ behaviour). It has also been established in the literature 
that PTSD is linked to higher risks of re-offending. In other words, PTSD is linked to the 
offender’s first criminal behaviour, and the criminal behaviour that follows. It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that for most cases, war veterans with PTSD would not be criminals, 
and very likely would not have PTSD, had they not been participants in the military in a war 
situation.  
Rational choice theory, which assumes that human beings make rational choices, 
makes a very strong case for separating war veterans with PTSD and PTSD sufferers in 
general from ordinary defendants. More often than not, the PTSD sufferer will be triggered 
by stimuli that transport him back in time to a traumatic situation. Typically, the PTSD 
sufferer finds himself reliving the war experience or the trauma that caused their PTSD, and 
in doing so, his reality is transformed to a fanciful atmosphere of terror. His actions are in 
response to this perceived terror.  
In such a case, it is impossible to conclude that the PTSD sufferer is acting out of free 
will and free choice. While his choices may appear to be entirely rational to him, they are 
irrational from the perspective of the ordinary citizen who is not burdened by a mental 
malady. It therefore stands to reason that PTSD sufferers (or war veterans) who act on the 
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basis of triggers, and due to the symptoms of PTSD, can make strong cases for escaping 





Chapter Four: Special Status of 
War Veterans with PTSD 
4.1. Introduction 
When we think of war veterans, we often assume that they should be treated 
differently by the criminal justice system due to their service. This is especially true when the 
defendant is a war veteran with PTSD which is linked to the war experience. The fact that a 
defendant’s status as a war veteran alone can invoke questions about mitigation demonstrates 
that alternatives to punishment may come into play when a war veteran with PTSD is brought 
before the courts. For instance, in Bell v Cone (2002), the US Supreme Court ruled that a 
failure to use substance abuse in mitigation for a war veteran could in fact amount to 
ineffectiveness of counsel.413 This ruling creates a question surrounding the judiciary’s view 
of war veterans and their entitlement to special status.  
This part of the chapter is concerned with the extent to which the mere fact of war 
veteran status is enough to invoke the philosophies in support of alternatives to punishment, 
especially for the war veteran with PTSD. Therefore, this part of the chapter deals with the 
status of war veterans and what this means.  
Of particular concern is the fact that war veterans with PTSD are in a “special 
category,” because they are not merely war veterans, but war veterans with permanent strains 
and scars from their own personal military experience. The question for consideration is, 
therefore, whether the terms of service should matter when considering whether these war 
veterans should acquire the official status of war veteran. 
The official status of war veteran is very important because it determines the extent to 
which a soldier can seek treatment and aid for his adjustment to civilian life in the post-
deployment era. While it is thought that merely serving time in the military should be 
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sufficient for obtaining veteran status, this is not necessarily true. This part of the chapter 
therefore examines the status of war veterans and makes a case for why the quantity and 
quality of service should not matter for obtaining this status.  
This part of the chapter also emphasises the special position of war veterans with 
PTSD and how they require some degree of “leniency.” The war veteran has made sacrifices 
for the life and freedom of his countrymen. This alone requires some degree of 
“appreciation.” When the veteran is the victim of a life altering injury such as PTSD, we 
might consider his status as “special,” even more. However, the case for mitigating at 
sentence (or for a defence) is based on the connection between PTSD and military 
experience, as well as on the link between PTSD and the crime for which the war veteran 
seeks leniency. Ultimately, this part of the chapter examines the status of war veterans with 
PTSD as a pathway toward alternative punishments (such as hospital treatment or community 
service), that will benefit war veterans, their families, and society in the long-term. 
4.2. Status of War Veterans 
  To begin with this section calls direct attention to what veteran status is, how it is 
achieved, how veteran status may be lost, and what the benefits of veteran status actually are. 
In a typical case, a veteran is an individual who has previously served in the military.  
However, the acquisition of veteran status is not as straightforward as it seems. There are 
different boundaries and limitations to relying on previous service in order to support a 
designation of veteran status. This part of the chapter sheds light on just what veteran status 
means. 
  When we think of war veterans, we think of them as the heroes of war. For example, 
following the First World War, there was a sense of “patriotism” which was reflected in the 
108 
 
honoring of the soldiers who fought the war.414 Whether a veteran fought in the war or not is 
beside the point. When the individual signed up for the military, he was certainly prepared to 
participate in war, and therefore, veteran status should not depend on whether the soldier was 
engaged in combat during his service.   
  Veteran status, however, is achieved differently depending on what country the 
soldier served. For instance, to qualify for veteran status in the US, the military service 
member must have been involved in active duty for at least two years or a period of ordered 
active duty, and have been “discharged under conditions other than dishonourable.”415 In 
England, a veteran is quite different. Veteran status is bestowed on any individual who is 16 
years old or older, who has “served at least one day” in the military.416 Veteran status is 
conferred by the British to those who were not part of the British military. For instance, 
veteran status is accorded to anyone who served in Poland’s past forces under the Command 
of the British during the Second World War, and who served as Merchant Marines during 
that war’s military operations.417 
It would therefore appear that qualifying for veteran service in the US is far more 
difficult than it is in England. Any amount of military service in England will suffice to 
obtain veteran service, whereas in the US, a veteran with one year’s service may not be 
entitled to veteran status. In fact, a veteran with many years in military service will be 
disqualified if he was dishonorably discharged. This is an unfortunate disqualifier because the 
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veteran may have been dishonourably discharged due to a mental illness or a breakdown 
which was directly related to his military service. This brings us to the question of how 
veteran status may be lost. 
Veteran status can be lost despite years of service and sacrifice. As Moulta-Ali and 
Panangala stated, any dishonourably discharged veteran is not eligible for veteran services. 
Individuals are routinely discharged dishonourably for misconduct.418 This is because the US 
military seeks punishment over treatment for veterans who end up on the wrong side of the 
law, regardless of their mental health status.419 The loss of veteran status is significant 
because as a veteran there are benefits. It is important to look at what the benefits are for 
those who have achieved veteran status. 
For instance, in the US, mortgages, tax exemptions, and immigration tend to benefit 
war veterans to a much greater extent than they benefit the ordinary citizen.420 Veteran court 
systems, which operate across the USA, are only available to those who have the officially 
recognised status of war veteran or active service member.421 Veterans may receive federal 
assistance, such as VA pensions, if they have served at least three months in the military. 
However, at least one of those service days has to have been during a war.422 Therefore, if a 
veteran has served for three days during which there was no war, he will not qualify for the 
federal VA pension in the US. 
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England takes the position that how you treat veterans will determine recruitment 
outcomes for future veterans, and therefore, England’s definition of “veteran” is relaxed in 
order to ensure that valuable aid reaches all service members during and after active duty.423 
By taking this approach, England grants a special status to all those who serve. In the US, the 
practice comes across as though service is a privilege instead. This impression stems from the 
fact that it is rather difficult to achieve veteran status in the US compared to England.   
     In England, the Royal British Legion is the largest charity supporting war veterans, 
and it also puts pressure on the government to improve pensions, housing, and so on, for war 
veterans and their partners and spouses.424 Veterans and their dependents in the UK are 
entitled to child benefit, sick pay, military and personal independence payments, maternity 
leave, job-seekers allowance, and tax concessions.425 
Having discussed what veteran status is, and how it is achieved, how it might be lost, 
and its benefits, we can reasonably draw some conclusions as to why the status of war 
veteran is important. There is a paucity of literature on veteran status which is surprising 
given how important it is to the post-deployment life of veterans who require assistance with 
adjusting to civilian life all over again. For many, returning to civilian life is a challenge 
because their lives may have been altered significantly. 
Veterans returning to civilian life after a period of deployment who are suffering from 
physical and/or psychological injuries will benefit from all the help they can get. For 
instance, a veteran with lost limbs will need support and care from professionals and 
relatives. A veteran with a psychological illness will also have many adjustments to make and 
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will also benefit from professional and familial support and care. Without the status of 
veteran, the individual will have limited resources available. This is very unfortunate because 
both the physically and psychologically injured war veteran is returning to resume their 
previous civilian lives while now significantly impaired. 
There is obviously no doubt that the status of war veteran is important because it 
determines whether the individual in question can receive the military and government 
funded aid necessary for relocation, treatment, and other welfare programmes in civilian 
society. In England, a veteran attains this status after only one day of service, and it makes no 
difference whether he was dishonourably discharged. This is significant because, as stated 
above, the war veteran returns to England with a range of benefits. However, in the US, there 
are time limits, conditions, and discharge requirements. What this means is that a veteran in 
England who is suffering from a war related trauma will have no problem receiving the 
necessary aid. On the other hand, a veteran in the US will have a range of obstacles obtaining 
treatment and welfare services.  
4.3. War Veterans as a Special Category 
Any individual who serves in the military for any length of time, and regardless of the 
reason for discharge, deserves to be recognised. At least in England this is the accepted 
standard for recognising that veterans are a special category of civil servants. In the US, this 
status is only recognised if the war veteran officially serves during a war, and for a limited 
period of time, and is discharged honourably. In this regard, only war veterans with a specific 
quality are deserving of special recognition in the US. In England, serving in the military is 
enough to confer special status on war veterans. 
 According to a report by the American Civil Liberties Union in California, a veteran’s 
special category in the US is eradicated after just one mistake. Regardless of how long the 
veteran has served, and in doing so has given up his freedom and risked sacrificing his life, 
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all of this is overlooked when the veteran commits a crime upon return to civilian life. If the 
veteran is an immigrant, he will not only be punished for the crime, but will also be 
deported.426 
As claimed by Dieter, war veterans who since returning home have committed grave 
criminal offences present the criminal justice system with a complicated dilemma.427 Dieter 
goes on to explain that: 
        ‘The violence that occasionally erupts into murder can easily overcome the special  
         respect that is afforded most veterans. However, looking away and ignoring this issue  
         serves neither veterans nor victims.’428 
There is no doubt that war veterans have sacrificed for their countries, and as such are 
deserving of special recognition. What the public fails to understand, due to a lack of 
academic attention, is the fact that the sacrifices among soldiers are not shared equally. Some 
veterans serve on the front lines, while others are deployed to post-war missions or 
peacekeeping missions, where obviously the threat to life is different, and therefore the 
sacrifices are not equally shared. 
There is some evidence that how soldiers are deployed in terms of risk and sacrifice 
may be related to the soldier’s status in society. In a study involving half a million war 
casualties among American soldiers, it was discovered that the overwhelming majority were 
soldiers from the poorer parts of the US.429 In other words, poorer American soldiers make 
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more sacrifices than wealthier American soldiers.430 Still, in the US, a war veteran’s special 
category of citizenship will not be decided on the basis of actual sacrifice, but rather on the 
basis of good behaviour and length of service. 
Gates, Holowka, Vasterling, Keane, Marx, and Rosen point out that PTSD is linked to 
many debilitating consequences for both war veterans and soldiers in active duty. The 
consequences of PTSD for combat soldiers and veterans are costly for the affected individual, 
their family members, and for society as a whole. The actual PTSD sufferer experiences some 
significant difficulties in areas such as finding and keeping jobs, marriage and domestic 
problems, legal problems, and health problems.431 
The problem is two-fold. First, war veterans acquire PTSD in service of their country 
in a way in which they have risked their lives and health in the process.432 Secondly, in the 
course of this brave and sacrificial service, many war veterans have been inflicted with 
PTSD. The data collected in the literature reveals that more than 800,000 war veterans from 
Vietnam ended up with PTSD. Approximately 175,000 soldiers participating in Operation 
Desert Storm were also PTSD sufferers. More than 300,000 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan 
have PTSD (further examples and literature were examined in Chapter Two).433 
The sacrifices that soldiers make are not limited to combat or the risk of combat. 
Soldiers basically lend their lives to a strict regimen, and in the meantime are separated from 
their families. These soldiers miss key milestones in their children’s development, also often 
missing the birth of their children. Soldiers spend important family holidays away from their 
families in isolated situations.  
Communication with loved ones is restricted, so that there are periods of time when 
the soldier has no-contact at all. In the meantime, families and loved ones who go through 
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these periods of no-contact are concerned that their loved one is either missing in action or 
dead. Every knock on the door is an alarm bell and a warning that an official could be about 
to report the death of the loved one who is serving in the military.  
According to Bird, war transforms the character of the individual soldier. Individuals 
who live normal lives suddenly find themselves ‘living in unprecedented situations and 
enduring hardships with great calm and utter fearlessness.’434 The character transformation 
may very well create a criminal who, but for the war experience, may have never committed 
a crime. Since the decision to go to war was instigated by the state, it is only fair that the state 
accepts some responsibility for the war veteran’s post-war criminal behaviour.  
A case can be made for exploring whether the individual veteran who served based on 
the standards offered in the US or in England, should be entitled to the status of veteran 
which should automatically involve some degree of leniency for criminal charges. In other 
words, it is worthwhile considering that a broad definition of “veteran” should be adopted, so 
that more veterans suffering from PTSD can make a case for a more lenient sentence. Still, 
the question in this chapter asks is why? By virtue of what do states treat war veterans 
(including, but not limited) to those with PTSD, as special? 
4.4. Status of War Veterans with PTSD 
It is worthwhile exploring the assumption that war veterans with PTSD should occupy 
a “special status.” This is because war veterans with PTSD have two special mitigating 
factors: they are individuals whose service compels us to be grateful, and also they are 
suffering from a mental disability.435 Surely, if a victim can forgive any offender, it would be 
the war veteran with PTSD. Forgiveness is important because it promotes healing.436 Healing 
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is something both victims and war veterans with PTSD can benefit from. However, in the US, 
much will depend on whether the soldier is a qualified veteran, otherwise he will be regarded 
as nothing more than a criminal if he commits a crime. This is the case regardless of whether 
the war veteran is suffering from PTSD at all. In the US, if a war veteran is dishonourably 
discharged, he will not be entitled to federal aid nor federally funded treatment for PTSD.  
The obstacles to war veteran status may therefore be linked to the lack of treatment 
for PTSD. As Cushing, Braun, Alden and Katz reported, ‘clinical and pharmaceutically based 
treatments are underutilized.’437 This may be because soldiers do not want to miss days off 
work with reduced or no pay at all. It may also be a reluctance to obtain treatment due to the 
stigma attached to mental illnesses.438 Still, failure to seek and receive treatment is costly, not 
only to the war veteran, but also his family and society.439 This is because the war veteran 
with PTSD is left with a greater difficulty attempting to adjust to post-deployment civilian 
life. In the meantime, his close friends suffer along with the veteran, and society loses out on 
a productive citizen in the war veteran disabled by untreated PTSD.440 
Thus, the status of the war veteran with PTSD is important for the war veteran’s post-
deployment experience, particularly with adjustment to civilian society, his family’s welfare, 
and for his status as a productive citizen for the good of society. The American Public Health 
Association describes the war veteran with mental illness and trauma as “vulnerable” 
members of the population.441 Obstacles to treatment for these war-related conditions only 
further compromise the post-deployment adjustment to civilian life for these war veterans. It 
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is therefore important for US officials (Congress/VA) to implement measures for improving 
this category of war veteran, so that they can seek and receive treatment.442  
Perhaps the US can learn from England, where veteran status is much easier to 
establish, and where there are twelve service providers that offer treatment for war veterans 
with PTSD.443 However, in the UK, the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 
reviewed the mental health consequences of combat. The Office concluded that there is a 
problem with correct diagnosis and treatment, and in addition to further research steps should 
be taken to understand, diagnose, and treat the offending war veterans.444 
Looking back at the lack of treatment, it can be assumed that the most important 
measure for improving access to treatment for veterans with trauma such as PTSD, would be 
to improve the qualifications for obtaining the status of veteran in the US. The status of 
veteran in the US should be as easy to achieve as it is in England. Anyone who has served 
their country for any period of time should be accorded veteran status, independent of the 
reason for discharge. Moreover, any individual soldier who acquired PTSD or any other 
illness, whether physical or mental, during deployment or service, should automatically 
acquire the status of war veteran. 
If these recommended changes are made to the definition and acquisition of the status 
of veteran, war veterans with PTSD will have significantly fewer barriers to diagnosis and 
treatment of PTSD. In the meantime, the criminal justice system can recognise the special 
status of war veterans with PTSD who succumb to the associated symptoms and commit 
crimes. Recognising the special status of war veterans who have incurred PTSD during their 
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service, the court should have the discretion to order treatment as an alternative to 
punishment. 
General strain theory reasonably provokes interest and concern about the status of the 
war veteran with PTSD. According to the general strain theory of criminal behaviour, 
individuals are more likely to act anti-socially if they have been confronted by trauma with 
negative consequences previously, usually in the form of “anger and irritability.” What’s 
more is that this theory is confirmed by research.445 Therefore, based on the general strain 
theory, a war veteran with PTSD is expected to act out in ways that amount to criminal 
offences. Therefore, with this status, one might generally expect that the state would take all 
of the necessary steps to get treatment for those afflicted. Thus, when PTSD comes to the 
attention of the state after a crime is committed this obligation should not cease. 
Hunter and Else came up with the PTSD defence theory which argues for the special 
treatment of those with the status of war veterans. According to Hunter and Else, war 
veterans with PTSD should benefit from this condition as a defence because they are placed 
in a position to defend themselves in ways that others with other mental maladies are not 
permitted to. The individual with the status of war veteran with PTSD can describe the 
trauma of war and the conditions that they were exposed to that caused PTSD. They can go 
on to describe just how these symptoms have impacted their behaviour.446  
An ordinary person cannot claim to have contracted PTSD while at war in the service 
of his country. The war veteran can do this and provide rich details of the war experience. It 
is therefore a plausible assumption to expect that war veterans with PTSD have a status that 
confers upon them a right to expect an outcome at trial that addresses more than the crime 
committed. This is expected due to the events leading up to the condition, and how those 
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events were relived and re-experienced at the time of the commission of the crime. In such a 
case, it is difficult to imagine how the PTSD experience and the war veteran factors do not 
combine to demand some form of leniency for the war veteran with PTSD. 
4.5. War Veterans with PTSD are a Special Category 
Conventional wisdom dictates that just as a minor may escape capital punishment, it 
makes sense to consider whether veterans with PTSD should also be accorded some degree of 
leniency for their crimes. There are two ways to make the case for this. To start with, it is a 
very difficult commitment (or a hard work) as the war veterans leave their home behind and 
enter a war zone, with no guarantees that they will return home alive or in good health. 
Secondly, once the war veteran returns home, he is promised aid that will make his recovery 
and relocation easier. When he returns home injured or with PTSD, his expectations should 
be higher (protection for the future, for example, by providing help finding housing or a job, 
and sometimes it helps by protecting war veterans from the full costs of criminality). 
Naturally, in support of these arguments, attention is turned to restorative justice and/or 
therapeutic jurisprudence under criminal justice theory.  
Perhaps the strongest case for restorative justice and/or therapeutic jurisprudence is 
the fact that criminal justice theory is aimed at accommodating the ordinary person’s 
understanding of justice.447 Both theories help us to come to an understanding that the war 
veteran who contracted PTSD during his military service, and committed a crime due to 
PTSD, is a special case because he sacrificed much in service and was harmed in ways that 
reflect that sacrifice. Therefore, the special status of veteran is earned and he deserves healing 
(restorative justice), and can therefore benefit from therapeutic jurisprudence. This trade-off 
makes sense because while dead soldiers are commemorated in ceremonies, the surviving 
soldier who is mentally and/or physically harmed by the war effort is systematically 
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forgotten.448 The trend for paying due respect and earned appreciation for military service, 
and honoring dead soldiers, while forgetting or neglecting the achievement of the surviving 
soldier, has been covered by three novels, Au revoir là-haut, Le Retour d’Ulysse and Le 
Réveil des morts on the subject that closely resemble reality.449 
This is one of those cases in which mercy is applicable. Mercy is a decisive factor 
which should be employed in certain cases when it is the right thing to do.450 One can make 
the argument that when a war veteran with PTSD commits a crime triggered by the 
symptoms of the condition, it is right and fair to render assistance for recovery rather that 
punishment. Punishing the war veteran with PTSD whose crime is connected to PTSD, which 
is in turn a war-related syndrome, is unfair and unjustifiable compared to the individual who 
deliberately and consciously commits a crime. The fact is, as previously discussed in Chapter 
Two, exposure to and experience with combat conditions has been consistently linked to 
PTSD. This is an important area of concern because there are many war veterans with PTSD, 
and those with this mental condition are also linked to homicide.  
In the case of the war veteran with PTSD, the order for treatment has a much more 
predictable outcome than an order for incarceration. An order for treatment virtually ensures 
that the war veteran with PTSD will adjust to civilian life more productively, and will likely 
not commit further crimes. This is because incarceration predictably means that the PTSD 
sufferer will not receive treatment. This is very important because PTSD has proved to be a 
major contributing factor to the risk of recidivism (as previously stated). 
A soldier who has been involved in an independent traumatic situation that causes 
PTSD should not be in the same position as the soldier who is involved in a military trauma 
that causes PTSD. There is an obvious difference. The war veteran who contracts PTSD due 
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to his war experience is a special case compared to the veteran who contracts PTSD from 
independent sources.  
Gansel argues that war veterans with PTSD deserve special treatment in terms of 
“extra attention and access to treatment.”451 As Gansel points out, the war veteran with PTSD 
deserves less punishment because of his sacrifices which is manifested in a mental condition 
as debilitating as PTSD.452 Still, we must be careful to ensure that we are not asking for 
leniency for the war veteran just because he has contracted PTSD during service. We are 
asking for leniency because the PTSD is a result of their service which has already required 
significant sacrifice. Thus, leniency is justified in this regard because the military contributes 
to the criminal consequences of PTSD. 
“Leniency” is necessary because these war veterans with PTSD can benefit from 
treatment and will only end up back in court at some later date if they are punished as 
opposed to treated (however, this is true of many people). It is up the criminal courts to take 
the position that war veterans with PTSD should receive less punishment and more treatment. 
This is unfortunate because there are service members who are discharged on account of 
PTSD-related behaviour, or those who did not serve for a long enough period of time. Thus, 
retributive theories of justice which seek to punish rather than rehabilitate are unsuited to war 
veterans with PTSD.453 This is demonstrated by the implementation and use of VTCs.454 
These courts are designed to circumvent retribution, with the focus being on rehabilitation 
instead.  
Huskey puts forward an argument for the special treatment of war veterans on the 
basis of restorative justice theory. Here, Huskey argues that war veterans with PTSD, 
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traumatic brain injury, and even substance abuse disorders, should all be under the 
jurisdiction of the VTC. This is because restorative justice theory is built around communities 
coming together in the form of the victim, the offender, and other stakeholders, with a view 
to restoring everyone to their original position where possible to promote healing and reduce 
recidivism.455 This is the ideal outcome for all war veterans, especially those with life-
altering conditions such as PTSD. 
Arno takes a similar position with regards to VTCs, arguing that based on the neo-
rehabilitation theory, there ought to be a move toward considering alternative methods of 
treating war veterans with PTSD who come into contact with the criminal justice system. 
These veterans should be subjected to the VTC which will aid the state in moving away from 
“mass incarceration” and take action, which is more in line with rehabilitative justice. After 
all, the purpose of criminal justice is to prevent recidivism and offending in the first place.456 
If a veteran with PTSD is punished rather than treated, it can result in additional veterans 
with PTSD refusing treatment and offending while those who are punished will be released to 
re-offend. The status of war veterans with PTSD can therefore be considered as special when 
determining the appropriate treatment in the criminal justice system. 
It is also possible to conclude that the war veteran with PTSD is in a special category 
due to his acquisition of a psychological injury during service to his country. The law of torts 
has been expanded and reformed to include psychological injuries and emotional distress.457 
War veterans with PTSD can be reasonably described as a special category of defendants. 
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This is because PTSD is caused by an external factor which alone garners much sympathy 
from tribunals of fact.458 
Moreover, as previously mentioned throughout this dissertation, especially in Chapter 
Two, Sparr, Reaves and Atkinson inform us that there is a proven link between the level of 
military combat involvement, PTSD, and criminal conduct.459 What this means is that a 
veteran who takes the greatest risk through combat is more likely to end up with PTSD, and 
in turn will more likely end up committing crimes. This connection with greater involvement 
in combat can arguably support a claim that the veteran in trouble with the law is entitled to 
the acquisition of special status. 
4.6. Treating War Veterans with PTSD differently from others 
When a war veteran signs up for the military, he is aware of the benefits that he can 
expect to receive upon retirement or following service (it is a part of the deal). These benefits 
may include pensions and access to healthcare service. These kinds of pay-offs and benefits 
become a part of the recruitment process. At the same time, these benefits do not include 
benefits for other war-related consequences, such as intermingling with crime and the 
criminal justice system. So, why ought a state treat war veterans with PTSD differently from 
others? 
According to Kinney, in the most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
psychological and physical damages incurred by soldiers who contract PTSD will require 
around 50 years of treatment for full recovery.460 Hence, any crime committed by war 
veterans with PTSD must be viewed as a part of the recovery process and point toward 
improved treatment and recovery aid.  
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War veterans with PTSD are a special category of individuals with this condition. 
This is because the war veteran had to have been exposed to a “life-threatening” or 
“extremely traumatic event,” and PTSD is a ‘psychological disorder that can have long-term 
psychological and behavioral effects.’461 PTSD is a linked to “life-threatening” or “highly 
traumatic events” in which the war veteran who was placed in the war effort finds that he is 
more likely to contract PTSD. This naturally raises the question of whether or not it is fair to 
treat war veterans with PTSD in the same way that we treat ordinary civilians who come into 
contact with the criminal justice system. Surely war veterans with PTSD deserve special 
consideration and treatment? 
The theory of neo-rehabilitation or an improved rehabilitation theory suggests that 
there should be pathways toward rehabilitating rather than punishing this category of 
defendants. The category of defendants that should benefit from rehabilitation strategies are 
those that can be rehabilitated.462 This puts war veterans with PTSD upfront because their 
PTSD relates to their service, and their crimes are related to their PTSD, for which they can 
be rehabilitated if properly treated.463 Therefore, according to the neo-rehabilitation theory, 
war veterans with PTSD deserve to be treated differently from other defendants because of 
the greater odds that they will be rehabilitated and less likely to re-offend.  
Beginning in 2002, “hundreds of thousands” of US soldiers returned to civilian life 
from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, with high rates of PTSD (this fact previously 
mentioned in Chapter Two).464 Right away, the mere fact that these PTSD sufferers return 
from a war with PTSD sets them apart from anyone else with PTSD, because the phrasing of 
this report indicates that the veterans did not have PTSD prior to going to war, and therefore 
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acquired PTSD while at war. Thus, one may accept that war veterans are in a special category 
of PTSD defendants since their condition was brought on by a war that was fought for the 
country in which their subsequent crimes were committed. 
In a case against an American war veteran (Massachusetts-2006), Daniel Cotnoir was 
acquitted by a jury in Salem (the jury obviously accepted the distinction between Cotnoir as a 
war veteran and other defendants). Cotnoir went on trial for attempted murder because he 
fired into a crowd outside a night club and injured two persons. According to Cotnoir’s 
testimony, he felt that he was “under attack” after someone threw a bottle through his house 
window. This is why he took out his gun and fired into the nearby crowd. The jury accepted 
that Cotnoir acted in self-defence.465 It is highly unlikely that a jury would accept this kind of 
response from an ordinary citizen. 
This does not mean that service alone should compensate the state for the crimes of 
war veterans with PTSD. What this means is that the country in which the crimes were 
committed must accept some responsibility for war veterans with PTSD who commit crimes. 
This is because most of the time, the war veteran with PTSD commits a crime when he 
relives the trauma of war. The war that traumatised the veteran and brought on PTSD was 
instigated by the state, and fought by the veterans on behalf of the state and its population. 
The commission of a crime while reliving this trauma separates the war veterans with PTSD 
from other defendants who deliberately and consciously commit crimes. 
 Actually, responding to the trauma of war in a way that includes the commission of a 
crime is also different from the defendant with PTSD. Although both sets of defendants are 
responding to triggers, rather than consciously setting out to commit criminal offences, the 
war veteran with PTSD is still different from the ordinary defendant with PTSD. The war 
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veteran is responding to triggers incurred while serving his country and putting his life in the 
line of fire. But for this sacrifice on behalf of the state, the defendant would not have PTSD 
and would probably not have committed a crime at all. Other PTSD sufferers were not 
making a sacrifice for the most part but may, for example, have been caught up in a natural 
disaster during a vacation, or while at work in a private enterprise.  
War veterans, on the other hand, are constantly subjected to traumatic events while 
fighting a war. What makes war veterans with PTSD special, and therefore entitled to 
different treatment by the criminal justice system, is the fact that when a war veteran returns 
with PTSD he will have served in a combat zone at a very high level.  
In other words, soldiers who are involved in combat are more likely to contract PTSD 
than soldiers who are not involved in combat. Therefore, the war veteran with PTSD 
definitively put his life on the line for the protection of his country and fellow citizens, and in 
doing so developes PTSD. It is therefore fair and reasonable to argue that war veterans with 
PTSD are perceived as different from the conventional defendant and the ordinary defendant 
with PTSD. It is not PTSD alone that warrants mitigation, but the differences in how PTSD 
was acquired. It is this difference that speaks to a special place for war veterans with PTSD 
(in the US, a special class can be seen in sentencing statutes and VTCs). After all, war 
veterans do end up in trouble due to the experience of war and the training which is necessary 
for learning how to stay alive in the war zone.466 This outcome places some responsibility and 
accountability on the state.  
What is even more troubling is the fact that only approximately one half of war 
veterans with PTSD have received treatment for their conditions (as previously confirmed 
with other references and arguments in Chapter Two).467 Thus, when PTSD is a mitigating 
factor for war veterans on trial for criminal behaviour, there is an opportunity to address the 
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treatment gap. Rather than punish veterans who have gone beyond the call of duty in service 
to this country, they should be diagnosed and treated.  
Attribution theory also gives us reason to argue that war veterans with PTSD ought to 
be treated differently than other defendants. Attribution theory argues that people are less 
likely to want to punish those whose criminal conduct is beyond their control.468 The 
symptoms of PTSD have been known to leave the offender with little to no control over his 
thoughts, beliefs, and actions. It is therefore within the realm of possibility that PTSD 
sufferers will end up with a majority unwilling to punish them when the connection between 
PTSD and the crime is made clear.469 
When the PTSD is clearly linked to military service, one can expect even greater 
reluctance to punish the war veteran for his criminal behaviour. Therefore, the willingness to 
treat war veterans with PTSD differently is a reality that can be promoted and considered. 
Where a war veteran has PTSD due to trauma experienced during military service, and 
subsequently goes on to commit a crime because of his PTSD symptoms, one can readily 
argue that he deserves to be treated differently by the criminal justice system. 
4.7. Social Contribution (Gratitude) 
 An argument can already be made based on the fact that the war veteran has risked his 
life, limb, and sacrificed his liberty for his country, and as a result is owed some leniency. 
The socio-historical perspective on criminal law attempts to fit criminal responsibility along 
the lines of present conditions with the aim of legitimising criminal law.470 It is therefore 
necessary to examine the social aspects of criminal responsibility. What this means is that 
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criminal law in practice reflects normative values.471 From the socio-historical perspective, 
society owes war veterans a debt of gratitude for their service, and this debt of gratitude 
should therefore be reflected when assessing criminal responsibility. 
There have been arguments that veterans do not deserve civilian gratitude when they 
voluntarily enlist in unjustified warfare.472 However, veterans will generally only enlist in a 
war if they believe the war is justified. For instance, an individual witnessing a man and his 
dog may erroneously believe that the dog owner is in danger and will intervene, putting his 
health and life at risk. Even though the witness is mistaken, he is acting on good intention. 
Certainly, such an individual is entitled to gratitude from the dog owner that he thought he 
was saving. Similar gratitude is owed to the veteran who enlists in an unjust war under the 
belief that he is defending the freedom, life, and safety of civilians.473 
In fact, official claims that the government and citizens owe a debt of gratitude to 
veterans and active service members are usually unqualified. This means that there are hardly 
ever provisos that the debt of gratitude is excluded for veterans who have fought in unjust 
wars. This is a very unusual qualification because there is no fixed method for determining 
what amounts to an unjust war. Besides those who fight in war are separate and apart from 
the unjust or just reasons for that war.474 Ultimately, even the combatants of an unjust war 
may follow the rules and laws regulating the conduct of war.475 Therefore, what we believe 
about the propriety of the war in question is not a factor. It is the soldiers’perspectives that 
matter. Besides, once the soldier has enlisted, he cannot choose the wars in which he fights. 
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There is always the possibility of being court-martialed and dishonorably discharged for 
misconduct.476 No doubt insubordination will fall under the parameters of misconduct. 
It is, therefore, hardly surprising when officials such as the Attorney General of the 
State of Illinois publishes a statement on the website of the Illinois Attorney General’s 
website that, ‘we owe a debt of gratitude to the men and women’ who protected freedom and 
served their country.477 This is ironic given the limits set on the acquisition of veteran status 
in the US. Still, according to the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, these veterans 
have suffered both physically and psychologically, and this suffering does not end once they 
re-enter civilian life. This suffering continues, and to show gratitude for their service, 
veterans are often entitled to government assistance via benefits which may include ‘case 
advocacy, health outreach and public advocacy forums.’478 Putting war veterans with PTSD 
in prison means that treatment is not going to be administered for a proven condition. This 
will not do anything to prevent re-offending.  
Due to the risk of recidivism for an untreated veteran with PTSD, it is therefore 
reasonable to argue that veterans belong in a “special category” of citizens due to the 
sacrifices that they have made for the lives, safety, and freedom of their countries, 
governments and fellow citizens. As a result, it makes sense that veterans should belong in a 
special category of criminal defendants. Indeed, this kind of thinking is behind the VTCs 
which are aimed at therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice. The idea is to help war 
veterans “get back on their feet.”479 Thus, putting war veterans with PTSD behind bars only 
helps to further destroy them rather than help them “get back on their feet.” 
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Society owes war veterans a debt of gratitude. The liberties and protections accorded 
to society are a direct result of the sacrifices that veterans have made. According to social 
contract theory, as members of society we all enter into social contracts with one another. 
These social contracts form the basis upon which individuals agree to form a society and live 
together as they discharge their socially agreed upon “moral and/or political obligations.”480 
Based on social contract, one can argue that when soldiers join the war effort, there is a social 
contract with society in that soldiers will fight for our country and our rights at significant 
risk to themselves, and we will recognise this sacrifice and its benefits by rewarding our 
soldiers once they return.  
As established in this paper the VTCs are limited in their reach and will only apply to 
veterans who have committed minor offences. There is a need for the special treatment and 
categorisation of veterans more broadly. After all (in the US), veterans are already given 
exceptional treatment within the legal and administrative systems (as previously mentioned, 
such as with mortgages, tax exemptions, and immigration). It would therefore make sense to 
extend this legal exceptionalism to criminal law, so that our gratitude toward veterans is 
displayed where it is needed the most in the criminal justice system. 
There is an obvious cycle that demands some form of leniency for the war veteran 
with PTSD. The cycle starts with war, which involves tremendous sacrifices on the part of 
the soldier. Next, the trauma of war creates the conditions for PTSD which in turn creates the 
conditions for crime. Today’s modern warfare environment, such as counter-insurgencies, 
facilitates the swift and deleterious mental conditions of the soldier.481 
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In fact, the modern day training and experiences of today’s drone fighter sets up a 
situation in which the veteran can be in a permanent state of warfare.482 When this training 
and experience of the modern day soldier is taken together with PTSD society, the 
government and citizens must discharge an incredible debt of gratitude toward the veteran 
with PTSD who ends up in contact with the criminal justice system. 
4.8. State’s Complicity in Producing PTSD 
The prevalence of PTSD is founded on research results indicating that where veterans 
are involved in combat, they are four times more likely to develop PTSD than regular US 
civilians.483 In addition, the number of veterans seeking treatment for PTSD has increased 
significantly over the last ten years.484 Based on these outcomes of war (also in Chapter 
Two), it can be argued that the state cannot “call to account” an individual whose conduct is, 
in part, the result of its own actions. The prevalence of war-related PTSD is bound to raise 
the issue of the state’s complicity in the contraction of PTSD by war veterans. 
When we look at the relationship between the soldier and the state, it is relatively easy 
to confer special status on war veterans, and to look at the state’s possible complicity. It is 
arguable that the state is involved in the war experience, and is therefore complicit to some 
extent. After all, it is the state’s war and the soldier is serving at the behest of the state that 
made the decision to go to war. The soldier is commissioned by the state as a prerequisite for 
service, and is fighting a war for state’s purpose, which in and of itself raises the question of 
state complicity. The doctrine of complicity is that when an individual commits a crime as the 
primary offender, there are times when secondary parties who have contributed to the 
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commission of the crime are accountable.485 It is reasonable to argue that the state has 
contributed to the crimes committed by war veterans with PTSD. 
The retributivist theory, which is based on just deserts, requires that an individual is 
only punished for crimes that he deserves to be punished for. The retributivist believes that 
punishment is meted out to those who deserve it.486 In this regard, criminal responsibility is 
linked to moral responsibility. The retributivist also requires that criminal responsibility 
arises out of free will.487 When we look at free will and moral responsibility along the lines of 
the retributivist’s perspective on criminal responsibility, the state basically robs the soldier of 
his free will in training and exposure to war where he contracts PTSD which controls his 
thinking and behaviour. Therefore, the state shares moral responsibility for this outcome. 
The prevalence of war-related PTSD points to the state’s complicity because it 
indicates that the war experience and/or military experience altogether contributes to or 
causes PTSD, which in turn creates difficulties for repatriation, and increases the risk of 
criminal behaviour. Given that the state makes the decision to deploy soldiers to war zones, 
the state is “complicit” in the production of PTSD. It is also the states’ own decisions and 
actions that either create the conditions for war, or perpetuates the conditions for war. 
An argument can be made that the state directly implants PTSD symptoms. This 
argument is supported by observations that military training instills hyper-vigilance and 
“rapid response to threatening encounters,” which can turn into aggression and ultimately 
criminal prosecution and sentencing.488 Although hyper-vigilance is found among trauma 
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related sufferers, including PTSD, it is directly linked to the war experience (as previously 
mentioned). This may obviously include training and deployment. 
This hyper-vigilance was observed in war veteran Matthew Sepi (Nevada-2005) who 
took an assault rifle with him to a convenience store one night. He used the weapon when he 
felt under threat and in doing so killed one person and wounded another. Yet Sepi, who 
claimed self-defence, was able to bargain for a conditional discharge and a conviction on the 
unlawful possession of a firearm.489 
Given the state’s role in the creation and perpetuation of the conditions for war which 
inevitably causes PTSD, which in turn causes crime, it is wrong and unfair for the state to 
insist on punishing these veterans for crimes indirectly and directly linked to state decisions, 
training, and war-time activities. There is no doubt that the state is complicit and therefore 
should offer the war veterans with PTSD some leniency, such as treatment rather than 
incarceration (for example, as will be discussed in Chapter Nine, Mike Jones received 
treatment instead of incarceration).  
We might sympathise with this argument, but of course the state creates all kinds of 
conditions – including poverty, bad education, and bad housing – that contribute to 
individuals committing crimes. So, the question arises again, what makes war veterans with 
PTSD special? The veteran who suffers from his condition due to war, which is service to 
one’s country, is special compared to those who are poor or otherwise disadvantaged. This is 
because these individuals’ conditions were not caused by service to the state, but were 
independent of the state’s behaviour. 
Arguably, the state is “aware” that training and war experiences lead to PTSD, which 
in turn, leads to crime. With this knowledge and understanding, the state still makes the 
decision to go to war and to recruit citizens to fight in the war effort. Greenfield’s discussion 
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on complicity to genocide provides a reasonable theoretical approach supporting this 
argument of the state’s complicity in the crimes committed by war veterans with PTSD. 
According to Greenfield, complicity can arise when the party who is guilty of complicity did 
not necessarily intend that genocide would be the outcome. All that is required is that the 
party could have reasonably foreseen that genocide would be the outcome of his behaviour.490 
Likewise, given the prevalence of PTSD among war veterans, and the significant 
research linking violence to PTSD, it can also be argued that the state could have reasonably 
foreseen that PTSD and crime were likely outcomes for soldiers. Therefore, using 
Greenfield’s argument, it is reasonable to conclude that the state does share some 
responsibility for the criminal behaviour of war veterans with PTSD. 
The right to treatment is necessitated by the fact that war veterans have increasingly 
suffered from war-related PTSD.491 In addition, it has become an established fact that war 
veterans are at a greater risk of contracting PTSD than the average citizen.492 Moreover, 
treatment barriers do exist.493 Treatment barriers have been discussed in this chapter and 
throughout this dissertation. For present purposes, the most important treatment barriers 
include stigma associated with mental illnesses such as PTSD, the veteran’s unpreparedness 
for treatment, and logistics.494 We have also learned that the veteran’s status and failure to 
have a condition diagnosed are additional barriers to treatment for PTSD. 
The government is obviously responsible for the failure of veterans to receive 
treatment for PTSD because it can take a more proactive role in establishing and 
implementing treatment programmes (and their availability and accessibility). Since the 
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untreated and undiagnosed veterans are more likely to commit a crime, the government’s 
failure to intervene becomes a complicit factor. 
In a study carried out by Smith, it was discovered that veterans who were diagnosed 
with and treated for PTSD before their arrest were more likely to be sentenced to treatment 
over those who were diagnosed with PTSD after arrest.495 In this regard, the government is 
“complicit” in the PTSD, and corresponding criminal conviction and sentencing, because the 
government has not only set up the conditions for war-related PTSD, but also failed to ensure 
the prompt diagnosis and treatment of PTSD for veterans. Obviously, a part of the healing 
and reintegration process includes mandatory treatment (or a mandatory screening process) 
for war-related illnesses, both psychological and physical. When the government fails to 
identify and treat those war-related conditions, the government is “responsible” for both the 
direct and indirect consequences. 
4.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has established that the soldier’s status as a war veteran is very important 
when considering what forms of benefits they can expect when returning to civilian life. This 
status as a war veteran is very important because the war veteran in need of care may be 
denied state aid if he cannot satisfy the veteran requirements. This is so important for war 
veterans with PTSD because it is this category of veterans that are vulnerable to criminal 
behaviour. The provision of state aid can provide these veterans with the treatment needed for 
eliminating, if not reducing, the risk of criminal behaviour.  
Moreover, the question that continues to loom is whether it is fair to dismiss the 
causative factors behind the war veteran’s PTSD. These causative factors can be traced back 
to the state that starts wars and recruits citizens. The sacrifices made by the soldiers are 
manifested in the life altering consequences of PTSD, therefore the state ought to consider 
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helping, rather than punishing, these war veterans. The imposition of criminal responsibility 
and punishment under criminal law is counterproductive. 
 War veterans with PTSD are, therefore, in a “special category” of defendants, and 
should receive the benefit of leniency compared to other defendants, and even ordinary 
defendants with PTSD, because the country and its citizens share a level of “responsibility” 
for the conditions that placed the veteran in a situation in which he would contract PTSD, and 
become a crime actor. It therefore makes sense that our gratitude is expressed through 
“leniency” within the criminal justice system. 
The chapters that follow examine how the “specialness” of war veterans with PTSD is 
recognised in criminal defences and in sentencing. The picture that emerges is one of 
inconsistent approaches and confusion. Similarly, situated war veterans with PTSD are 
sometimes able to plead a particular defence, and sometimes not, and their PTSD is 
sometimes used in mitigation, and sometimes not. Chapters Five to Eight each deal with a 
particular defence, Chapter Nine with mitigation, and Chapter Ten concludes by reflecting on 











Chapter Five: Insanity Defence 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers the insanity defence, and its implications, for defendants with 
PTSD and emphasises the consequences of deploying this defence for veterans with PTSD. 
The insanity defence rests on the moral assumption that it is unfair and unjust to hold the 
insane criminally responsible. In general, where a defendant charged with a crime 
successfully pleads insanity, he will receive appropriate treatment, and will be 
institutionalised, but for treatment rather than punishment. Under English law, when a sane 
defendant is acquitted, or an insane defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), 
there is no criminal culpability, and therefore, there can be no punishment.496  
In an ideal world, where a war veteran with PTSD successfully pleads insanity, he 
would receive appropriate treatment in order to ensure that the condition does become any 
worse, his behaviour improves, and this would thus respond to the “specialness” arguments 
presented in Chapter Four. 
However, there is significant “stigma” attached to being labelled insane, and there is 
evidence that in a number of cases an individual charged with a crime would rather plead 
guilty than risk the return of a verdict of NGRI.497 Furthermore, a successful plea of insanity 
automatically results in the disposal of indefinite detention.498 Thus an individual who is 
accorded a special verdict can face an indefinite sentence.  
It is therefore possible that the state of the law on insanity leads to some individuals 
being convicted, who should not be convicted. This is troubling because it both violates 
moral intuition that only those who are guilty ought to be punished, and means that instead of 
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receiving appropriate treatment, some of the “insane” are being incarcerated, thus adding to 
the disproportionate numbers of prisoners suffering from mental illness.499 
5.2. Controversies over the Insanity Defence 
          Criminal responsibility was initially founded on the exercise of free will by a rational 
human being.500 This initial thinking in the earlier part of the 20th century has developed over 
time to dispense with the free will requirement. Still, insanity raises the presumption that the 
individual is unable to form rational thought and action, and is therefore outside the realm of 
criminal responsibility.501 In England and in various states in the US, a defence of insanity 
will only succeed if the accused is able to prove that he suffered from a “mental disease” or 
“defect” at the time of the commission of the crime.502 
          The insanity defence has proved hugely controversial. In part, these controversies 
relate to the individual elements of specific tests, and the inclusion or exclusion of other tests. 
For example, as Hostettler points out, in England the insanity defence rules fail to recognise 
the issue of irresistible impulse.503 As such, an individual is unable to access the defence if he 
is fully aware of the nature and quality of the crime, and knows the difference between right 
and wrong, but because of a mental illness is unable to stop or control his behaviour. The 
irresistible impulse defence is permitted in several Commonwealth jurisdictions, as well as in 
some states in the US.504 These issues are examined below. 
          With respect to the theories of the overall purpose of criminal law, insanity has also 
proved controversial. As noted above, for blame-based or retributive theories, the insane are 
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not held responsible, and therefore not blameworthy; insanity provides an excusable 
explanation for criminal behaviour.505 For some retributivists, the nature of insanity is such 
that rather than operate as a defence, it ought to be an exemption (or bar to trial). This is 
because it makes no sense to call the insane to account and then excuse them.506 Rather, by 
virtue of their insanity, they cannot be a participant in the moral community of “blame.” 
         Within the realm of the protective theory of criminal law, punishment is warranted for 
the purpose of deterring criminal behaviour.507 At the same time, an individual who 
successfully pleads insanity is ‘said not to be deterrable,’ and therefore ‘not rightly subject to 
the criminal law.’508 The result is that with respect to “individual deterrence,” it would seem 
that the insane ought not be punished, but rather treated instead.  
          However, this is too quick. Some consequentialist theories (of which protective 
theories are a sub-set) hold that punishment for an insane defendant can result in deterrence 
in two different ways.509 Firstly, because it is not clear that all insane people are undeterrable, 
the fear of punishment can act as a deterrence to “some insane criminals.”510 The mechanism 
is the same as for the sane, in that the fear of punishment may be sufficient in some cases to 
hold back the “insane inclinations” to commit crimes.511 
          Secondly, punishing the insane can act as a deterrent to those who are sane.512 This is 
because the fact that a successful insanity defence can result in an alternative to incarceration, 
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which could motivate criminals to malinger and launch a bogus, but convincing, insanity 
defence.513                                     
As ever with consequentialist theories, the assessment of these claims depends on the 
facts. Punishing or treating the insane will have consequences, and which is to be preferred 
will depend on those and other consequences, including recidivism rates (it might be, for 
example, that simply incarcerating the insane would lead to higher recidivism rates for those 
released). Moreover, for those who are not thoroughly consequentialist, there remains the 
issue of whether it can ever be right to punish the blameless, and whether those who need 
treatment have a right to that treatment. Finally, controversies around insanity are part of 
larger debates about mental health and the criminal justice system.    
          There is a persistent and well-grounded complaint that far too many individuals with 
mental health issues are in prison. This is a common theme throughout the literature on war 
veterans with PTSD. A similar observation was made by the Howard League that advocates 
criminal justice reform in England.514 Of course, this is not to say that all those with mental 
health issues in prison are insane, but rather that insanity belongs to a family of issues that 
remain unresolved, despite years of advocacy for reform.515    
 Having looked at the general controversies around the insanity defence, it is time to 
turn to the specifics, beginning with the rule that is used in England and in a number of US 
states, which is the M’Naghten rule, named after Daniel M’Naghten, who was charged with 
killing a personal secretary to the British Prime Minister in 1843. He was acquitted because 
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the court determined that he was insane, and thus, M’Naghten became the first appellate case 
of insanity.516  
The M’Naghten special verdict more than 40 years later was notorious as it was 
perceived by the public as setting the stage for permissible crimes.517 This worry persists 
across a number of jurisdictions, despite it being, in most instances, a misunderstanding. As 
noted previously, in England, those found NGRI are liable to indefinite detention (although, 
of course, this does not mean that they serve the same), and across other jurisdictions an 
individual who is NGRI may be liable to institutionalisation for a period longer than the 
maximum sentence, if the individual is convicted.518 For example, it was held by the US 
Supreme Court in 1983 that an individual who had been found NGRI who had attempted 
shoplifting could face an indefinite period of institutionalisation, compared to the actual 
maximum penalty of one year.519   
It is important to point out that in the USA and England, the defence of insanity needs 
to be made by the defendant, therefore, the burden on the defendant claiming insanity is 
onerous. The shifting of the burden here is unconventional because in a typical case the 
prosecutor is the accuser and is required to make the case. The burden of proof rests with the 
prosecution because the defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence and will not be 
deemed guilty until the prosecution discharges that burden of proof. This is referred to as the 
“golden thread” that runs throughout the English criminal justice system.520 In a conventional 
trial, the defendant’s not guilty plea invokes the presumption of innocence which places the 
burden of proving the defendant’s guilt BRD upon the prosecution.521  
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5.3. M’Naghten Rule 
          The M’Naghten rule is a legal test implemented to ascertain whether the person 
accused of a crime was insane or sane at the time of committing it.522 Although the test refers 
to “disease,” it is important to note that M’Naghten is not a medical test, and the insanity it 
establishes is not a medical diagnosis.523               
The insanity defence has little, if anything, to do with psychiatry in terms of its legal 
definition.524 In fact, the defence dates back in time before psychiatry and psychology 
became officially recognised areas of practice.525 That said, by the 19th century, and 
especially with the introduction of the M’Naghten rules and its tests, psychiatrists and 
psychologists began to play an important role in the development of the insanity defence, and 
how the disease of the mind is linked to requisite defective reasoning.526 
 A pivotal issue under the test is determining whether or not the defendant was 
capable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the commission of the 
crime. Moreover, the defendant must also be unable to appreciate the nature of his crime due 
to a defect of reason linked to a disease of the mind. Under the M'Naghten rules: 
 ‘to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the 
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect 
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he 
was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was 
wrong.’527 
The following three sections will discuss each of these elements.  
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5.3.1. Elements of M'Naghten Rule 
5.3.1.1. Defect of Reason 
          A defect of reason on its own is inconsequential under the M’Naghten rules, and 
having nothing more than a defect of reason will not satisfy the M’Naghten rule. Although 
the defect of reason is a key component of the M’Naghten rules, it is only a key component if 
it is consequential to a diseased mind.528 English criminal law is clear that the defect of 
reason must be a result of a disease of the mind to the extent that the reasoning ability of the 
individual is “impaired.”529  
           A defect of reason is a failed ability to reason.530 It cannot be a situation in which the 
defendant may be absent-minded or forgetful as determined in R v Clarke.531 Defect of reason 
due to a diseased mind must be cognitive, and cannot be related to emotional or volitional 
matters of the mind.532 This cognitive focus is the reason that irresistible impulse is excluded 
in the English insanity defence. The defendant must show that he suffers from defect of 
reasoning caused by a disease of the mind. The defect of reasoning must be in action at the 
time of the commission of the offence and must be such that the defendant cannot appreciate 
the difference between right and wrong or acknowledge the nature of the crime.533 Thus, 
defect of reason is required to have a negative impact on one’s cognitive/intellectual faculties, 
including one’s ability to remember, to reason, to think, and so on.534 
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The defect of reason due to a disease of the mind is relevant only if the defendant 
either did not know the quality or nature of his behaviour or was unaware that what he was 
doing was wrong.535 Applying defect of reason due to a disease of the mind can be tricky in 
the context of intoxication. According to the Law Commission, an individual with alcohol 
induced defective reasoning ought to be able to plead insanity, although the disease of the 
mind under the influence of alcohol is temporary.536 
Apparently, when intoxicants induce defective reasoning due to a diseased mind, the 
defendant does not have to be intoxicated during the commission of the crime.537 At the same 
time, it was determined in the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher case that a 
defendant with a pre-existing psychiatric condition, in which he is predisposed to “outbursts” 
when under the influence of intoxicants, cannot rely on the defect of reason due to a diseased 
mind component to substantiate an insanity defence.538 
5.3.1.2. Defect of Reason must be caused by a Disease of the Mind 
          In order to escape criminal responsibility using an insanity defence, the individual must 
prove that they suffered from a disease of the mind according to the M’Naghten test. 
“Disease of the mind” is defined by several English cases. For instance, in R v Kemp, Devlin 
J defined disease of the mind as distinguishable from the brain and relevant only to cognition, 
such as ‘the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding.’539 Devlin J specifically 
stated that the brain’s condition is not the issue.540 In this regard, it does not matter what or 
how the mind malfunctions, and thus any external factor may be applicable.   
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What is important is that the disease of the mind must be such that it has an impact on 
the mind’s ability to function regardless of the cause.541 The only requirement in this regard is 
that the disease of the mind was operating during the commission of the crime. In other 
words, any mental illness or disorder that impacts the mind’s ability to function, and results 
from an internal rather than external factor, is a disease of the mind.542 
Similarly, in R v Sullivan, the House of Lords ruled that if a disease had the ability to 
impact cognitive functioning, such as one’s memory, reason, and understanding, it was a 
disease of the mind, pursuant to the M’Naghten rules.543 Thus, the broadening of 
opportunities for pleading insanity due to a disease of the mind leaves open the possibility of 
defendants using any number of mental disorders in support of an insanity defence. 
           The House of Lords subscribed to Devlin J’s definition of disease of the mind in the 
case of Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland. The House of Lords stated in Bratty 
that while diseases such as schizophrenia are undoubtedly diseases of the mind, there are also 
others. For instance, any mental disorder that reveals itself violently and has a tendency to 
return is a disease of the mind.544  
          The relevant sense of “disease of the mind” has been considerably expanded to the 
point where diabetes may amount to the requisite defence element for a successful insanity 
defence.545 In addition, in English law, according to Horder ‘the internal factor doctrine has 
resulted in epilepsy, sleepwalking, and hyperglycemia being classified as insanity.̕ 546 At the 
same time, the “internal” and cognitive elements of the test mean that M’Naghten remains 
narrower than other insanity tests.    
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            Defect of reason is connected to cognition. This is because in order to successfully 
claim defect of reason, the defendant must show that his reasoning was so defective that he 
could not appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct, or, if he could, he could not tell 
whether it was wrong or not.547 However, while the defendant may satisfy the M’Naghten 
rules by showing a temporary defect of reason, courts have tended to interpret the defective 
reasoning arm of the rules very narrowly, and focus has been on the cognitive aspect of 
defect of reasoning which alters the individual’s ability to distinguish between right and 
wrong, or appreciate the nature and quality of his crime.548 This cognitive focus has proved 
controversial and, as discussed below, narrows the scope of insanity in ways relevant to 
veterans with PTSD. 
5.3.1.3. Cognitive Test 
          In England, a person seeking to substantiate a defence of insanity may rely on a 
cognitive incapacity, provided it is consistent with the standards established within the 
M’Naghten rules.549 What this means is that a defendant can only succeed on a NGRI plea if 
they are able to prove that their cognitive functioning is related to some form of physical or 
mental illness. Essentially, the cognitive deficiency must be such that the defendant is unable 
to distinguish between right or wrong. Moreover, a cognitive malfunction can also be 
substantiated if the defendant is unable to appreciate the nature and quality of his behaviour. 
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5.3.1.3.1. Difference between Right and Wrong 
          The defendant is unaware that what he is doing is wrong. The right and wrong test has 
been used to refer to the M’Naghten rules.550 Essentially, the defendant seeking to succeed in 
an insanity defence must prove that they did not know the nature and quality of the act, or did 
not know that it was wrong.551 In English law, the test is narrowly directed toward whether 
the accused knew that his behaviour was lawfully wrong.552 This is narrower than a possible 
interpretation of wrong as morally wrong or incompatible with society’s normative values 
and practices.553 
 This engages a complex conundrum, because we are left with the crucial question of 
whether it makes sense to distinguish a moral obligation from a legal obligation in this way. 
For example, a defendant may claim to have killed a child based on the belief that the child 
was really a reincarnation of Hitler, or the defendant may have killed a child believing the 
child was an alien, and the killing was necessary in self-defence. The issue here is that the 
defendant erroneously believed that he had a moral duty to commit the crimes, but in the first 
case may have been aware that the act was legally wrong. 
          This, however, must be on account of a mental disease that affects the functioning of 
the mind and voluntary behaviour. This is a necessary requirement otherwise individuals 
would just be able to proceed on an ignorance defence (if available). There must be 
something so wrong with the defendant’s mind that it is categorised as a disease.  
          The main idea is to show that the defendant is insane because he is not morally 
responsible.554 Distinguishing between right and wrong addresses two alternative norms: law 
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and morality.555 The law, in support of an insanity defence, goes beyond the idea that the 
insane person is unaware that his conduct is against the law. This is because ignorance is not 
a valid response to a criminal charge. 
The legal basis for establishing whether the defendant knows the difference between 
right and wrong was established by early English authority. For instance, in R v Windle, Chief 
Justice Lord Goddard stated in the House of Lords that the courts are only able to ‘distinguish 
between that which is in accordance with the law and that which is contrary to law,’ and it is 
inappropriate to leave it up to a juror to determine whether an ‘act was morally right or 
wrong.’556 
          This is especially contrary to the principles of justice within England where non-insane 
principles establish that ignorance is not a defence. Judges in England have notoriously ruled 
under the maxim “ignorantia juris neminem excusat” in declining a defence based on 
ignorance or mistake.557 However, under the M’Naghten rules the cognitive test requires that 
courts forego this maxim and general principle of English criminal law, and consider whether 
the defendant meets the requirements of insanity based on ignorance of the law. The only 
saving grace is that ignorance of the law emanates from a disease of the mind that contributes 
to defective reasoning. 
           As far back as the mid 19th century, Stephen points out that an individual may not 
have a mental illness but may still end up in a condition in which he is unable to even think 
about the legalities of his conduct. For example, an individual driven by extreme anger or 
provocation can lose all sense of reality, and in that instance fail to distinguish between right 
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or wrong.558 Yet, since the reaction is driven by emotion as opposed to cognition, the 
defendant’s inability to distinguish between right and wrong during the commission of the 
crime does not allow insanity to be a viable defence (although “loss of control” type defences 
may be available). 
The mental conditions affecting the defendant’s mind must make the defendant 
incapable of realising that his behaviour was against the law, or inconsistent with community 
standards. It is worth noting that were the test to include reference to volitional loss of 
control, such as an irresistible impulse, then the test of knowing legal and/or moral right from 
wrong would have less of a sting; a defendant may actually know that he is acting against 
morality or the law, but the unreasonable fear or belief is so strong due to a defect of the mind 
that he is incapable of controlling his behaviour. 
The primary problem for the right and wrong test is that it is not specifically detailed.  
The defendant must not be able to form an opinion about whether his behaviour is right or 
wrong (and might in any case be incapable of conforming his behaviour accordingly).559 The 
difficulty here is that the accused person’s beliefs are not the standard for the test. The 
defendant had to definitively know or not know that their behaviour was lawfully wrong. 
This in turn basically provides a defence where one is usually denied: ignorance of the law. 
To say that the defendant believed that his behaviour was unlawful is more compatible with 
establishing defective reasoning while labouring under a disease of the mind. 
5.3.1.3.2. Knowing the Nature and Quality of the Act 
          Not knowing the nature of the conduct appears to be a straightforward requirement for 
proving insanity under the M’Naghten rules. This means that the defendant, by some disease 
of the mind, is unaware of what he is doing under some appropriate description. This is 
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accepted by the requirement that the fact that the defendant was either not aware of the nature 
of his actions, or if he was, did not know that what he was doing was wrong.560  
Essentially, an individual who commits a crime, in the absence of appreciation for the 
nature and quality of the act, does not have the necessary intent, nor did they “act” in the 
relevant sense of the term. Knowing the nature and quality of the act is straightforward, 
however, the cognition test is not so simple.  
 The question for consideration is how one determines the quality of an act. Is the 
quality of the act based on the act itself, or the motivating factors behind the act? If a man 
believes it is in the world’s best interests to kill all boys younger than 5 years old, for 
example, is the quality of this act any different from a man who believes it is in his best 
interest to murder six adults because he believes they are aliens?  
          The defendant unreasonably or irrationally perceives that he is justified in his actions, 
or due to hallucinations or other misperceptions interprets his surroundings erroneously. For 
example, an individual commits murder under the belief that the victim is an inanimate 
object, such as a jar.561 As Loveless, Allen, and Derry point out, the courts will not consider 
the mental disease, but rather will look at the defendant’s cognitive inability to understand.562 
Still, the House of Lords ruled in R v Clarke that an individual relying on an insanity defence 
under the M’Naghten rules must present some evidence of a disease of the mind.563 This is 
because the courts have consistently refused to accept that an individual with a fleeting 
mental incapacitation qualifies as an individual who cannot appreciate the quality of his 
crime. The fact that the individual is a rational human being and loses his rational thinking in 
a transitory manner will not suffice. 
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However, if an individual commits a heinous act under some delusional interpretation 
of the environment, or as a result of hallucinations, it is very likely to be in response to a 
mental disorder impairing cognition.564 This kind of behaviour is very unlikely to be a result 
of an emotional lapse, and therefore, in the context of understanding the nature and quality of 
one’s act, this arm of the cognitive test under the M’Naghten rules makes sense. If 
substantiated by expert testimony, this establishes that the defendant was labouring under a 
mind that was so defected or diseased that he could not appreciate the nature of his crime.  
             Essentially, the defect of reason must be such that it negatively impacts the accused 
person to the point where they are unaware of the nature and quality of their behaviour. What 
this actually comes down to is the criminal law establishing a threshold of morality, and in 
this instance, the defendant’s ability to know the nature and quality of his act allows for a 
consideration of the defendant’s moral standing with respect to the conduct.565   
5.4. War Veterans, PTSD, and the M'Naghten Test  
As we have seen, the M’Naghten test requires 
a defect of reason caused by a disease of the mind, such that the defendant did not 
know the nature and quality of his act, or, if he did know, then he did not know the act was 
wrong. 
The discussion of the elements of the test above has highlighted the ways in which a 
“defect of reason caused by a disease of the mind” has been interpreted broadly as including 
any physical disease that affects mental functioning. Thus, including epilepsy, sleepwalking, 
and hyperglycemia.566 However, it is also very narrow in two important senses: first, the 
defect of reason must be caused by an internal and not external source. For example, 
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hypoglycaemia, which is the result of the external cause of taking too much insulin, is 
excluded.567 Second, the test focuses on cognitive rather than volitional features.  
In addition, the requirement that the defect of reason must be such that the defendant 
did not know what he was doing, or, if he did know, then he did not know the act was wrong, 
has also been narrowed to not knowing that the act was legally wrong (independent of the 
defendant’s beliefs about the act’s moral rightness or wrongness). 
All of these factors are important in considering the accessibility of the insanity 
defence to war veterans with PTSD, and it is worth considering each in more detail. 
5.4.1. Defect of Reason caused by a Disease of the Mind 
Intuitively, one might think that an individual suffering from PTSD would be able to 
claim a defect of reason due to a disease of the mind. The English Court of Appeal made it 
clear that in order to succeed in an insanity defence, the defendant must present clear 
evidence that he was labouring under a defect of reason due to a disease of the mind.568 PTSD 
sufferers have been found to suffer from episodes in which they relive a traumatic experience 
with no sense of reality. However, as we have seen, in England it is doubtful that PTSD 
symptoms would support an insanity defence, because the “disease of the mind” requirement 
under the M’Naghten rules, requires an internal factor capable of affecting reasoning 
capabilities.569 
In R v Quick, the Court of Appeal stated that a “malfunctioning of the mind” is not a 
disease of the mind under insanity parameters if the malfunctioning is due to an external 
factor, such as violence, substances, and hypnosis.570 It therefore follows that where the mind 
malfunctions due to an external cause, it is more consistent with a defence of automatism as 
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opposed to insanity.571 Similarly, in R v T – where T was charged with robbery and assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm, and it emerged that she was suffering with PTSD having 
been raped a few days prior to the offence – it was held that PTSD was not a disease of the 
mind in itself, as it was the result of external causes (in this case, T’s rape), but that T’s 
dissociative state at the time of the offence was such as to allow the jury to consider non-
insane automatism (they did, but subsequently convicted).572 
The R v T case suggests that violence induced PTSD is not sufficient to ground a 
successful insanity defence, although according to Friel, White and Hull, a search of UK case 
databases reveals one case in which PTSD was successfully used as an insanity defence.573 
However, the case was not identified. Yet, in other cases in other jurisdictions, using similar 
legal tests, violence induced PTSD has successfully been used in an insanity defence. For 
example, in Louisiana, US, in State v Heads, the defendant – a combat veteran who shot and 
killed his brother-in-law following the breakup of his marriage – was found insane due to 
flashbacks in a dissociative state during the commission of the crime.574 Louisiana operated a 
modified M’Naghten test, that due to mental disease or defect the defendant did not know the 
nature or quality of the act or that it was wrong. Similarly, in New Jersey v Cocuzza, the 
accused was a Vietnam War veteran who was charged with assaulting a police officer. 
During his trial, the accused reportedly thought that when assaulting the police officer, he 
was assaulting a war enemy.575 
In itself, these differences are not surprising. Absent in an internal/external division, it 
makes sense to think that different jurisdictions could come to different judgments on 
whether PTSD is “really” a disease. Rather, the point is that the weight given to the 
internal/external distinction is in tension with the fundamental moral idea to which we are 
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appealing that it is unjust to punish those who lack responsibility and therefore 
blameworthiness. The division of diseases between internal and external conditions arguably 
results in unfair outcomes since the fact of the matter is that whether internal or external, 
some conditions will have the same impact on the mind.576 The Law Commission of England 
has criticised the internal/external parameters of disease of the mind. According to the Law 
Commission, many individuals suffer from a psychological trauma which causes them to 
enter into a dissociative state.577 Still, dissociation ‘has not yet been classified authoritatively 
in England.’578 
This worry is exacerbated when one considers the further distinction made famous by 
Stephen J, that ‘drunkenness is one thing and the diseases to which drunkenness leads are 
different things.’579 That is, whilst it may be the case that violence induced PTSD is 
externally caused, it may lead to further problems, such as psychosis or dissociation, which 
ought to bear independent weight. In fact, it was determined in Coley & Others v R that a 
psychotic breakdown qualifies as a defect of reason linked to a disease of the mind.580 
Moreover, based on a review of the evidence in the US and the UK, Friel, et al. state that if 
PTSD sufferers can illustrate a link between the crime and a dissociative state, they will have 
a better chance of succeeding with an insanity defence.581 In the American case of United 
States v Rezaq (war veteran with PTSD), it was upheld that PTSD can support a defence of 
insanity if the symptoms are grave.582 
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5.4.2. Nature and Quality of the Act and its being Wrong 
As with the defect/disease test, one’s intuitions that war veterans with PTSD might, 
on occasion, not appreciate the nature and quality of their act or, if they do, the wrongfulness 
of those acts might seem intuitively plausible.  
Consider as an example a war veteran with PTSD who is triggered by a sound or an 
image and experiences flashbacks to the war trauma that caused their PTSD. Their flashbacks 
are realistic that the war veteran believes that he is reliving the trauma, and immediately 
responds by shooting at innocent bystanders, killing them in the unshakable belief that he is 
killing his enemies at war. For example, a soldier on active duty was referred for an 
evaluation for criminal responsibility after he kicked in the door of a home and shot at several 
people inside, including children. The report revealed that the soldier was adamant that he 
had to kill someone, and that he did not know what he was doing. It was also revealed that 
the soldier was in and out of a dissociative state in which he was experiencing flashbacks, 
and thought that he was in combat at that time. It was concluded that the soldier was suffering 
from PTSD, did not know the difference between right and wrong, and could not appreciate 
the nature and quality of his behaviour.583 Obviously, such a war veteran with PTSD will not 
stop for a moment to consider whether the act is legal or not when acting in response to the 
symptoms of PTSD. 
Of course, this will not always be the case. In State v Felde, a Vietnam veteran with 
PTSD pleaded NGRI, and two psychiatrists were appointed to evaluate him. Both 
psychiatrists agreed that at the time of the murder, Felde was capable of distinguishing 
between right and wrong.584 The facts of the case showed that it was obvious that the murder 
was committed in an intoxicated burst of violence, and the defendant’s ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong was evidenced by the defendant attempting to escape the law 
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enforcement when they arrived at the scene.585 In Cooke v DPP, a defendant with PTSD 
appealed to have an anti-social order set aside. However, the appellate court examined the 
record of the lower court which indicated that the defendant had made threats and had 
continuously behaved in ways that indicated that he did know the difference between right 
and wrong.586 Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.587 
5.4.3. M’Naghten Insanity 
The fact that PTSD can cause deficits in cognitive functioning is uncontroversial. The 
fact that a war veteran with PTSD who believes he is shooting at the enemy is not aware of 
the nature and quality of his act is similarly convincing. However, the availability of the 
insanity defence depends, as one would expect, on the legal test that defines insanity. In 
England, the narrowness of “disease of the mind” means that war veterans with PTSD are 
unlikely to successfully claim insanity. In other “M’Naghten jurisdictions” that do not appeal 
to the external/internal division, the availability of the defence will hinge in the main on the 
degree to which PTSD is thought of as a genuine psychiatric illness.  
PTSD is a trauma induced mental malady. Within the realm of the DSM-III and 
subsequent amendments, PTSD is a recognised mental illness. However, PTSD is not listed 
as a psychosis. This is an important omission, because the legal definition of insanity under 
the M’Naghten rule insists on a mental disease, but jurors may have a difficult time accepting 
that individuals with PTSD truly suffer from a disease of the mind. The phrase brings more 
dangerous conditions, such as paranoid schizophrenia and multiple personality disorders, to 
mind. This is not a fair assessment for jurors to consider because PTSD victims can also have 
difficulties distinguishing reality from illusion. Therefore, a more appropriate standard may 
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be necessary to ensure that PTSD victims who truly lose touch with reality can justifiably 
escape responsibility. 
The legal tests for insanity within the Anglo-American criminal justice system share 
one common theme, which is while a person may have a mental illness in the psychiatric 
field, he is not necessarily insane in the legal realm. For example, an individual diagnosed 
with anti-social personality disorder does have a recognised psychiatric condition, but in most 
cases, will be thought of as nothing more than a criminal in the eyes of the law in both the US 
and England.588 Thus, as a legal matter, “insanity” can be (and is) one thing in England and 
another in Louisiana. However, the legal tests are themselves accountable to the moral 
purpose of distinguishing those who are responsible and blameworthy, and who it makes 
sense to call to account. In this view, there is (something at least approximating to) a right 
answer for the question of whether a given defendant is answerable or not, and the fact that 
different, and even very similar, legal tests can give contradictory answers is at least a good 
reason for a critical reflection. In England, this critical reflection has resulted in many 
criticisms of the M’Naghten test, but no change in policy. Elsewhere, this is not true, and a 
number of alternative tests have been proposed. 
5.5. PTSD and other Insanity Tests 
The underlying rationale for the M’Naghten test is to remove insanity as an excuse for 
criminal behaviour.589 Other tests have been subsequently presented as a means of relaxing the 
strict application of the M’Naghten rule. As seen below, the irresistible impulse alternative to 
the strict application of the M’Naghten rule will provide the PTSD sufferer with greater 
advantages when attempting to claim an insanity defence. 
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Ultimately, to get away from the restrictions imposed by the cognitive test established 
by the M’Naghten rules, some jurisdictions in the US have moved, in the main, towards the 
Model Penal Code (MPC) test, and in far fewer cases, the Durham rule. Embedded in these 
rules within the US is the idea of an irresistible impulse, which is among the most 
controversial arms of the alternative insanity tests.590 Ultimately, the irresistible impulse is 
best understood as a medium that distinguishes the MPC and Durham tests from the 
M’Naghten rule. 
The Durham test excuses a criminal defendant whose behaviour is “the product” of a 
mental disease or defect.591 It is also known as a “product test,” because it requires the jury 
only to consider whether the defendant’s crime was “the product” of a mental 
defect/disease.592 The Durham rule is the broadest in its application, and its product test was 
almost immediately subject to criticism. For instance, Judge Burger, as well as two other 
judges sitting in the same appellate court that administered the Durham rule, stated that the 
main issue should always be knowledge and appreciation of the act, and the ability to choose 
against committing the act.593 
In the meantime, the M’Nagthen rule appears to have significant longevity. The 
M’Naghten rule is the narrowest of the three rules. The M’Naghten rule appears to be 
consistent with Judge Burger and his colleagues’ argument that the real test of insanity should 
be the defendant’s ability to know and appreciate the wrongness of his conduct. Added to 
this, by Judge Burger and his colleagues, which distinguishes it from the M’Naghten rule, 
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was whether the defendant is able to freely refrain from committing the act.594 As Helen 
Howard points out, one of the critical failings of the M’Naghten rule is its failure to connect 
incapacity with regards to criminal liability to the irrational choices of the defendant.595 
The MPC test relaxes the M’Naghten rule, stating:  
‘A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.’596 
It thus allows the distinction between sane and the insane to be made on the basis of 
the capacity to conform.597 It is important to note that the MPC prefaces this irresistible 
impulse element with a knowledge requirement, so that an inability to conform alone will not 
suffice. The sole irresistible impulse faction has been criticised as capable of allowing some 
criminals, such as paedophiles, who cannot conform their behaviour to the requirements of 
the law to receive reduced sentences.598 In fact, in People v Parrish, a special verdict was 
reached for a defendant who was diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder, sexual 
perversions, and atypical gender identity disorder.599 Therefore, it is possible for an insanity 
defence to succeed in the US where the defendant’s deviance is backed by impulse control 
disorders. 
Essentially, under the MPC’s volition test, a defendant who knows that what he is 
doing is wrong can escape liability if he is unable to resist the act due to a mental disease or 
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defect.600 Therefore, in the US jurisdictions that apply the MPC, defendants with PTSD have 
a better opportunity for successfully launching an insanity defence. The M’Naghten rule will 
be more difficult for a PTSD sufferer if he is not in a dissociative state when acting in 
response to triggers.  
Ultimately, PTSD symptoms can also fit neatly within the realm of the US MPC. 
Where a defendant with PTSD is triggered into hyper-vigilance, and knows that what he is 
doing is wrong, but cannot resist the urge to act due to fear and panic caused by the hyper-
vigilance, he will have a better opportunity of claiming insanity under the MPC than under 
the M’Naghten rules, due to the cognitive test under the latter rule. In the meantime, the 
volition test under the MPC is more favourable for the PTSD sufferer. 
In 1982, in United States v Hinckley, a jury returned the verdict of NGRI using the 
MPC test.601 This proved to be hugely controversial and led to several jurisdictions in the US 
narrowing their insanity tests, or returning to something closer to the M’Naghten rule.  
Defendants residing in jurisdictions with the MPC test have been more successful in 
their defence because it is possible to consider the defendant insane, even after he is able to 
appreciate the criminality of his actions.602 Furthermore, compared to the M’Naghten test, the 
MPC test is broader. Until now, the MPC has been considered as the most accepted insanity 
test that is implemented by courts in the US to check the validity of insanity claims.603 
Robert Willey notes that the legal definition of insanity is antiquated and unrealistic 
since the law and criminal courts continue to rely on the M’Naghten rule, which tests insanity 
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on the basis of cognition.604 According to Willey, it is erroneous to establish insanity by 
segregating the mentally ill from the mentally well on the basis of a cognition test.605 
The M’Naghten rule is a very old method for testing insanity. It was created more 
than 100 years before the official listing and recognition of PTSD as a mental disorder in the 
APA’s DSM-III in 1980. The Law Commission argued that despite the broadening of the 
definition of insanity over the years, it remains substantively the same as it did over 100 years 
ago.606 The problem with the stagnant state of the legal definition of insanity is that 
developments over the years have not taken account of the reality of today’s psychiatry, 
medicine, and psychology.607 
While examining the insanity defence in England, Memon quotes McAuley defining 
legal insanity as an excuse for wrongdoing, and hence suggests that judges and jurors should 
examine the sanity of defendants on a case-by-case basis.608 It is also better to utilise a similar 
strategy when determining whether people suffering from PTSD have acted rationally during 
the commission of a criminal act. In reference to the types of insanity recognised by Mathew 
Hale, who would later ascend to the position of the Lord Chief Justice of England, the 
following are listed – idiocy, melancholy, total alienation of mind, and perfect madness.609 
The four instances of insanity still apply in the M’Naghten principles, and the “total 
alienation of mind” coincides with the symptoms of PTSD in most systems. Therefore, if the 
jury is convinced that a person is mad, they are then compelled to declare him not responsible 
for the crime. 
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The US MPC test confers upon courts the authority to look beyond the boundaries 
established by the M’Nagthen rules and the English criminal law interpretations and 
applications of the law. As noted above, the US test provides that insanity is established if the 
individual has suffered from a ‘mental disease or defect,’ and as such ‘lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct’ to the law.610 The last part of this rule provides more room for interpreting insanity 
over the narrow limits imposed by English law.611  
It is, therefore, not surprising that scholars have found cases in the US where the 
defendant has been successful in relying on PTSD in support of an insanity defence, and 
these cases have shown defective reasoning for PTSD sufferers who were war veterans. The 
facts and evidence in these cases are also consistent with what one might expect of war 
veterans with PTSD. There are many images in popular films of the war veteran triggered by 
sights and/or sounds that immediately bring on the dissociative state. For instance, in the case 
of State v Wood, a Vietnam veteran pleaded insanity in defence of charges stemming from his 
shooting of a factory foreman at his place of work. The defendant had been exposed to 
combat and the factory was found to be reflective of his combat experiences that caused 
PTSD. The shooting took place when the defendant sank into a dissociative state.612 
Thus, war veterans with PTSD in those US states that utilise the MPC test have a 
much better chance of successfully pleading insanity in defence of criminal charges. In the 
US, MPC provides courts with greater room for dealing with an individual who pleads 
insanity. The substantial capacity case separates disease and defect, making it possible for the 
defendant to choose to substantiate insanity through a disease of the mind or defect. This 
broadens the boundaries established by the M’Naghten rules that otherwise hamper the 
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availability of the insanity defence for war veterans. Therefore, US war veterans with PTSD 
have a much better chance of successfully pleading insanity, compared to English war 
veterans.  
5.6. Insanity and War Veterans Suffering from PTSD 
There is a strong moral argument that punishing an individual who has a mental 
malady that renders him incapable of understanding his criminal conduct, or of taking control 
of his criminal behaviour (cognition vs. volition), is wrong. The question of balance of the 
impact of PTSD on cognition and control holds the key to concluding the debate on the 
legality of using PTSD as a defence for certain crimes, such as murder and rape.613  
          It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a war veteran with PTSD, who is triggered 
to the point where he re-experiences a traumatic war event, and in the course of doing so, 
kills civilians, and while re-experiencing the war is aware of how wrong it is, and can 
immediately adjust his behaviour. It is unrealistic to expect this kind of control, unless the 
defendant is in treatment where he is learning effective strategies for recognising and coping 
with triggers. 
5.7. Conclusion 
There are controversies over the insanity defence. This chapter has argued that some 
of these can be brought to light through looking at examples of war veterans with PTSD, and 
that there is a chance that some war veterans with PTSD who ought to escape criminal 
responsibility are not able to do so. In particular, this chapter has argued that the narrowness 
in the various forms of the M’Naghten rules that dominate in England has several regrettable 
consequences. These are particularly problematic when applied to those to whom, as argued 
in Chapter Four, the state has some special obligations.   
                                                          
613 Ralph Slovenko, ‘The Watering Down of PTSD in Criminal Law’ (2004) 32 Journal of Psychiatry 
& Law 411, 413. 
163 
 
On a practical level, the difficulties of establishing insanity, the stigma that is attached 
to it, and the disposal of potential confinement, means that the insanity defence is only very 
rarely used. This not only means that some people who ought not to be punished are being 
punished, but also that those with severe mental health issues are first being inappropriately 
punished, and then confined in the name of “dangerousness.” 
On a theoretical level, punishment – condemnation and blame – ought only to be 
attached to those who are criminally responsible, whereas there is a complex relationship 
between the criminal conduct and PTSD, and for some war veterans with PTSD, their violent 
conduct will follow a pattern of combat addiction, flashbacks, and their inability to control 
their actions. Such conduct arguably meets Stephen Morse’s blunt statement of what the 
insanity test should say: 
‘A defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the offense, the 
defendant was so extremely crazy and the craziness so substantially affected the 
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 Chapter Six: Automatism Defence 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the automatism defence with a particular emphasis on the 
likelihood of it being accepted in the case of war war veterans with PTSD who are facing 
criminal trials. Automatism refers to a state in which the actor proceeds to act, or omits to act, 
involuntarily and unconsciously.615 It was introduced as a means of filling a gap left by the 
insanity and diminished responsibility defences.616 Automatism was thought to resolve these 
limitations by providing a defence to those with temporary mental break-downs, short of the 
mechanisms of a diseased mind. For example, in England, sleepwalking crimes are 
categorised as insane automatism (insanity defence), and crimes committed when awakened 
suddenly can be excused on the basis of non-insane automatism (automatism defence).617 
Thus, an individual in both situations who is unable to form the intention to commit an 
offence due to a defect of reasoning, but is not suffering from a disease of the mind can still 
avoid an absolute conviction (in the US, this defence is known as unconsciousness, but in 
England it is known as non-insane automatism). 
In fact, individuals relying on a defence of non-insane automatism can be completely 
exonerated.618 For war veterans with PTSD, both insane and non-insane automatism are 
promising defences because in many cases, the war veteran with PTSD is in a dissociative 
state where he automatically and involuntarily responds to triggers.619 
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Automatism is used in circumstances in which the individual accused of a crime 
claims that he had no control over their behaviour.620 The question for consideration is to 
what extent, and in what circumstances, ought automatism exonerate an individual’s criminal 
behaviour, especially a war veteran with PTSD. 
6.2. Controversies over the Automatism Defence 
Theoretically, under the common law, criminal behaviour must be the result of “free 
will and volition.”621 The theory of choices argues that where one lacks the freedom to make 
choices there is an excuse justifiable in law.622 The problem for the defence of automatism is 
that it may excuse conduct that ought to be criminal, therefore, controversy arises when a 
defendant claims involuntariness and non-consciousness under automatism for offences that 
require a suspension of reality. 
Rumbold reports that the defence of automatism has been controversial at times 
garnering the media’s attention, and recently, the media’s incredulity over accused persons 
acquitted due to actions carried out while sleepwalking has created controversy. Some of 
these cases have been incredible. For example, cases of sexual assault while asleep have 
involved intoxication which is the most likely factor contributing to the crime.623 
Thus, the theory of excuses gives weight to the controversy that sexual assailants 
claiming to be sleepwalking benefit from an excuse. The theory of excuses argues that 
defences such as automatism are excuse defences because this provides conditions under 
which a defendant might argue existed in order to excuse culpability.624 
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This controversy was heightened when a doctor from the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists acknowledged that people may perform various actions involuntarily while 
asleep, such as teeth grinding or lip smacking, for example. Some sleepers may even get up 
and make a cup of tea. However, it is obviously ‘extremely difficult to perform such a 
complex manoeuvre as having sexual intercourse while asleep – especially if the other person 
is unwilling.’625 
Reznek goes further in his review of automatism and refers to it as “an insane law.” In 
addition, Reznek argues that automatism is really nothing more than an excuse for criminal 
behaviour. As such, automatism is no different from the “excuse of ignorance.”626 Quite 
simply, a defendant is only required to prove that he was ignorant of the act that he was 
carrying out and/or ignorant of its nature and quality.627 
Reznek also takes issue with the division of automatism into the insane and non-
insane categories. The division is “meaningless” because it makes no sense to assume that 
insulin arising from an injection and resulting in violence is non-insane, and insulin from the 
pancreas resulting in a crime is insane.628 
Citing a Canadian case and the comments of one of the presiding judges, Coles opens 
his article with a strong argument relaying the controversial aspect of the defence of 
automatism. In the opening citation, Coles points out how difficult it is to believe that an 
individual who commits a crime under the guise of automatism could carry out the activities 
involuntarily and/or in an unconscious state.629 
Rumbold argues that the defence of automatism is very concerning due to the fact that 
rapists who have consumed alcohol may use it to defend themselves, claiming they were 
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sleepwalking at the time. Moreover, the defence of automatism is not confirmed, nor 
explained, by medical science.630 At the same time, the court must rely on the opinions of 
experts as opposed to scientific proof of the link between sleepwalking and involuntary 
criminal offending.631  
This brings up the question often posed by the responsibility thesis within the scope 
and range of the theory of excuses. Pursuant to the responsibility thesis, excuses function to 
permit the defendant to deny responsibility. Excuses are not based on reasoning as a defence, 
but rather as a basis for denying responsibility, and there is remorse involved in presenting an 
excuse in defence of criminal behaviour.632 
Another controversy that arises out of the defence of automatism is the voluntariness 
issue. The defence of automatism is intended to prevent a defendant paying for a crime when 
he was not acting voluntarily. However, what amounts to involuntariness is not defined nor 
discussed enough.633 Therefore, the emphasis on involuntariness in the defence of 
automatism is problematic because its lack of definition renders the defence uncertain and 
unpredictable.  
Moreover, in Westen’s examination of the theory of excuses, automatism is not totally 
involuntary, nor is it totally uncontrollable. For example, the sleepwalker who goes 
downstairs and retrieves a weapon before returning to use it on a victim is not acting on 
reflexes. Rather the sleepwalker’s behaviour is “agent-directed,” and there are series of 
choices the sleepwalker must make in order to carry out the crime.634 
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The preceding discussion illustrates that the major controversy over the defence of 
automatism is that it might provide some individuals with an excuse for their criminal 
offending. It is difficult to refute the claim that the defendant was asleep, and therefore 
unaware of his actions, during the commission of a crime. It is therefore troubling for many 
observers that this defence is available and can help a criminal get away with murder. At the 
same time, some war veterans with PTSD can benefit from automatism because there is no 
doubt that when such individuals slip into dissociative states, they are unaware of what they 
are doing. 
The law in England draws a distinction between what amounts to insanity and what 
amounts to automatism. Essentially, an internal factor causing the defect of reason and the 
subsequent act will support a defence of insanity. However, an external factor contributing to 
a specific act will be recognised as automatism. For example, in R v Quick, the defendant 
suffered from hypoglycemia having taken too much insulin, and the Appeal Court ordered 
that he ought to have been allowed to use the defence of automatism rather than insanity, as 
the administration of insulin was an external factor. By contrast, in R v Hennessey, the 
diabetic defendant acted when his blood sugar was too high (hyperglycemia) and therefore 
acted due to an internal factor. Therefore, insanity was the proper defence.635 
Under the law of England (and the US), automatism is a common law defence.636 This 
means that judges interpret facts and circumstances that can amount to the defence of 
automatism. Therefore, in the absence of a statute fixing and defining the automatism 
defence, judges have not consistently applied and interpreted what amounts to automatism.637 
Therefore, in an attempt to launch the defence of automatism, defendants essentially face 
significant uncertainty pertaining to the likely outcome of the trial. In other words, defendants 
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seeking to use automatism as a defence to a crime are unable to refer to a statutory definition 
and requirement for establishing automatism. 
6.3. Automatism as a Defence 
Automatism is a physical action in which the actor has no control. A simple definition 
of automatism was posed by the Law Reform Commission of Ireland. Automatism takes 
place when an individual completely loses control of the self, due to externalities such as a 
head injury.638 In such a case, the individual loses conscious awareness of their behaviour, 
and will normally lack mens rea and actus reus.639 Therefore, the defence of automatism 
would involve showing that the accused was completely devoid of voluntary judgment, and 
that such a loss of control was due to external events outside of the individual’s control.640 
Automatism can be insane or induced by insanity or, non-insane which is unrelated to 
insanity. Non-insane automatism may be the loss of control due to a non-conscious state. 
Plausibly, the non-conscious state in the non-insane automatism may be seen as a state of 
temporary insanity, although the disease of the mind element is difficult to establish. All that 
matters in England is that the defendant loses control altogether.  
Regardless of the type of automatism (insane or non-insane), the criminal law is based 
on the perception that no individual should be convicted of a crime if his actions were 
involuntary.641 Automatism arises to prevent this perceived injustice under the criminal law 
in most jurisdictions. In England, the defence of automatism is available for a special verdict 
or an absolute acquittal under the insane and non-insane automatism defences, whereas in 
many states in the US, the defendant can expect an absolute acquittal on the basis of 
automatism, which does not provide for an insane version of the defence. 
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There are two important elements to the defence of automatism: involuntariness and 
non-consciousness. Moreover, for non-insane automatism, external causes or factors must be 
responsible for the elements of unconsciousness and involuntariness.642 This part of the 
chapter will examine the external factors and the two important elements of automatism: non-
consciousness and involuntariness. 
6.3.1. External Factor 
The involuntary element of automatism must be linked to external factors, including 
‘violence, drugs, including anaesthetics, alcohol and hypnotic influences.’643 The point of 
these requirements is that automatism is a defence that must be proven to have been centered 
on the defendant’s unconsciousness or lack or consciousness.644 It is the defendant’s non-
consciousness that renders his behaviour involuntary (the offender is acting with no control 
over his actions and is non-conscious and unlikely to recall the episode). 
Ultimately, automatism occurs when the defendant’s involuntary conduct takes place 
within a non-conscious state. Such behaviour is not aimed at a purpose, nor is it goal 
oriented.645 This loss of consciousness and involuntary behaviour is often brought about by 
an external factor, such as a psychological shock which robs defendants of their ability to 
control their behaviour.646 
In some cases, automatism from a medical perspective occurs when an individual 
cannot consciously control his behaviour. To medical practitioners, this means that something 
is terribly wrong and requires some form of treatment. From a legal perspective, automatism 
occurs when an unlawful act is carried out by a defendant who does not have control over his 
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behaviour.647 As we have seen, in England, the control element is divided between internal 
and external factors to distinguish between insane and non-insane automatism.648 
The defence of automatism is not a denial of guilt, but rather a claim of a lack of 
control. As a result, it is possible for just about anyone charged with a crime to claim 
automatism. This is illustrated by strict liability cases of driving without voluntary control 
where automatism may be claimed. Recognising this, the courts have developed constraints. 
For instance, in the defence of automatism, where the defendant claims to have lacked some 
form of mental control such as blacking out, the court will demand some form of medical 
evidence.649 
In other words, there must be some medical or expert proof of an external factor to 
support a defence of automatism. For instance in Broome v Perkins, a 1987 English case, a 
conviction for driving without due care and attention was affirmed, although the defendant 
claimed to have been rendered out of control due to hypoglycemia. The appellate court ruled 
that the defendant could not succeed with an automatism defence without proof that he lacked 
control.650 In this case, the defendant was suffering from diabetes, and was therefore driving 
in an erratic manner due to low blood sugar.651 
A test similar to the one used in Broome was alluded to in the Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No 2 of 1992). The case at issue surrounded the claim that the defendant drove 
without being aware of the fact. However, the court found that this was not enough to support 
an automatism defence because automatism ‘requires a total destruction of voluntary control 
on the defendant’s part,’ and the defendant’s claims relating to his condition were 
insufficient.652 
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Only in rare cases might an external factor rob the defendant of total control over his 
behaviour. The issue is the defendant’s level of consciousness as evidenced by his voluntary 
responses to the external element.653 For instance, a defendant might claim that a bee flew in 
through the car window and robbed him of all control over his driving.654 However, this 
defence does not explain why the defendant did not stop immediately.  In other words, panic 
in response to an external element will not suffice to support a defence of automatism. The 
courts are determined that a defence of automatism is not available to anyone seeking simply 
to escape criminal liability.  
6.3.1.1. Self-Induced 
Non-insane automatism can take the form of a “brief psychotic” episode.655 In other 
words, self-inflicted/induced is caused through voluntary actions, but the cause of insane 
automatism is involuntary. All that is required is that the defendant’s actions are not 
deliberate. For example, a defendant is not able to claim automatism on the basis of his going 
into a panicked state and ignoring moral and ethical values behaving criminally. Such an 
occasion will not suffice to claim automatism.656 Ultimately, the test for distinguishing 
between sane and insane automatism is determining whether the behaviour was brought about 
by external (sane) causes or internal (insane) causes.657 
When the defendant has the mens rea for a crime, whether he became intoxicated 
voluntarily or not is irrelevant.658 This state of the law of intoxication is demonstrated in the 
case of Kingston. In this case, the defendant who had paedophilic tendencies succumbed to a 
state of non-consciousness after his drink was laced. In the state of non-consciousness, the 
defendant proceeded to seduce a minor. It was held that the mens rea was formed prior to the 
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intoxication, and therefore intoxication was not a successful defence on the grounds of non-
consciousness.659 In this case, it was ruled that intention was still intention, regardless of the 
fact that it was fueled by intoxication.660 
The reality is, automatism is not much of a problem for a defendant who can prove 
involuntary non-consciousness that rendered the individual out of control. The problem is 
always going to be whether voluntary intoxication will stand up to the same test. In DPP v 
Majewski, the House of Lords dealt with the issue of voluntary intoxication. In this case, the 
defendant was intoxicated by choice, and in the process committed assaults on several police 
officers.661 
The defendant argued in his defence that his decision to become intoxicated robbed 
him of the necessary mens rea in his subsequent non-conscious state. However, the 
defendant’s conviction was upheld by the House of Lords, where it was ruled that voluntary 
intoxication would not factor into the subsequent state of non-consciousness, as a means of 
defeating the necessary mens rea.662 
Arguably, if the mens rea was formed prior to the commission of the crime, the 
defendant’s non-conscious state, due to his own voluntary actions, will not suffice to negate 
involuntary behaviour. Thus, if the defendant voluntarily takes an intoxicating substance 
which renders him not conscious and then carries out a criminal act, the resulting non-
consciousness will not be enough to defeat mens rea. As a result, intoxication will not be an 
acceptable defence.  
Moreover, where an offence requires specific intent to satisfy the elements of the 
crime, self-inflicted automatism will suffice.663 This is because automatism requires 
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involuntary behaviour. The mind must not know what the body is doing, nor can the mind 
have control over what the body is doing.664 Thus, an individual may naturally intend to 
misbehave when he knowingly consumes intoxicating substances. On the other hand, an 
individual who panics and crashes into another vehicle in response to a spontaneous attack by 
bees is acting involuntarily, and without the benefit of control (these actions are not 
unconscious or signs of some terrible medical problem, but uncontrollable actions).   
As the Law Commission stated, voluntary or self-induced intoxication must carry 
some responsibility for criminal behaviour, even in cases requiring specific intent. For 
instance, an individual who kills someone after voluntarily becoming intoxicated, without the 
specific intent to cause the death of the individual, must be responsible although not to the 
extent of murder due to the absence of intent.665 The obvious exception is where the intent 
was formed prior to voluntary intoxication. In the US, however, there are mixed results. 
Some states hold individuals who commit crimes while intentionally intoxicated wholly 
responsible for their behaviour, while other states will allow a reduced offence and 
sentence.666 
A self-induced state of involuntariness or unconsciousness will not necessarily 
amount to a bar to the intoxication defence. Perhaps, a self-induced automatism can support 
an intoxication defence to crimes where specific intention is required, but not in cases where 
basic intent is sufficient.667 At the same time, even where a defence of intoxication may 
suffice in self-induced cases, the defence may only be partial.  
In England, R v Bailey illustrates the court’s reluctance to consider self-inflicted 
incapacitation due to voluntary intoxication.668 The court ruled that self-inflicted automatism 
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save for that brought on by the consumption of drugs and/or alcohol can function as a defence 
negating mens rea. An altered state of consciousness is more problematic for substantiating 
automatism in England. Apparently, the courts are not concerned with the reason for 
consuming intoxicating substances, but rather the issue is whether consumption was 
voluntary. This is an understandable approach if the courts are reluctant to permit everyone to 
attempt to mitigate a crime on the grounds of voluntary intoxication. Take, for example, the 
alcoholic who drinks to relieve physical dependency problems – such an individual may be 
able to argue involuntary intoxication. 
6.3.2. Non-Conscious  
The key to the success of automatism is the lack of mens rea.669 Therefore, a claim of 
non-consciousness is very important. According to Child and Ormerod, ‘the clearest cases of 
sane automatism will involve D being rendered fully unconscious’ at the time of the 
offence.670 In such a case, the defendant clearly and obviously lacks the requisite control over 
the body, and thus, any actions taken by the body are independent of the mind and therefore 
unconscious, which in turn means that mens rea was not formed.671 
Non-consciousness is not normally a permanent condition, and consciousness is only 
temporarily suspended. During the suspension of consciousness, the individual is unable to 
control or direct his movements or actions. In other words, the individual is moving and 
acting, but is unaware of his actions or movements.672 
Essentially, automatism is based on a claim that the defendant was devoid of control 
and consciousness.673 This means that the defendant carries out acts that he is neither aware 
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of nor in control of. In other words, there is a total lack of control. As a result, the defendant 
cannot form the necessary mens rea for a conviction in a criminal case.674 The California 
Supreme Court ruled that an individual who is not conscious of his actions is not acting with 
the necessary volition for a finding of criminal responsibility.675 
 It therefore appears that much controversy surrounds how the defendant found 
himself of herself in a state of non-consciousness when they committed the crime in question. 
If the non-conscious state is involuntary, the defendant has a much better chance of 
acceptance with an automatism defence. However, if the non-conscious state is voluntary, the 
defendant has an uphill battle in successfully launching a defence of automatism. 
6.3.3. Involuntary Action 
The defence of automatism follows from the belief that an individual cannot be held 
criminally responsible unless his behaviour is voluntary. Still, there is some criticism of this 
requirement in criminal law because it assumes that the mental and physical elements of 
crime are bounded.676 In other words, an individual may perform an act deliberately, but at 
the same time, lack the mental element necessary to be accountable. Automatism assumes 
that if the action was involuntary, the defendant did not intend to behave as he did. The 
offender is not acting voluntarily, and pursuant to an impulse he is unable to resist.677 
This is borne by the ruling in Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, where 
Lord Denning stated that automatism is action that is not consciously and voluntarily 
undertaken. What happens is ‘an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the 
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mind.’678 In other words, the actions of the individual are involuntary, and the factors causing 
involuntary action are also involuntary.679 
When a physical act is involuntary, the individual is said to be able to use the defence 
of automatism.680 The involuntary act is a result of the individual’s actions being separated 
from the “conscious mind.”681 What comes to mind is a muscle spasm or a reflex,682 however, 
automatism goes beyond these, because such involuntary actions would not usually result in a 
criminal investigation and trial. 
Non-insane automatism requires that there is a connection between the mind and the 
involuntary action. This will typically involve some form of guidance through the mind that 
the actor is wholly unaware or unconscious of.683 In other words, the action must be such that 
it is behaviour that can be described and impactful. Automatism only arises where the action 
is disconnected for the mind and is, therefore, involuntary. 
A defendant is not permitted to succeed on a defence of automatism where it is a state 
brought on by their voluntary behaviour. For instance, voluntary intoxication will not 
generally result in an acceptance claim of automatism.684 This is probably because 
automatism requires complete loss of control and involuntariness.685 Clearly, the courts are 
determined to make it harder for a defendant to claim automatism if it was due to his own 
decision to become non-conscious. Although the behaviour was involuntary, it was not a state 
of involuntariness from the beginning. There was a conscious and controlled decision to bring 
about a state of involuntariness. 
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For the defendant who voluntarily becomes intoxicated, but slips and falls while 
intoxicated and hits his head resulting in a concussion, automatism may be a viable defence 
to conduct that was due to the concussion, and had no connection whatsoever with the 
voluntary intoxication.686 In other words, voluntary intoxication cannot be a direct cause of 
the automatism claimed (in this case, the connection between concussion and conduct). 
Under English criminal law, the case of R v Charlson established the defence of 
automatism.  In R v Charlson, the defendant suffered from a brain tumor, and as a result he 
gave in to uncontrollable impulses of violence against his son. It was ruled at trial that the 
defendant’s attack on his son was consistent with the impact of the brain tumor.687 The 
defendant’s violence against his son was deemed uncontrollable due to an involuntary 
condition. The jury, therefore, acquitted the defendant on the grounds of automatism.688 
However, this case was superseded by R v Kemp (1957) that held that a brain tumour was a 
disease of the mind and so insanity, not automatism, would have been the appropriate plea. 
Under English criminal law it is clear is that for a defence of automatism to be 
accepted, the defendant must be shown to have lost complete control of his behaviour during 
the commission of the crime.689 Thus, in England, the main question is not so much whether 
the defendant was non-conscious, but rather whether they lost complete control over their 
actions.690 One good example would be the individual who sneezes and loses control of his 
bodily functions, and is at the same time fully conscious.691 It was held that a bout of 
sneezing may possibly amount to an involuntary act for automatism defence (the defendant 
was conscious, but lacked control).692 
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6.4. War Veterans, PTSD, and Automatism Defence 
As illustrated in this chapter, there are three factors that are important for determining 
whether an individual charged with a crime can reasonably offer automatism as a defence. 
The main problem is whether it is fair for an individual who is seemingly non-conscious to 
claim that what might seem like otherwise agency-directed actions were not conscious 
decisions.693 The defence of automatism is therefore contentious and controversial. As a 
result, the question for consideration is not so much whether war veterans with PTSD can 
succeed in offering automatism as a defence to a crime, but rather whether the circumstances 
and conditions exist for war veterans with PTSD to offer automatism as a defence for a 
crime.  
The three factors are external elements (fundamentally in England, but not in the US), 
non-consciousness (not essential in England, but essential in California as well as important 
for war veterans with PTSD who experience dissociative states to claim/succeed with the 
automatism defence) and involuntariness (total loss of control). Essentially, this means that 
an individual claiming a defence of automatism would have to prove that he acted 
involuntarily due to an external factor. One example that ties the three factors together is the 
individual who is shot and reacts automatically, so that he is non-consciously making 
decisions, and as a result acting involuntarily due to an external factor (however, in some 
cases, an individual cannot act voluntarily even if he is consciously making decisions such as 
sneezing while driving). 
The main issue for consideration is whether, and to what extent, PTSD symptoms 
when triggered, can amount to the necessary external factor preceding non-conscious and 
involuntary acts. PTSD has been described as a mental condition induced by fear that 
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generates automatic reactions that hinder a rationalised approach to the analysis of 
information.694 
For the war veteran with PTSD, the brain can become programmed, so that the 
veteran immediately responds to triggers with the options of fighting or fleeing. Rational and 
reasonable assessments of the triggers are delayed while the flight or fight response takes 
over.695 Therefore, an individual with PTSD may respond to a trigger in ways that are 
consistent with automatism. The war veteran with PTSD is more likely to have automatic 
responses that are consistent with automatism when his flight or fight instincts are aroused. 
6.4.1. External Factor  
Determining where PTSD fits within the sphere of automatism can be complicated. 
PTSD is listed in the DSM as a mental disorder, which necessarily raises the question of 
whether a crime committed by an individual is more suited to a claim of insanity. Yet, at the 
same time, PTSD symptoms are often triggered by an external factor or trauma. In this 
regard, PTSD may not necessarily meet the legal standard of an internal factor, such as 
schizophrenia, hyperglycaemic episodes, sleepwalking, epilepsy, and arteriosclerosis.696 In 
such a case, insanity is the appropriate defence.697 
The problem with PTSD is that it is neither a straightforward psychotic state nor a 
straightforward personality disorder, but rather exists somewhere in between.698 This means 
that PTSD has an uneasy co-existence with both insane and sane automatism. While 
psychosis can establish the legal definition of insanity, a personality disorder may not. 
Therefore, PTSD occupies a tenuous position for the purpose of satisfying insane and non-
insane automatism.  
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External factors serve to distinguish non-insane automatism from insanity. The court 
has distinguished between internal and external causes as a means of avoiding stigmatising 
diabetes as a mental malady.699 The medicine, and failure to take the medicine, are external 
causes and as such, are factors establishing non-insane automatism. For the war veteran with 
PTSD, the question for consideration is whether or not the veteran can rely on PTSD to 
establish a defence of external influences, and thus non-insane automatism, when PTSD is 
officially listed as a psychological disorder. 
Still, there are lists of personality disorders in the DSM that are not accepted as 
mental defects or diseases of the mind for the purpose of establishing an insanity defence.700 
For the most part, an insanity defence is usually available only to those who suffer from some 
form of psychosis or mental disability.701 This is not the case for PTSD, because it is not 
listed as a psychosis. Yet, some of its symptoms can be so serious that a psychosis is 
possible.702 The psychological trauma, which is the external factor, is the reason for the 
tenuous position of PTSD in law and in medicine. For the war veteran with PTSD, where the 
war experience is the external factor, it is difficult to assign a label of insanity. 
External factors such as the ingestion of intoxicating substances, reflexes, 
convulsions, concussion, blackouts, and so on will support a claim of non-insane 
automatism.703 Blackouts are an important external factor when considering the feasibility of 
a war veteran with PTSD claiming non-insane automatism as a defence. Blackouts occur 
when the war veteran with PTSD has flashbacks and goes into a dissociative state. Losing 
complete consciousness, and then all of his decisions and actions are involuntary. During a 
blackout, the same level of consciousness and involuntariness will also arise, so that the war 
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veteran with PTSD loses connection with the real world and is unable to control their 
behaviour. The dissociative state is described as ‘an altered state of consciousness’ where ‘an 
alternate mental system’ takes over.704  
For war veterans with PTSD, the experiences of war might act as the external factor 
necessary for establishing a defence of automatism. To satisfy the elements of automatism, 
the war veteran with PTSD can argue that the crime occurred during a dissociative state 
which, in fact, gave way to unconscious and involuntary actions. This is especially possible 
because psychological automatism is described as a situation in which the conscious mind is 
entirely taken over by “past experiences.” 705 These past experiences are external factors for 
the war veteran with PTSD who becomes submerged in a dissociative state where he relives 
the combat experience. 
The experience of war is especially traumatic and therefore could be regarded as an 
external factor for establishing the necessary elements of automatism. However, the issue 
would be whether the cause of the conduct was the current state of having PTSD, or the cause 
of that current state. Combat experience is so traumatic that it is difficult to identify 
individuals who have experienced it, and in particular, those who have been injured during 
combat who have not developed PTSD.706 Therefore, PTSD is an anticipated consequence of 
war.707  
There are a number of variables that can act as external elements for the purpose of 
establishing a defence of automatism by veterans with war-related PTSD. The variables 
include the actual combat experience in terms of front line battles against the enemies; 
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immoral undertakings such as attacks on civilians, witnessing immoral injuries, being taken 
as a prisoner of war, witnessing the death or injury of a colleague, and so on.708 
When considering the combat soldier with PTSD, the necessary external factors can 
be violence.709 For example, Kennedy, Jaffee, Leskin, Stokes, Leal and Fitzpatrick’s study 
concluded that combat soldiers who were exposed to explosions and sustained physical 
injuries were more likely to develop PTSD than soldiers who sustained no injuries during 
war.710   
Combat is difficult to weather and can cause amnesia together with dissociation.711 
When in a dissociative state, the individual can have amnesia.712 The war veteran with PTSD 
can emerge from a dissociative state with no memory of the behaviour carried out while in 
that state.713 A Vietnam veteran shared a vastly similar experience in which he experienced 
combat nightmares, as well as dissociative episodes.714 Thus, the war experience is an 
external traumatic factor (unlike epilepsy and other internal causes, the causative factor is 
external and is an internal factor negating the proper use of resulting action). 
PTSD symptoms supporting an automatism defence must show that the external 
trauma existed at the requisite time.715 This is especially important for war veterans with 
PTSD because they are attempting to argue that the trauma inducing PTSD symptoms and 
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triggers precede the crime.716 Therefore, in order to appropriately claim automatism, the 
PTSD sufferer must establish a strong correlation between the initial trauma and the 
dissociative event.717 
As the Law Reform Commission explains, automatism takes place when the 
individual loses absolute control of the self, due to an external factor, ‘such as being hit in the 
head and then losing all awareness’ of one’s acts.718 Here, it is easy to reconcile this 
explanation of automatism with the case of the war veteran with PTSD who is triggered by 
stimuli and relives the trauma of war, and in doing so, loses all sense of reality. 
     There is no fixed law for determining whether or not war veterans or any other 
defendant with PTSD can set out a defence identifying external factors. This means that the 
fate of the PTSD sufferer is in the hands of a jury of his peers. In North Carolina, in State v 
Connell, it was established that whether an individual has acted unconsciously or 
involuntarily while in a dissociative state is a question of fact for the jury. In this case, it was 
determined that when there is evidence of unconsciousness or dissociation, the defence of 
automatism is a question of fact best left to the jury.719  
      In England, it was determined that a traumatic event giving rise to PTSD symptoms of 
dissociation can support a defence of automatism. In R v T, a rape victim with PTSD 
produced medical evidence showing that she was in a dissociative state when her subsequent 
alleged crimes were committed, and as such was in an altered state of consciousness lacking 
control. The court ruled that the automatism defence could be put to the jury because rape 
could traumatise its victims and could satisfy the external factor requirement.720 
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When an individual voluntarily becomes intoxicated, they cannot expect to 
successfully claim intoxication, since voluntary intoxication assumes that the individual knew 
in advance that he can lose control.721 Therefore, when considering whether intoxication is an 
appropriate defence for veterans with PTSD, it is important to consider whether abuse of 
drugs or alcohol, or other intoxicating substances, is voluntary or involuntary.  
Voluntary intoxication is obviously a question of reckless intent. This is because the 
individual who voluntarily becomes intoxicated assumes the risk of carrying out involuntary 
actions. Indeed, driving while there is a risk of becoming unconscious due to diabetes is 
considered to be reckless intent, because the individual is deemed to have reasonable 
foresight of the risk of becoming unconscious, but takes the risk nevertheless.722 This may 
raise some concerns for war veterans with PTSD who resort to substance abuse as a means 
for soothing the unpleasant symptoms of PTSD. Substance abuse is recognised as being a 
serious problem among the military.723 
When an individual deliberately and consciously becomes intoxicated, he assumes the 
risk that comes with intoxication. Therefore, purposeful voluntary self-intoxication is not a 
sustainable defence (for basic intent crimes, but a sustainable defence for specific intent 
crimes). In the case of Coley, the defendant had been convicted of attempted murder, and had 
consumed cannabis. The problem for the defendant in Coley is that he had voluntarily 
become intoxicated through the use of cannabis. As a result, his temporary state of psychosis 
was self-induced, and therefore insufficient to support a claim of automatism.724 However, 
returning war veterans may abuse substances to alleviate the symptoms of PTSD, and such 
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intoxication may be considered involuntary. It is hardly a coincidence that those returning 
from Iraq and Afghanistan with PTSD were at higher risk for alcohol abuse and violence.725 
The US takes a similar approach to England in voluntary and involuntary intoxication. 
For example, in Schlatter v Indiana, the defendant could not claim automatism due to 
voluntary intoxication.726 The difficulty for war veterans with PTSD who go undiagnosed 
and, therefore, untreated, is that they may not claim automatism when their altered states of 
non-consciousness are brought on by intoxicating substances as a method of self-treatment.  
6.4.2. Non-Conscious 
A chain reaction occurs in the defence of automatism, which starts with an external 
factor which brings about an involuntary response action by a defendant who is in an altered 
state of non-consciousness. In this regard, one must consider that the involuntary response 
action is carried out in a state of altered consciousness, which is all brought about by an 
external factor. As Morse points out, however, when an individual is in an unconscious state, 
he will rarely carry out criminal activities, and if he does carry out a crime, he will not incur 
criminal responsibility.727 Morse’s observation sheds some light on why it is difficult to 
identify the appropriate circumstances and conditions in which it is feasible for an 
automatism defence to be proffered. 
Automatism arises when the defendant is unconscious, or not conscious of his 
behaviour.728 In many states of the USA, “unconsciousness” is used interchangeably with the 
defence of automatism (however, in England, the emphasis is on complete loss of control). 
The individual is in a state of unconsciousness because the individual is able to act, but is not 
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aware of his actions.729 While the US MPC does not define unconsciousness, it does equate it 
with involuntariness and the state of being asleep. Specifically, section 2.01 states that a 
voluntary act is not established when the individual’s body moves while unconscious or 
asleep.730 
 Under the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2017), 
unconsciousness is defined as an “impairment defense,” and an individual is unconscious 
when he is non-conscious of his acts.731 Ultimately, the individual may be unconscious, but 
still able to move. While sleepwalking is commonly associated with actions that are carried 
out unconsciously, the dissociative state can also fall under the unconscious element of 
automatism.732 In California, the state of unconsciousness is pivotal to the defence of 
automatism since criminal responsibility can only be established via a state of conscious 
decision making and actions.733 
Obviously, a dissociative state makes it impossible to form the necessary mens rea.734 
This is because if a dissociative state is the basis for an automatism defence, the defendant 
must show that his act was separated from the conscious mind. This separation negates the 
necessary mens rea. Dissociation works to negate mens rea only when it is linked to a 
psychological factor.735 The psychological factor for the PTSD sufferer would obviously be 
the trauma that caused PTSD and the underlying symptom of dissociation. For war veterans 
with PTSD, the traumatic event causing PTSD and the related symptom of dissociation would 
be the exposure to combat. Thus, the unconscious element makes it possible for an 
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automatism defence to be made by defendants with PTSD, who claim they were in a 
dissociative state.736 
PTSD victims can fall into an unconscious state due to dissociation. In such a case, 
the PTSD victim is not “consciously aware of his actions.”737 The dissociative state is 
described as creating ‘a sense of being out of their own bodies.’738 This out-of-body 
experience is obviously a separation of the mind and body, so that the PTSD sufferer is 
wholly non-conscious of what the body is doing. Images of the war veteran going into a 
dissociative state, where he blacks out and relives a traumatic event, comes to mind. It is 
fortunate that for the war veteran with PTSD, the defence of automatism is available for 
episodes such as flashbacks and blackouts that cannot support a defence of insanity. 
Although sleep disorders are prevalent among PTSD sufferers, there is very little 
research on the degree of sleep disorders among war veterans.739 Since sleep disturbances are 
common among PTSD sufferers, it can be assumed that sleep disturbances occur in war 
veterans with PTSD. The dissociative state can be comprised of sleepwalking and 
experiencing night terrors.740 Automatism has been used for sleepwalkers experiencing a 
dissociative state in the US.741 For US scholars, sleepwalking is treated as automatism, which 
is defined as a state of unconsciousness and “temporary mental incapacity.” On the other 
hand, in England, sleepwalking is treated as insanity. At present, however, some courts in 
England tend to treat sleepwalking as a sane automatism.742  
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The appropriateness of automatism for the PTSD sufferer in a dissociative state was 
validated in a North Carolina case, State v Fields, where the defendant was considered to be 
in a state of unconsciousness, although temporary, but such that his mind and body were 
disconnected. The Court of Appeals ruled that the judge, in the first instance, was incorrect 
when he did not instruct the jury that they could take account of the fact that the defendant 
with PTSD was in a dissociative state.743 When there is evidence of an unconscious or 
dissociative state, the question of whether it is enough to support automatism is a question of 
fact for the jury.744 It has been clearly established throughout this dissertation that the 
dissociative state has a strong correlation with PTSD. Dissociative states and veterans with 
PTSD have also been well documented in the literature.745 
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that a Vietnam veteran with PTSD succeeded in his 
appeal against a conviction, where automatism could have been established due to 
dissociative state. The case in question was People v Lisnow (California) which determined 
that a defence of automatism on a charge of battery could succeed where a defendant was in a 
state of unconsciousness due to a dissociative or fugue state at the relevant time.746 This 
ruling established that automatism is an acceptable defence where the individual with PTSD 
has a flashback due to a dissociative state.747 
However, in some cases, automatism in connection with PTSD may be not enough to 
succeed. The defence of automatism may be unsuccessful because the defendant is unable to 
prove that the trauma incurred during combat, which then that caused the PTSD. There is an 
obvious necessity for the proof requirement. If individuals were able to simply claim that 
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they were in a dissociative state due to the trauma of war without proof, automatism would 
validate fears that it can be exploited as an excuse for criminal behaviour.  
6.4.3. Involuntary Action  
Involuntary actions denotes the extent to which the actor has control over his actions. 
The emphasis is on the defendant’s inability to control his behaviour in that he is not aware of 
his actions, and as such cannot take control of them. As a result, the defendant is acting 
involuntarily.748 However, the defendant is not always non-conscious. 
As with the external factor that triggers the dissociative state for a PTSD sufferer, the 
dissociative state can also render the PTSD sufferer in a state of altered consciousness in 
which he acts involuntarily. What is necessary for establishing involuntariness is that the 
defendant’s behaviour was determined by a condition that rendered him unable to make a 
decision based on reason.749 The causative factor must be such that the involuntary behaviour 
is accounted for, and not merely an excuse for committing crimes.750 When one thinks of the 
PTSD sufferer in a dissociative state, images of the war veteran suffering a flashback 
triggered by sight and/or sound easily comes to mind. It is therefore quite plausible that a war 
veteran triggered by an external factor can act involuntarily, and therefore offer automatism 
as a defence with respect to his involuntary acts. 
Automatism amounts to complete involuntariness.751 This means that the defendant’s 
actions must be observed to be completely disconnected from the conscious mind. There 
must be a state of automatic behaviour, so that it is clear that the defendant’s mind had no 
control over the body. Combat veterans who are trained to respond to threats with a fight or 
flight mentality are especially vulnerable to automatism.752 Therefore, when veterans with 
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PTSD comes face to face with a triggering event and make a hasty decision, the trigger is a 
threat that the consequential dissociative state will intervene to take over the conscious mind 
of the veteran (the veteran is left in an automatic state).753 
In the US, a defence of automatism will generally succeed for PTSD sufferers, where 
there is a reflex action over which the individual has no control and a dissociative state, since 
some US courts agree that automatism does not always require a total “state of 
unconsciousness.”754 However, in California, the unconsciousness element is an essential 
condition to succeed in the automatism defence due to the fact that people are supposed to be 
conscious.755 This is included in the US MPC, as previously mentioned, which goes on to 
state that involuntary action occurs when the body moves during unconsciousness or while 
asleep. 
6.4.4. Rejection and Acceptance of the Automatism Defence  
The controversies regarding the defence of automatism have been discussed in this 
chapter. The main concern is the possibility of defendants exploiting this defence as a means 
of excusing criminal behaviour. Still, automatism together with insanity establishes the 
constraints around which an individual may be excused for criminal behaviour.756 It is, 
therefore, not a surprise that some judges have shown “scepticism” toward some of the 
claims of automatism where the actions have appeared to be “purposive.” This section is 
concerned with the rejection and acceptance of the automatism defence. In considering the 
rejection of the automatism defence, it is necessary to examine the weakness of automatism.  
The primary weakness of automatism as a defence for PTSD sufferers is linked to 
controversies over the defence. This main weakness for England is that the defendant is only 
in a state of automatism if he has lost absolute control of his actions. There must be an 
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absolute disconnect between the mind and the body.757 On the other hand, the jurisdiction in 
California relies on the state of unconsciousness to support the automatism defence, as we 
have seen in the Lisnow case. This means that the defendant must deal with the very difficult 
task of proving automatism when he is seemingly able to function and control his actions.758 
This has been a main controversy for the automatism defence because an individual who 
commits a crime in this state is seen to be making a number of apparent conscious decisions. 
However, in some jurisdictions, such as North Carolina, which require unconsciousness, in 
the Fields case, the court insisted on a state of unconsciousness.    
With regard to acceptance, it is clear that external factors, such as the trauma of war, 
may be available for a non-insane defence of automatism by a war veteran with PTSD 
(precisely in England, but in the US they could use the trauma as insanity or automatism). 
The triggered war veteran with PTSD who falls into a dissociative state through reliving the 
PTSD inducing trauma can claim the involuntary and unconscious elements of non-insane 
automatism. It is not difficult to imagine a war veteran with PTSD responding to triggers that 
lead to a dissociative state. For example, many films about veterans, or featuring veterans or 
active duty soldiers, usually include soldiers or veterans with PTSD who are triggered by 
light or sounds that immediately cause flashbacks. In these flashbacks, the veterans or 
soldiers are reliving their war experiences, and are automatically carrying out war functions. 
There is a total disconnect with reality.  
The involuntary actions required to support defences of automatism are different from 
the insanity defence because they do not require a mental defect or a disease of the mind.759 
Dissociation will usually take place when a PTSD sufferer is triggered by a stimulus.760 It is 
an external factor rather than an internal factor that drives a mental defect or a disease of the 
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mind. This is essentially a dissociative case, which is tantamount to unconsciousness or 
automatism. The individual with PTSD is often out of touch with reality, and is actually taken 
back, in their mind, to the traumatic episode that caused PTSD.761 
Unlike in England, the US makes no real distinction between sane and insane 
automatism. In the US, where a defendant seeks to rely on any element in support of 
automatism that can fit under an insanity defence, the defendant is more likely to claim 
insanity. This is because experience informs us that US jurors are more inclined to return a 
verdict that is not amenable to a defence of “temporary insanity.”762 
However, in the US, where automatism is not divided into insane and non-insane, a 
Chinese woman was found guilty of manslaughter instead of murder in the case of People v 
Wu (California). In this case, the woman was put on trial for the strangulation of her son. In 
her defence, she argued automatism on the grounds that her actions came about as a result of 
a fugue state, due to her humiliation over being rejected by her lover. The judge ruled that the 
jury was permitted to take account for the culture of the defendant (so, by extension, combat 
experience could be accepted for the automatism defence). This was an important element for 
establishing the defendant’s claim of automatism, and whether it was reasonable to accept 
that she would be so impacted by her status as a rejected lover, that she would fall into a state 
of automatism.763 
In the US and England, war veterans with PTSD confront the difficulty of uncertainty 
when offering automatism as a defence, because automatism is a common law defence. This 
means that there is no statute regulating and fixing the elements of the automatism defence. 
Therefore, predicting the outcome of an automatism defence for war veterans with PTSD is 
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problematic. This is especially complicated when one considers the tenuous position of PTSD 
as a psychosis, placing it precariously between insanity and automatism. 
The problem with the automatism was discussed by Loveless, Allen and Derry, when 
they argued that intoxication produces various problems. For example, when intoxication 
gives rise to insane behaviour and the defendant is unaware of his actions, the case is more 
appropriately tried on the basis of insanity, because the M’Naghten rules will be applicable. 
Yet, where the defendant already has a disease of the mind and becomes intoxicated, it is not 
altogether clear whether his crime will fall under insanity or simple intoxication.764 
The availability of automatism is also unclear in such circumstances, which obviously 
presents a problem for war veterans with PTSD who are reliving their symptoms. The 
problem is that automatism can easily coincide with a dissociative state which can lead to an 
identification of PTSD, with attention on the need for treatment. However, the lack of clarity 
surrounding automatism leaves it as an uncertain defence. 
 It is clear that in both the US and England, the defence of intoxication is unlikely to 
be accepted in instances where automatism is allegedly brought on by voluntary intoxication, 
because mens rea can be established prior to intoxication. An individual is expected to know 
in advance what sort of behaviour he is likely to manifest following intoxication, and 
therefore, the decision to become intoxicated shows a consciousness of guilt beforehand. It is 
important to recognise that there is no acceptable defence in self-induced or voluntary 
intoxication for crimes that require basic/general intent (for example, manslaughter and 
reckless criminal damage), but in involuntary intoxication, there is a defence of intoxication, 
and for crimes that require specific intent (for example, murder and grievous bodily harm 
(GBH) with intent), and there is also a defence of intoxication.  
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Still, it may be feasible to argue that war veterans with PTSD are left in an uncertain 
condition when it comes to automatism in the criminal law. According to Schopp, the English 
explanation of automatism and its correlation with insanity renders automatism a difficult 
defence to lodge.765 As established previously in this chapter, the issues tend to surround 
what distinguishes non-insane automatism from sane automatism. 
6.4.5. Automatism or Insanity 
It is quite simple to illustrate this chain reaction through a war veteran with PTSD. 
The war veteran with PTSD can be suddenly startled by a helicopter flying overhead and 
immediately lose all connection to reality, believing that he is back in combat and reliving the 
traumatic event that caused the PTSD. Therefore, the trigger places the war veteran with 
PTSD in an altered state of consciousness, and in this altered state, the war veteran 
involuntarily shoots at a passerby, thinking that he is the enemy in a war zone. In such a case, 
the shooting is not directed by a conscious mind, and is therefore involuntary.  
In such a case as the one above, whether the war veteran pleads insanity, non-insane 
automatism, or indeed something else entirely, will depend on the jurisdiction in which the 
event occurred, the precise legal rules, and the details of the case. However, it is possible to 
draw together some strands.  
In jurisdictions with narrow insanity rules, such as M’Naughten, the issue identified in 
Chapter Five on insanity, is whether PTSD is a “disease of the mind,” and if it is, then the 
defendant may be able to plead insanity. In jurisdictions with wider tests, such as the MPC or 
Durham tests, this is even more plausible. 
If PTSD is not a “disease of the mind,” and the relevant insanity rule requires this, 
then insanity will not be applicable. The question addressed in this chapter, therefore, is 
whether non-insane automatism is available and, if so, on what grounds. Here the issues are 
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more complex, but will depend on whether the initial violence or the “trigger” are regarded as 
“external” and, if so, whether the veteran can show that the external factor caused his 
conduct, such that it was completely out of his control. If he can do this, then he ought to 
have the option of a defence of non-insane automatism to put to the jury.      
6.5. Conclusion 
The most controversial aspect of the defence of automatism is that it permits an 
absolute acquittal for otherwise criminal behaviour on the grounds of non-consciousness and 
involuntariness, brought on by an external factor. There is a problem accepting that an 
individual can carry out a series of acts and not have any conscious awareness or direction 
with regards to the acts. The more serious the crime, the more difficult this line of reasoning 
becomes. For instance, in the Bratty case, a defence of automatism as a basis for an outright 
acquittal was denied by the House of Lords.766 
It is, therefore, hardly surprising as this chapter has demonstrated, that there are very 
few cases where automatism has been used by defendants suffering from PTSD, partly 
because PTSD sufferers have been more amenable to offering insanity as a defence. This is 
particularly true for war veterans with PTSD. This is unfortunate because automatism can 
apply to a dissociative state which is common among war veterans with PTSD who are easily 
triggered into experiencing flashbacks, and as a result, slip into blackouts/non-consciousness. 
In England, there has been an obvious hesitancy about permitting a defence of 
automatism where a defendant is charged with serious offences, such as murder. This is 
understandable because the end result is an absolute acquittal. When a defendant receives a 
special verdict on the basis of insanity, they will receive treatment for the disease of the mind 
established. For war veterans with PTSD, court ordered treatment is necessary for diagnosing 
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and treating war veterans who have somehow managed to confront delayed PTSD, or to 
escape recognition and treatment. 
It appears that the US and England are hesitant to permit an absolute acquittal in cases 
of serious crimes, such as murder, based on a claim of a temporary mental condition. As long 
as the charge is murder, the PTSD sufferer hoping to establish a dissociative state would have 
the best chance for an acceptable defence by using insanity. For lesser charges, the PTSD 



















Chapter Seven: Self-Defence 
7.1. Introduction 
The 17th century English poet and statesman, John Milton, introduced a theory of 
natural law which held that mankind had a natural right to self-defence.767 In the US, the right 
to self-defence is accepted as a significant element of natural law (at least by those scholars 
inclined to that perspective).768 Natural law has played a significant role in the US’s castle 
doctrine (the right to protect the home from invaders) upon which contemporary self-defence 
is founded.769 In fact, under the common law which also applies in England, persons have the 
inalienable right to defend life, liberty, and property. However, this is not merely a common 
law right, it is also a constitutional right in the US.770 In many states, self-defence is a 
constitutional right applicable to the criminal law.771 
The greatest difficulty encountered with self-defence is attempting to determine 
whether the act of self-defence is justified or just an excuse for criminal behaviour.772 For 
example, the individual must have reasonable grounds to believe such force is necessary to 
prevent an urgent threat to life or an immediate threat of physical injury.773 Generally, self-
defence requires an objective test, but the lack of a precise definition of threat to life and 
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immediacy leaves open the possibility of a subjective test, which has caused significant 
debate over the opportunities this presents for abusing and exploiting self-defence.774 
Essentially, a reasonable perception of a threat forms the grounds for justifying self-
defence. This can be entirely tenuous and subjective because the perceived threat requires an 
examination of the surrounding circumstances, and of how the defendant perceives his 
safety.775 Self-defence, therefore, promises to at least aide war veterans with PTSD in their 
defence of criminal behaviour. This is because the state of hyper-vigilance, that often haunts 
PTSD sufferers, will undoubtedly have a significant impact on their perceptions of danger. 
This part of the chapter will analyse and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of self-
defence, and how it may or may not have a satisfactory outcome in a criminal trial. 
7.2. Controversies over Self-Defence 
Self-defence as a defence in criminal law is premised on the distinction between 
justifiable behaviour (examining whether the behaviour is wrong or not, focusing on the act), 
and behaviour that is merely an excuse (the behaviour is wrong, but examining the 
responsibility of the defendant, focusing on the actor). Justification theory holds that killing 
in self-defence is justified in specific conditions and circumstances. Those conditions are that 
killing is necessary, and proportional to the threat invoking a defensive response, otherwise 
the homicide may not be “tolerated or excused.”776 
Ultimately, the theory of justification argues that when a defendant carries out a 
justified act, it is not criminal behaviour.777 However, when an individual carries out an act 
that is excusable, the individual still acts criminally, but is not punished for the behaviour.778 
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When self-defence is justified, it would therefore not be expected to create controversy. For 
example, a man who uses a weapon to kill a home invader whom he believed was about to 
kill his children will be justified in the defence of his children. For those who suspect that 
self-defence is used as an excuse for the killing, controversy is expected.  
Such controversy relates to the fact that when it is concluded that the defendant 
committed a crime, but should not be convicted nor punished, this is tantamount to permitting 
a criminal to go free.779 In fact, such an outcome is regarded as an “injustice” and ‘a 
magnanimous, but gratuitous, and entirely insulting gesture’ or rather offensive.780 
One of the most controversial cases in which self-defence can be seen as an excuse 
for murder was the killing of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman. This particular case 
resulted in significant research on “the stand your ground law” (meaning the right to defend 
oneself in a confrontation outside of the home when one could otherwise retreat).781 The 
public generally doubted that Zimmerman had a genuine reason to believe that killing Martin 
was necessary or proportional. This was evidenced by the public outrage that ensued.782 After 
all, Martin was an unarmed teenager, lawfully taking a stroll in the neighbourhood where his 
father lived.783 Yet, self-defence under the State of Florida’s “stand your ground law” 
permitted Zimmerman to use this law as an excuse for what would have otherwise been 
regarded as first degree murder. 
The Trayvon Martin and George Zimmerman case attracted significant media 
attention, and great controversy over whether or not it is feasible to permit a person to use 
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deadly force outside of one’s home under the guise of self-defence. Attention was also drawn 
to the absence of a duty to retreat first. These shortcomings drew significantly more attention 
to self-defence.784 
There are always going to be cases where self-defence was an obvious response to a 
grave situation. For instance, when a home invader enters a home at night, armed and 
dangerous. At the same time, when there are young children in the home, an attack on the 
home invader to prevent an attack on the young children, with no other resource available, 
will be perceived as justified. However, an attack on an individual based on a groundless 
suspicion will be perceived as unjustified, although possibly excused. The latter will draw 
significant controversy.  
In England, even where one’s home is invaded, there are restrictions on the use of 
force that can be legitimately used against the intruder.785 One thing is certain, in England, the 
use of excessive force in the death of someone in self-defence will ultimately lead to a 
conviction for homicide; an absolute acquittal will not be the outcome.786 Essentially, if 
action in defence of oneself or another leads to the unintentional death of an attacker, self-
defence has a better chance of succeeding than a situation in which the attacker was 
intentionally killed.787 
7.3. Self-Defence 
Pursuant to criminal law, self-defence has a good chance of succeeding if the 
defendants are able to demonstrate that they responded as they did because they reasonably 
feared that their lives or limbs were threatened (standard of reasonable behaviour). Two tests 
are applied to self-defence – the first test is subjective, and the defendant must discharge the 
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burden of proving that he actually felt that there was danger (looking at the mental state of 
the defendant). Under the second test, which is objective, the defendant must also discharge 
the burden of proving that his response was what one might expect of anyone else 
confronting the same conditions, circumstances, and facts (looking at ordinary reasonable 
response of someone in the same circumstances).788 
The common law self-defence relies on the perception of fear. An individual need 
only fear that he was about to be attacked, and even when the defendant makes a mistake of 
judgment, self-defence will suffice to absolve the defendant of culpability, provided the 
defendant’s fear is not unreasonable.789 It is also important to note that within the realm of 
common law, self-defence is not confined to murder. Self-defence can be claimed for other 
crimes.790 
Like loss of control, self-defence requires the concept of “reasonableness.”791 
Moreover, under common law, self-defence is not merely a partial defence, but rather an 
absolute defence. If a defendant succeeds in claiming self-defence (private defence or public 
defence) he will be acquitted. This is because the defendant is essentially arguing that his 
behaviour was necessary and justified. This is especially true because self-defence is about 
‘the common law right to defend oneself against invasion of person and property.’792  
Under the Criminal Law Act 1967 (in England, self-defence is derived from statutes 
and common law), self-defence is illustrated as using force while executing an arrest or the 
use of reasonable force in preventing crime or helping make a legal arrest, whereby such 
force is justified in the circumstances.793 In addition, section 5 of the Criminal Damage Act 
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1971 clarifies the protection of property.794 More recently, section 76 of the Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Act 2008 permits the use of reasonable force for common law self-defence, 
common law defence of one’s property, and the Criminal Law Act 1967 (explains subjective 
and objective elements in detail).795 The following three essential sections will investigate 
each of these parts. 
7.3.1. Imminence of Harm 
Under criminal law, self-defence is a formal claim in which the actus reus and mens 
rea are typically undisputed elements.796 Basically, the defendant must prove that his self-
defence is rooted on the belief that harm was imminent. In this regard, imminent means 
immediate.797 Imminent peril permits the use of force in order to avoid an attack.  
The imminent rule requirement for self-defence can be problematic because an abused 
woman, who has been abused over a period of time, will not successfully plead self-defence. 
The difficulty for an abused individual is that they may always fear that they could confront 
imminent harm, when in legal reality, harm may not be imminent during intervals of peace. 
Therefore, the issue for consideration would be whether an individual experiencing 
continuous domestic violence can claim self-defence if such a person attacked their abuser at 
a time when the abuser was asleep. Obviously, the sleeping abuser would present the abused 
person with an opportunity to defend themselves in the future, but that would not be the case 
when they are asleep.  
Another area of the law that may run afoul of the imminence rule is known as the 
human trap. For example, someone living in a neighbourhood where home invasions are 
constant and frequent may feel the need to set a human trap for preventing a similar attack in 
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his home. Such a trap is actually “pre-emptive” and “premature.”798 Therefore, it would be 
especially difficult for the defendant to satisfy the court that the premature trap was in 
response to the threat of imminent harm. 
In England, the duty to retreat does not exist (this obliges the defender to 
withdraw/retreat, if this possible, before using any force). The omitted rule was discussed in 
R v Bird, where the presiding judge ruled that unless the defendant showed an unwillingness 
to fight, he would not be able to use self-defence.799 On appeal, the conviction was quashed 
on the grounds that while a willingness to retreat would show good faith, there was no duty to 
retreat.800 The duty to retreat is a common law rule that remains the law in a few states in the 
US. This duty raises some questions about imminent harm.801 By virtue of the rule, if an 
individual feels threatened at all, and there is an opportunity to escape the threat, the 
individual then has a duty to escape.802 However, the question that remains unanswered is 
whether the imminent harm relieves the individual of the duty to retreat in states where the 
duty still exists. 
7.3.2. Reasonableness of Belief 
Self-defence is founded on the belief that it is human nature to impulsively protect the 
self.803 Regardless, the defendant must show that he had a “genuine” belief that using force 
was necessary.804 Mainly, the defendant has no duty to prove that using force was actually 
necessary, he will only have to prove that he had reasonable belief that force would be 
necessary. 
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It is interesting to observe that reasonable belief is paired with honest belief, in that an 
honest and reasonable belief in harm is enough to substantiate self-defence.805 Thus, a threat 
may not actually be real. As long as the defendant reasonably believes that the threat exists, 
this will be enough to obtain an acquittal. Where a defendant’s belief that he faces a threat or 
harm is unreasonable, the defendant will not be entitled to an acquittal.806 
Where a defendant is mistaken, negligent, or reckless in coming to the conclusion 
about a threat to himself or others, any reasonable belief will be much harder to prove. 
However, not impossible, because the defendant’s honest perception of a threat whether 
reasonable or not can suffice.807 The defendant’s circumstances, conditions, and facts will 
determine whether the defendant’s genuine belief that there was a threat to his life, limb, 
and/or liberty was genuine enough to warrant a self-defence claim. 
In England, threat assessment is very important in a self-defence claim in response to 
a criminal charge. For example, cases such as Harvey have established that authentically 
believing in the circumstance, if real, may substantiate a claim of self-defence and will 
therefore defeat the element on intention necessary for establishing the crime that the 
defendant is charged with.808  
The question for consideration in self-defence is whether the behaviour justifiably 
responded to dangers to the self or others.809 Justification of one’s behaviour is therefore not 
based on actuality, but rather the perceptions or beliefs of the actor, provided they are 
reasonable in the circumstances.810 An individual might actually err in the belief that he or 
another is in imminent danger, and still the belief may be justified to substantiate a self-
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defence claim in criminal law.811 Essentially, the defendant will have to prove that he 
honestly and reasonably believed that the use of force was necessary.812 
7.3.3. Reasonable Force 
Under common law, self-defence refers to the use of reasonable force for defending 
the self, another or property.813 Reasonable force must align with the prevention of a breach 
of the safety of another ‘for the sake of protecting some minor harm.’814 However, some 
courts will allow an unjustifiable defence of the use of deadly force in circumstances where 
the individual could have retreated.815 
In practice, the use of force is justified if the force used is matched by the force of the 
assailant, or threatened by the assailant.816 If force is threatened, the defendant is justified in 
using force similar to the force threatened in order to prevent the use of force against him. If 
force is used once a threat has passed, or as an act of revenge, or with a degree of 
unreasonable force, it will not be justified (if self-defence does not meet this requirement, this 
is known as incomplete self-defence, which in some jurisdictions leads to a change in the 
charge or mitigation in sentencing).  
The courts in England have already made it clear what the force must be to be 
reasonable, that does not require the defendant to calculate the response that would be exactly 
commensurate with the force of the attack, while he is under attack.817 In R v Scarlett, the 
defendant’s conviction for manslaughter was quashed on appeal, and it was held that the 
amount of force used was purely a subjective test. All that mattered was what the defendant 
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thought was necessary in the circumstances. If he thought that the amount of force used was 
necessary to prevent the threat, or to protect the self or property, the defendant should not be 
convicted if the force used was excessive.818 
Generally, the determination of the defendant’s use of reasonable force requires an 
examination of the totality of facts and circumstances. This includes the level of force used, 
the severity of the threat, and how one might have been able to avoid the threat by methods 
that did not include the use of force.819 Ultimately, reasonable force will not be substantiated 
unless it was necessary for preventing harm, and the outcome from the threat would have 
been so serious that a reasonable person would believe that he were justified in responding 
the same way that the defendant responded.820 
In summary, the level of force necessary depends on the degree of force used or 
threatened by the attacker. If the degree of force used by the defendant is greater than the 
level of force used or threatened by an attacker, then the force used by the defendant is not 
reasonable. In such a case, what one might think is a reasonable case for self defence, can 
turn into a case of assault and battery. This is likely to be the case when the defendant 
continues with the use of force when the assailant is no longer a threat. Therefore, reasonable 
force is not about the degree or type of physical force used, but the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the use of force. The court is interested in the events and circumstances that gave 
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7.4. War Veterans, PTSD, and Self-Defence 
In England, as noted above, both common law and statutory law provide an escape 
from prosecution for those who intentionally inflict harm on others in self-defence.821 What 
distinguishes deliberate and intentional self-defence harm from other forms of harm is the 
fact that self-defence offenders are not inflicting harm as an end in itself. Rather, the self-
defence claimant is inflicting harm on a threat in order to avoid further potential harm to 
himself.822 
What makes self-defence appealing when thinking about war veterans suffering from 
PTSD is that it is a complete defence for murder.823 This gives rise to two important questions 
for the defendant who is a war veteran with PTSD. First, where the defendant uses deadly 
force in a claim of self defence, the first question for consideration is whether the force used 
was necessary. The second question is whether the force used was proportional to the threat 
or the situation giving rise to self-defence.824 As previously discussed, the third element of 
self-defence is reasonableness of belief. 
When considering whether the use of force was necessary, and whether it was 
proportional to the threat, a subjective test is used which is beneficial to war veterans 
suffering from PTSD. In R v Gladstone Williams, the court ruled that when considering these 
questions, one must look at the facts and circumstances specific to the defendant.825 Hence, a 
war veteran with PTSD will be accorded the opportunity to be judged according to his own 
perception of the threat before him. It is irrelevant whether a reasonable person might have 
interpreted the threat differently. Obviously, a war veteran with PTSD who is triggered by a 
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sight or sound will have a very different perception of threats than a reasonable person with 
no psychological trauma to contend with. Thus, this part of the chapter analyses how the 
elements of self-defence can be applicable to a war veteran with PTSD. 
7.4.1. Imminence of Harm 
According to the DSM-IV, PTSD is brought on by a traumatic event that causes 
significant fear.826 The PTSD symptom that will most likely give way to an action that can be 
consistent with self-defence is hyper-vigilance. This symptom is linked to the PTSD 
sufferer’s altered sense of reaction. Therefore, in a situation where the defendant is a PTSD 
sufferer, and is triggered to the extent that he re-experiences his trauma, the perception of 
imminent harm is very different from the ordinary individual (in such a case, the perceived 
threat of harm can be expected to be exaggerated). 
The main requirement is that the defendant perceives imminent harm (subjective test). 
This term has been used interchangeably with the term “immediacy,” indicating that the 
imminent harm is immediate.827 In such a case where the defendant has an opportunity to 
alert law enforcement, but nevertheless takes the law into his own hands, self-defence is not 
likely to be a successful claim.828 When a PTSD sufferer, particularly a war veteran, 
experiences flashbacks and relieves the combat-related trauma that caused PTSD, he is likely 
to perceive each episode as a situation in which immediate or imminent harm is threatened. 
However, PTSD brought on by violence might result in hyper-vigilance associated 
with feelings of revenge and anger.829 Thus, for this category of PTSD sufferers, a self-
defence claim may be difficult to substantiate. In such a case, the defendant who is motivated 
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by a feeling of revenge and anger due to PTSD will have difficultly proving a claim that the 
force used was necessary because of a perception of imminent or immediate harm. For 
example, battered woman’s syndrome (BWS) is a subset of PTSD.830 BWS is prone to hyper-
vigilant responses to perceptions of looming danger.831 
Faust states that “subsets” of PTSD may lead to a successful self-defence claim in a 
criminal trial. This is most commonly observed in cases involving BWS.832 In such cases, a 
woman who has a history of spousal abuse kills her abuser at a time where a threat is not 
imminent, and in fact, at the relevant time, she could have escaped. The defence will typically 
call an expert witness to explain the defendant’s behaviour. The defence will use expert 
testimony to substitute the reasonable person test with a subjective test of how a person 
suffering from the subset of PTSD would reasonably respond in these circumstances.833 The 
idea is to introduce an “imperfect self-defence” calculated to exonerate a defendants’ 
culpability in a criminal offence.834 
PTSD is relevant to self-defence claims in BWS cases, where the wife attacks the 
husband at a time when she might have escaped. Her self-defence claim is that due to 
repeated abuse, she developed PTSD. As a result of her PTSD, she had a heightened and 
exaggerated fear of a threat of attack, and acted accordingly.835 From the perspective of an 
individual who has not been traumatised by domestic violence, the battered woman who kills 
her abuser based on a fear that an attack in the future is imminent did not act reasonably. 
However, from the perspective of an individual traumatised by domestic violence, her threat 
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assessment and reaction are reasonable.836 This perceptive might exist with war veterans with 
PTSD. 
Gover argues that a self-defence claim is quite viable for a war veteran.837 For 
example, in the US, the MPC describes self-defence as the use of force in circumstances 
where the defendant believes that he is in immediate danger of being harmed.838 For PTSD 
war veterans, the experience of war that brings on PTSD can establish a persistent pattern of 
exaggerated fear in the post-deployment phase.839 Stimuli can re-awaken those traumatic 
fears that brought on PTSD. The problem may be in convincing a tribunal of the fact that an 
assailant induced a real threat of danger warranting self-defence.840 Regardless, PTSD does 
induce a threat that the victim perceives is real, and therefore acts accordingly.841 It is also 
important to note that PTSD victims often feel vulnerable, and are generally worried about 
their personal safety.842 
Threat perception is also pronounced among military personnel due to the stressors 
associated with “warzone” deployment.843 It is expected that military veterans who have been 
at the frontlines of war, will return with a persistent fear of threats. It is also expected that 
military veterans with PTSD are far more prone to hyper-vigilance and startled reactions due 
to the fact that the trauma of war was not a one-off event. Persistent war trauma is expected 
to increase the level and repetition of PTSD symptoms, which includes those symptoms that 
                                                          
836 Ormerod and Laird, Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod's Text, Cases, and Materials on Criminal Law 
(12th edn, Oxford University Press 2017) (n552) 178. 
837 Gover (n20) 580. 
838 ibid 580-581. 
839 ‘PTSD in Military Veterans: Causes, Symptoms and Steps to recovery’ (help guide.ORG)               
< https://www.helpguide.org/articles/ptsd-trauma/ptsd-in-military-veterans.htm> accessed 5 January 
2018. 
840 Gover (n20) 581. 
841 ibid. 
842 Wendy S. David and others, ‘Making a Case for Personal Safety Perceptions of Vulnerability and 
Desire for Self-Defense Training among Female Veterans’ (2004) Journal of International Violence 
991. 
843 Cynthia L. Lancaster and others, ‘The Role of Perceived Threat in the Emergence of PTSD and 
Depression during Warzone Deployment’ (2016) 8 Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice 
and Policy 528. 
212 
 
are relevant to a self-defence claim: threat perception and negative alterations of cognition. 
Studies have shown that combat exposure increases PTSD symptoms.844 
           In State v Janes, Janes a 17-year-old male was charged in the shooting death of his 
mother’s boyfriend. Janes claimed that his mother’s boyfriend had abused him, his siblings, 
and his mother for a decade.  As a result, he developed PTSD. On the night in question, there 
were no confrontations or incidents involving the victim. Nevertheless, the defendant felt that 
his life or the life of his siblings or mother were in imminent danger. The shooting actually 
occurred a night after the victim had argued with his mother.845 
           The defendant called expert testimony to prove that he suffered from PTSD and his 
fear of imminent danger was induced by his PTSD. Since the presiding judge did not think 
that the defendant was in imminent danger, he did not instruct the jury on the issue of self-
defence. The defendant was convicted of second degree murder. On appeal to the 
Washington Supreme Court, it was held that the PTSD and battered child syndrome were 
perfectly admissible, and that the lower court erred, and the case was returned for a new trial. 
The appellate court ruled that PTSD was admissible to demonstrate how the condition 
interacted with threat perceptions causing the defendant to act as he did in the circumstances 
of the case.846 
In State v Mizell, the defendant claimed self-defence in response to an attempted 
murder charge. On the facts of the case, the defendant, who was a Vietnam veteran, had a 
fight with a man at the home of another man. The defendant argued that the victim posed an 
immediate threat to him and confirmed this threat by indicating through gestures that he had a 
concealed weapon. This indicated to the defendant that the victim intended to make good on 
his threat. He therefore repeatedly hit the victim with a stick. The defendant applied to call 
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evidence of PTSD in support of the self-defence claim. The court allowed the application and 
the prosecution appealed. However, the appellate court ruled that the PTSD evidence was not 
only admissible, but also relevant to the claim of self-defence.847 As far as the appellate stage 
is concerned, this Vietnam veteran with PTSD was successful in his self-defence claim.  
One can imagine how combat-related PTSD can cause a heightened fear of imminent 
harm (or real threat). In the combat zone, all activities are carried out with the belief that 
harm is imminent. In these hostile and chaotic situations, military personnel have very little 
time to react or to deliberate over what is going on around them and how to react. Instead, 
they are constantly proactive and prepared for battle. When these types of situations result in 
PTSD, with the war veteran relieving this experience, one can expect such a person to 
perceive everything around him as imminently dangerous. 
7.4.2. Reasonableness of Belief 
Threat assessment is an important part of the self-defence claim in criminal law for 
victims of PTSD. Given the symptoms of PTSD, an individual might be mistaken in his 
interpretation of danger to the self or others. The threat assessment of PTSD sufferers is 
highly subjective, and is related to the trauma that induced PTSD. The ability to assess threats 
is clouded by a number of emotional maladies, including “fear, panic, grief, guilt and 
shame.”848 In such a case, there is no such thing as reasonable belief for the war veteran with 
PTSD who is triggered by a post-deployment event and finds himself believing that he is 
back in the combat zone. 
One has to draw a careful line when using self-defence on the basis of reasonable 
belief in a threat of harm. As Child and Ormerod suggest, when a defendant claims that his 
belief is founded on a reasonable belief of a threat because of a psychotic state, it may very 
well be more prudent to claim insanity. This is because insanity involves a claim that no 
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offence was committed, and is more appropriate for psychosis.849 A claim of self-defence 
does not deny the offence, but provides a justification for it.850 
However, those with PTSD alone are placed in an untenable position because, as 
repeatedly stated throughout this thesis, PTSD is not listed as a form of “psychosis,” and 
therefore, victims of PTSD are left to be judged on their own perceptions of harm and how 
they are expected to respond to perceived threats, whether they are reasonable or not, from 
the perspective of the ordinary person. What is important is the perspective of the subject 
with PTSD, and his belief that there is a threat of harm and a necessity to respond 
accordingly. 
The PTSD victim finds that he is experiencing “exaggerated startle reactions.”851 In 
the context of PTSD, the victim of PTSD is responding very differently to stressors.852 The 
combination of hyper-vigilance and startle reactions can easily set the PTSD sufferer up for 
erroneous perceptions of danger to the self or others. In such circumstances, it would not be 
fair to pass judgment on these perceptions in the same way that one might judge the 
perceptions of an individual who does not suffer with the symptoms of PTSD. 
In State v Hines, an accused adult female with PTSD used self-defence in a trial for 
the murder of her father. The defendant claimed that she was abused by her father as a child, 
and on the day of the incident he had made overtures that took her back to the incident. Her 
repeated stabbing of him in retaliation for these stressors were brought on by her hyper-
vigilance and startle reactivity. Although her PTSD defence was not accepted at the trial, the 
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appellate court ruled that she should have been permitted to call expert testimony to support 
her self-defence claim on the basis of PTSD. The appellate court therefore ordered a retrial.853 
A similar situation arose in the case of Rogers v State, where the defendant went on 
trial and was convicted of first degree murder in respect of her boyfriend’s death. At her trial, 
she tried to present evidence of battered spouse syndrome on the basis of PTSD. The court of 
first instance denied her attempts on the grounds that the expert testimony that she was 
attempting to proffer fell short of the admission standards. The appellate court did not agree, 
and ruled that the evidence not only met admissibility standards, but was also relevant, since 
PTSD is popularly acknowledged among health professionals, and expertise on PTSD has 
long since been acknowledged by Florida’s courts. Therefore, a new trial was ordered.854 
The PTSD sufferer who is triggered to believe that there is an imminent threat is 
usually unaware that his fear or threat perception is irrational.855 Irrational fear may lead to 
irrational responses, that the force used in self-defence by a PTSD sufferer may be excessive 
in the circumstances (excessive force because of revenge may lead to conviction, but 
excessive because of mistake may lead to mitigation of the sentence). 
When a defendant successfully establishes that he believes that he was acting in self-
defence, if the force used was unreasonable he will not be absolutely absolved. Instead, he 
could receive a mitigated sentence.856 For instance, Matthew Sepi (Nevada-2005), a war 
veteran who had served in Iraq, pulled out a firearm and shot two men who approached him 
with a weapon, killing one man and injuring the other. At his trial he raised self-defence on 
the basis of PTSD. He was sentenced to probation for having a concealed weapon.857 
According to his public defender, Sepi agreed to treatment for substance abuse and PTSD in 
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exchange for the charges being dropped once his treatment was completed.858 Sepi’s self-
defence claim was supported by his combat language when talking to investigators about the 
shooting. He spoke of breaking contact with the enemy and engaging the targets.859 
For the PTSD sufferer this element of self-defence is helpful, because although this 
part of self-defence requires reasonableness in the belief of threats and harm, it is judged 
relative to the perspective of the defendant. A defendant could therefore be mistaken as to the 
threat of harm, but as long as he honestly believed in the threat at the relevant time, he will 
not be barred from claiming self-defence.860 This part of self-defence is well-suited to the war 
veteran with PTSD who honestly believes that he is back in the war zone after a triggering 
event.  
7.4.3. Reasonable Force 
The statutory provisions cleared up what is meant by reasonable force in a claim of 
self-defence.861 Ultimately, the question for consideration is whether the quantity or quality of 
force used by the defendant in a specific situation was supported by the facts and 
circumstances of the case. The facts and circumstances surrounding the use of force, and the 
question of whether the amount of force used was reasonable, will depend on a construction 
of the facts and circumstances from the perspective of the defendant.862 
In other words, the question of reasonable force is a subjective issue (the degree of 
force in accordance with defendant’s perspective). Yet, there is some confusion because only 
reasonable force may be used in self-defence. This leaves open the question as to what 
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amounts to unreasonable force.863 A war veteran with PTSD, who is triggered by an event 
and responds as if he is confronting the trauma that caused PTSD, may not be the best judge 
of whether the force used was reasonable or unreasonable, but if the subjective view is to be 
legitimate, what is reasonable will only matter from the perspective of the individual 
experiencing PTSD symptoms at the time in question. 
Under both common law and statutory law, war veterans with PTSD stand to benefit 
in a criminal trial. This is because under the common law and statute, the use of reasonable 
force in self-defence is based on “trigger and response.”864 The trigger is the defendant’s 
belief that in the facts and surrounding circumstances, according to his belief and perceptions, 
it is reasonable/necessary for him to use force.865 The response is therefore the amount of 
force and whether it matches the threat that the defendant perceives he faces.866 The 
defendant must reasonably believe that he faces imminent harm, and also must believe that 
the use of reasonable force is necessary for evading this imminent harm. 
Clancy, Ding, Bernat, Schmidt, and Li reported that PTSD is significantly aligned 
with an exaggerated response to a threat, which is in turn linked to a distorted threat 
evaluation process.867 For war veterans, the effects on the brain following the PTSD inducing 
trauma is expected to increase the war veteran’s faulty threat perception in the post-war 
period.868 It would therefore appear that hyper-arousal or hyper-vigilance, together with 
negative alterations of cognitive function, produce an exaggerated or faulty assessment of 
threats amongst PTSD sufferers. This will be especially prevalent among war veterans for 
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whom threat appraisals become sustained during combat and follow the PTSD sufferer in the 
aftermath of a war as they attempt to rejoin civilian life.  
The difficulty that the PTSD sufferer faces in this case is that generally the law 
permits the use of the amount of force that is “objectively reasonable in the circumstances,” 
in terms of the defendant’s genuine belief of what the threat is.869 For the PTSD sufferer, this 
can mean that his perception of the amount of force may not be reasonably tenable. However, 
the law does state that it does not matter whether the defendant is mistaken, provided he is 
genuinely mistaken.870 
What this actually means is that the PTSD sufferer will be objectively judged 
according to his own subjective belief in the quality of the threat, and his corresponding 
belief in the amount of force that he should be employing in self-defence (what is reasonable 
force depends on the circumstances in play at the time). In other words, the test of the 
reasonableness of force will only be judged in accordance with what the PTSD sufferer 
believed in relation to the threat of harm. For instance, if a war veteran with PTSD was 
triggered by an episode that led to a flashback in which he genuinely believed that a passerby 
was a combat enemy, it would be objectively reasonable to expect him to shoot at a combat 
enemy, and intentionally cause death. 
7.4.4. Rejection and Acceptance of Self-Defence 
The Anglo-American theory of criminal law focuses on the difference between 
justification and excuses for criminal offending.871 In this regard, a criminal behaviour can be 
justified, or an excuse is based on the fact that the offender can avoid personal “blame” for 
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the behaviour.872 A triggered PTSD sufferer may feel justified in their hallucinatory episodes 
where they believe they are once again in the combat zone. 
A war veteran with PTSD may feel that his crime was justifiable since he was 
genuinely mistaken as to his whereabouts, believing that he was in a combat zone once again. 
Ultimately, the killing will be acceptable because the veteran with PTSD is suffering from a 
war-related trauma. However, there is an argument to be made that self-defence is a 
“justification” and not an “excuse,” so that killing is only justified where there is a real threat 
to life, and not where the defendant wrongly perceives this to be the case. This reasoning 
would exclude PTSD from the defence, if the defence is understood as a justification rather 
than an excuse, and push veterans with PTSD towards a defence of diminished responsibility 
or insanity.  
Still, there are concerns that the idea of self-defence can be used as an excuse to 
intentionally kill another human being. Obviously, when a person acts in self-defence, he 
deliberately and intentionally kills or causes harm to another. However, the intentional 
infliction of harm or death is not always justified. That is why the law is crafted to dictate the 
circumstances in which the use of force, or the degree of force used, is reasonable. Other 
elements of self-defence, such as the imminence of the harm, are also designed to prevent the 
use of force as an excuse to commit a crime of violence against another. However, these 
limitations on self-defence can be exploited and used as excuses. 
The defendant might not be in a dissociative state at the time of the commission of the 
crime. However, a war veteran with PTSD can ‘overreact to surrounding events and stimuli 
because of their PTSD.’873 Because of PTSD, the war veteran may see a threat, and the 
danger associated with another, to be a lot worse than it actually is.874 Therefore, in 
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jurisdictions where the test for self-defence can be satisfied with subjective analyses of threat 
perception, the war veteran with PTSD is likely to successfully claim self-defence.875 
In Texas, self-defence on the grounds of PTSD has also been successful in reducing 
the original charge to a lesser offence. For example, in Harwood v State, the appellant, a 16-
year-old male, was tried for murder. The victim was a man who had molested the appellant. 
The appellant claimed he acted in self-defence, and that he suffered from PTSD. The 
appellant was convicted of manslaughter and appealed the verdict. The appellate court 
affirmed the manslaughter verdict and stated that the jurors appeared to have believed the 
appellant’s defence, but concluded that an absolute discharge was unfair.876 
However, in Perryman v State, the court did not see the relevance of PTSD to a self-
defence claim in response to a first-degree murder charge. In this case, the defendant claimed 
that he suffered from PTSD due to childhood sexual abuse. He killed the victim in self-
defence when the victim attempted to sexually assault him and threatened to shoot him if he 
resisted. The court of first instance failed to see the relevance of the testimony regarding 
trauma inducing PTSD and excluded it. Upon appeal, the appellate court upheld the 
conviction and the exclusion of evidence relative to PTSD.877 
In State v Sullivan, the defendant, a Vietnam War veteran, was charged with 
attempted murder, as well as aggravated assault. The charges arose from the defendant 
shooting into a crowd that was assembled at a bar. The shooting followed an altercation with 
a patron at the bar.  The defendant claimed that he acted in self-defence, and that his actions 
were directly linked to PTSD. The court of first instance did not instruct the jury on self-
defence. The defendant was subsequently convicted. The verdicts were appealed to the 
superior court and upheld. However, upon appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, it 
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was ruled that a jury properly advised, could have decided a different fate for the defendant 
and may have found him not guilty on the basis of PTSD induced self-defence. Therefore, the 
judgment of the superior courts was vacated.878 
           A relatively recent English case considered a self-defence claim by a British war 
veteran with PTSD, in an incident in which an attack on another soldier resulted in GBH.879 
In this case, the defendant who was charged with others, claimed that he attacked the victims 
in self-defence during a confrontation in the early hours of the morning after a night out 
drinking. He also argued that his perception of threat warranting self-defence was induced by 
PTSD. The expert witness, however, testified to only a mild form of PTSD. Moreover, the 
defendant in question had given two separate and contradictory accounts of the incident on 
the relevant night, and explained his discrepancies by stating he suffered memory loss due to 
a blow to his head on the night in question.880 
          The presiding judge left it to the jury to decide, explaining that it was up to them to 
determine whether the defendant was manufacturing his testimony or did in fact suffer from 
memory loss. The presiding judge also instructed the jury that it was up to them to decide 
whether PTSD had an effect on the defendant’s interpretation of the events of the night that 
caused him to respond in what he thought was self-defence. The jury returned a guilty verdict 
and the defendant appealed claiming that the trial judge had not fairly instructed the jury. The 
appellate court reviewed the trial transcript and disagreed, ruling that the jury’s verdict was 
safe, and therefore affirmed it.881 
This case is important because it confirms that self-defence on the basis of PTSD is a 
viable defence in England. The defendant’s contradictory statements, and the fact that this 
defendant’s PTSD was only a mild form, did not help his claim. The results might have been 
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different if the defendant’s evidence had been consistent and he was suffering from a more 
serious level of PTSD. After all, it was decided in Martin v R that the jury may take into 
account a defendant’s psychiatric condition when determining whether or not excessive force 
in self-defence was reasonable.882 However, it was ruled in So v The Crown, that the rule in 
Martin is the exception rather than the rule.883 
            Common law self-defence is more broadly applied in England, and extends to a 
manifestation of a mistaken but honest belief. Under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, self-
defence in property or on residential property carries the same standard of honest belief.884 In 
any self-defence claim in England, the defendant can succeed if he proves that his belief was 
genuine, although he erred on the interpretation of the facts.885 However, such a defence will 
fail if the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated,886 since the lines between reasonable and 
unreasonable belief are blurred when intoxication is involved. 
It is also important to note that there is a paucity of documented cases of war veterans 
with PTSD using self-defence in criminal courts. This indicates that there is a lack of 
confidence among war veterans with PTSD in the success of this defence. The paucity of self-
defence claims among war veterans with PTSD may also reflect an aversion to claiming self-
defence, and ignoring the way that self-defence was an unnatural response to a misconceived 
situation. One has to remember that the cases where self-defence is used are those where a 
defendant is actually in danger, and not under fear of a mistaken attack as one might assume 
when PTSD symptoms are triggered, so that the sufferer has flashbacks. 
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7.4.5. Self-Defence and War Veterans Suffering from PTSD 
The discussion of abuse victims could be linked more clearly to the case of veterans. 
Is there a moral difference between an abuse victim with PTSD who kills their abuser, and a 
war veteran with PTSD who kills a stranger? In both cases, the killing may be due to a 
wrongly perceived threat, but the context is very different. Should these cases be treated the 
same or differently? Should it be the PTSD that matters, or the moral status of the offender as 
a victim? 
For the war veteran suffering from PTSD, the trauma of war follows him once their 
deployment comes into play. Hafemeister and Stockey argue that for a war veteran living in 
the civilian world following their return from war, the haunting effect of war trauma can 
provide incidents of fear and violence, and at the same time, a self-defence claim to criminal 
charges. The war veteran may be confronted with a situation very similar to the one that 
triggered the onset of PTSD. In such a case, the veteran can be transported back in time and 
relive those feelings that he had to confront at the time. This can very likely lead to a feeling 
and impulse to defend himself or someone else.887 
          Self-defence is also well-suited to PTSD because of the sufferer’s propensity to relive 
the event. Certain events or places can act as a trigger which may set the PTSD sufferer off 
and heighten PTSD symptoms to a point where he might believe his life is in imminent 
danger. These kinds of threat perceptions are common among PTSD sufferers, especially war 
veterans. War veterans with PTSD are more prone to suspect danger and threats due to the 
sustained nature of combat stress (however, self-defence requires necessity and 
reasonableness). 
The subjectivity of the use of force and the belief in the immediacy of harm will help 
to protect a war veteran with PTSD from a conviction in circumstances where a defence of 
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insanity or automatism or diminished responsibility will not succeed. This is because 
subjectivity does not require proof of psychosis, or the kind of mental illness that will usually 
support defences of insanity, automatism, and diminished responsibility.  
In using self-defence, the defendant war veteran with PTSD is essentially claiming 
that he was triggered by an event which brought on the symptoms of PTSD. These symptoms 
subsequently led the defendant to genuinely believe that his life, or the life of another, was in 
imminent danger of being harmed. Such a defence will not require proof of psychosis which 
is difficult to substantiate when one is suffering from PTSD (however, there is no real 
predictability for defendants who seek to launch a self-defence claim). 
7.5. Conclusion 
Self-defence has been described as both a means by which a deliberate criminal act 
can be excused and justified. Still, the strength of self-defence is that it can provide for a 
complete acquittal of the defendant who successfully uses it. In other words, even where a 
defendant is charged with murder, the defendant can escape liability altogether if he claims 
self-defence successfully. A review of the literature on self-defence has also revealed that 
where a defendant with PTSD launches a defence of self-defence, and the jury believes that 
the force used was excessive, yet they believe the defendant’s claim of self-defence, the jury 
will return a verdict on the lesser included offence, indicating that self-defence can also 
provide a framework for, in effect, mitigating sentences. 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on self-defence. The research findings suggest 
that self-defence is a valid and viable defence to a criminal charge. The primary element 
establishing self-defence is the threat perception. Since PTSD sufferers are often hyper-
vigilant, have flashbacks, and revisit the event, they have the traits to succeed. Under these 
circumstances, PTSD sufferers will often have exaggerated fear assessments and misinterpret 
events that might not be a threat in circumstances. 
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It can, therefore, be concluded that self-defence can be helpful to PTSD sufferers in 
two ways (in some jurisdictions): a complete dismissal of the case, or a mitigation of 
sentence. There is always the risk that PTSD might not work at all, but as observed in Sepi’s 
case, PTSD can mitigate sentences for war veterans with PTSD. Essentially, the PTSD 
sufferer will not have to satisfy the court that he is suffering from a mental defect and that the 
mental defect is linked to the behaviour giving rise to the criminal offence. 
The PTSD sufferer will merely have to argue that he was labouring under a genuine 
belief that there was an imminent threat of harm to the defendant or someone else. This belief 
can be substantiated by triggers that induce PTSD symptoms which impact the defendant’s 
ability to adequately assess threats. Regardless, what is important is the defendant’s belief 
and not what a reasonable person may would believe in the circumstances. All that is 
important is whether the defendant with PTSD genuinely perceived a threat, and whether it 
was reasonable for him to respond as he did. In other words, self-defence helps PTSD 
sufferers to get around the strenuous requirements associated with diseased and defected 
minds in the other defences such as insanity, automatism, and diminished responsibility. It 
thus perhaps offers an effective route for the state to put into practice its commitment to the 










Chapter Eight: Diminished 
Responsibility 
8.1. Introduction 
Diminished responsibility as a defence in criminal law is based on the idea that an 
individual who is incapable of rational judgment or reasoning is not criminally responsible.888 
It is an important to remember that diminished responsibility is not a complete defence, but 
rather a partial defence that acts as a mitigating factor in the distribution of criminal 
responsibility. The defendant who demonstrates diminished responsibility is essentially 
stating that he committed the crime in question, but due to some degree of mental incapacity 
the defendant is not wholly responsible. In common law, in many states in the US 
(diminished capacity), and in England (diminished responsibility), diminished will usually 
only mitigate a charge of murder which can be reduced to a less culpable homicide.889 In 
some states in the US, however, diminished capacity will be permitted to challenge the 
element of any crime, and can therefore result in a complete acquittal or a partial defence.890      
In England, diminished responsibility, like absolute loss of control, permits murder to 
be reduced to manslaughter in circumstances where the defendant may appear to have the 
necessary intention, but can escape the insanity label.891 Defences based on an impaired or 
abnormal mind usually state that the elements were present that at the time of the offence, at 
which time, the defendant did not understand his behaviour, nor was he able to take control of 
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his behaviour.892 The links between PTSD and violence, and factors related to PTSD that 
mediate this link, have drawn significantly more attention over time.893  
This chapter is connected with whether diminished responsibility can offer a partial 
defence for war veterans with PTSD who commit fatal violence. In other words, this chapter 
explores whether diminished responsibility can be used as a valid defence for criminal 
behaviour where a war veteran defendant was suffering from PTSD. 
8.2. Controversies over Diminished Responsibility Defence 
In England, diminished responsibility as a partial defence is consistent with the 
assumption that it is impractical and unfair to impose full criminal responsibility for murder 
on an individual who is with diminished “powers of self-control or self-restraint.”894 This 
way of thinking comes from the choice theory. According to the choice theory, when an 
individual makes the decision to take a certain cause of action, and has the ability and a 
reasonable opportunity to take another cause of action, that person is a “moral agent.”895 In 
such a situation, an individual is able to make the moral choice, but instead chooses to make 
the immoral choice. Such an individual, being of free choice capabilities, can be held 
criminally responsible.  
The most popular choice theory is capacity theory which was promoted by Hart. 
Capacity theory basically sets the stage for diminished responsibility because it states that 
when an individual has free choice, the individual is criminally culpable.896 Therefore, 
according to capacity theory, an individual can claim diminished responsibility if he does not 
have the capability to make a choice, nor does the defendant have a fair opportunity to choose 
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a healthier cause of action. Therefore, under capacity theory and choice theory in general, 
where an individual lacks the ability to exercise free choice, such an individual should not be 
criminally responsible.897 
According to choice theory, an individual may make the decision to commit murder. 
However, in this case, this individual suffers from diminished mentality because this 
individual does not have the presence of mind, nor the wherewithal to consider other better 
options, nor is he able to rationalise restraint. In such a case, this individual lacks the 
capacity, opportunity, and the freedom to choose between the moral and immoral courses of 
action. Therefore, diminished responsibility is a viable option.  
Character theory of criminal responsibility draws attention to the link between 
criminal responsibility and the moral norms of society, as well as among cultures.898 The 
purpose of criminal law is to take action against those who stray too far away from normative 
morals and values. The criminal law’s action is an expression of society’s disenchantment 
with those who stray too far away from normative values and morals.899 
Character theory therefore conveys the message that when an individual is convicted 
of criminal acts, punishment for those acts is an expression, by society, of its indictment of 
the individual’s moral character. In other words, it is only punishable when the criminal act is 
a reflection of the moral flaws in the character of the wrongdoer.900 In other words, character 
theory does not judge a person solely by his acts. Instead, character theory judges the person 
behind those acts.901 
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Character theory would ultimately expect that the actor is acting voluntarily when 
carrying out a criminal act.902 If an individual is suffering from an abnormality of mental 
functioning, then such an individual is not acting voluntarily, and neither is the individual’s 
character flawed to the extent that any mental short comings are a reflection of immoral 
character. Rather, mental shortcomings explain why the individual is not morally flawed.  
The controversy arising out of the application of character theory is the fact that 
murder is the most serious criminal act. When a defendant claims diminished responsibility, 
they can have their murder charges replaced by a voluntary manslaughter charge which 
recognises that the defendant did have the necessary intention for a murder charge.903 Murder 
is then reduced based on a character flaw that prevents sound and rational judgment. 
Character theory argues that this is the correct cause of action because the law ought to look 
at the character of the individual rather than the act. Society would beg to differ if the 
defendant has the necessary mens rea. This is one of the problems that exists with the defence 
of provocation. This was demonstrated in the case of R v Ahluwalia, where it was ruled that 
the character traits of the individual were necessary for determining how certain words and 
deeds affected her reactions.904  
Between choice/capacity theory and character theory, diminished responsibility can 
be rationalised and explained as a reasonable and rational defence to murder. Choice/capacity 
theory draws attention to the fact that actions must be guided by free choice, and where an 
individual is unable to rationalise and make choices, they can claim diminished responsibility 
in response to criminal behaviour. 
Character theory focuses attention on the character and traits of the individual actor. 
The main issue is whether the defendant is acting voluntarily. If the defendant suffers from an 
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abnormality of mental functioning, the defendant is not acting voluntarily. As such, the 
defendant cannot be judged or punished as if he acted in ways that offended the moral values 
and norms of society. 
The defence of diminished responsibility is intended to fill a gap left by the defence of 
insanity. The Law Commission felt that the issue of insanity and sanity was not 
straightforward and that there was a lengthy gap between the two.905 The Law Commission 
pointed out that there were different degrees of the mind between insanity and sanity, and 
there should also be different corresponding degrees of criminal responsibility. The Homicide 
Act, and its provision for diminished responsibility, were intended to provide different levels 
of criminal responsibility.906 This is obviously very important for war veterans suffering with 
PTSD who experience flashbacks and other combat induced trauma. 
The stricter definition of diminished responsibility under the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 raises concerns that judges are limited in their ability to exercise discretion in 
sentencing an individual who should not be labelled a murderer.907 Still, the defendant bears 
the burden of proving diminished responsibility and the prosecution is at liberty to consider a 
plea bargain, which must be approved by the trial judge in the event that the defendant’s 
lawyer and the prosecution arrive at an amicable solution.908 
The UK Supreme Court explained the difference between the statutory definition of 
diminished responsibility under the Homicide Act and the Coroners and Justice Act. Under 
the Homicide Act, prior to its amendment by the Coroners and Justice Act, the jury was 
required to apply a “global” interpretation of mental capacity.909 Under the amendment, 
proffered by the Coroners and Justice Act, the jury now evaluates three elements: the 
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defendant’s understanding of the nature of crime; the ability to “form rational judgment,” and 
the ability to “exercise self-control.” 910 The three elements can be discharged on a “balance 
of probabilities.” 911 
8.3. Diminished Responsibility as a Defence 
  The revised section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 refers to diminished responsibility as 
a condition in which the defendant is suffering from an abnormal mental functioning which is 
linked to a medically recognised condition, and substantially impairs the defendant’s rational 
judgment capabilities and the ability to understand the nature of his behaviour, as well as the 
ability to control himself.912 The condition must explain the defendant’s behaviour or 
omission in carrying out homicide or participating in a homicide.913 Therefore, the key 
elements of diminished responsibility are an impaired ability to understand the nature of 
one’s conduct, or to form a rational judgment, or to exercise self-control – all due to a 
medically recognised mental condition. 
The elements of diminished responsibility have narrowed previous law, and medical 
experts have now been brought in to have an impact on the success of the defence of 
diminished responsibility.914 To this end, the defence of diminished responsibility recognises 
that an individual may not be so hampered by a mental illness that they are able to escape 
liability altogether. 
Diminished responsibility, as a defence to murder, indirectly confers upon the judge a 
wide discretion as to punishment. This is because diminished responsibility will function to 
reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter. When a defendant is convicted of murder, there 
                                                          
910 ibid, para 50. 
911 Nicola Wake, ‘Recognising Acute Intoxication as Diminished Responsibility? A Comparative 
Analysis?’ (2012) Journal of Criminal Law 1, 2. 
912 De Than and Heaton, Criminal law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press2011) (n691) 194. 
913 ibid. 
914 David Ormerod, John Cyril Smith and Brian Hogan, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2011) 529. 
232 
 
is a mandatory life sentence, and the presiding judge has little sentencing discretion. When 
the defendant is convicted of manslaughter, the judge has a broad sentencing discretion.915 
Under the Homicide Act 1957 (amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009), 
diminished responsibility is defined as: 
‘A person (“D”) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be convicted 
of murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which — (a) 
arose from a recognised medical condition, (b) substantially impaired D's ability to do 
one or more of the things mentioned in subsection (1A), and (c) provides an 
explanation for D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing. (1A) 
Those things are — (a) to understand the nature of D's conduct; (b) to form a rational 
judgment; (c) to exercise self-control.’916 
The following four sections will analyse each of these parts. 
8.3.1. Abnormality of Mental Functioning 
  Abnormality of mental functioning must be causative of the act, or capable of 
explaining the act.917 Yet the difficulty here with this is that causative factors are legal 
determinations, and a medical expert cannot testify as to whether the abnormality of mental 
functioning has caused or contributed to the offence, although an opinion can be proffered.918 
Loughnan points toward additional difficulties with the abnormality of the mental functioning 
requirement of diminished responsibility, and reiterates that the Law Commission noted that 
there is no real guidance under the law for distinguishing between what is normal and what is 
abnormal.919 
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It is important to note that abnormality of the mind will not typically apply to an 
individual who commits a crime after voluntarily becoming intoxicated.920 However, if the 
defendant has suffered from a mental abnormality that was further complicated by the 
consumption of alcohol, the defence of diminished responsibility will be available to him.921 
However, in R v Tandy, the court ruled that where an individual is so addicted to alcohol or 
drugs that he suffers with significant cravings, the consumption of those substances cannot be 
categorised as voluntary (although it did not find that this applied to Tandy).922 In such a 
case, the defendant would be able to avail himself of the diminished responsibility defence on 
the grounds of abnormality of mental functioning (the defendant can also offer intoxication 
defence). 
Essentially, abnormality of mental functioning is not established by assessing the 
effects of alcohol mentally, but rather by how alcohol interacts with, or impacts, a pre-
existing abnormality of the mind.923 Ultimately, the defendant must suffer from some 
abnormality of mental functioning, which must be a medically recognised condition, and this 
requirement basically makes it more difficult to apply the defence of diminished 
responsibility broadly.924 
8.3.2. Recognised Medical Condition 
It must be remembered that the recognised medical condition requirement is only one 
element of the defence of diminished responsibility.925 However, legal and medical terms 
always tend to have an uneasy co-existence.926 For instance, a malfunctioning mind might be 
very easily identified in a court of law by a tribunal of fact. However, when attempting to 
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couple that finding with a medically recognised condition, the court will encounter problems. 
Medically recognised conditions that give rise to a malfunctioning mind might qualify as 
insanity, therefore, the gap filling role of diminished responsibility may suffer from various 
shortfalls. With the medically recognised condition requirement, the defendant will ultimately 
have to produce a medical expert to testify that he has suffered from a recognised medical 
condition.927 
The difference between medical and legal terms is demonstrated by the fact that the 
DSM includes diagnostic terms such as “unhappiness,” “irritability,” “anger,” and 
“paedophilia.”928 None of these recognised medical conditions will amount to a satisfactory 
element for establishing diminished responsibility on the grounds of a mental malfunctioning 
in a court of law.929 Still, the Crown Court substituted a murder conviction for manslaughter 
in the case of a woman who produced evidence of pre-menstrual problems and post-natal 
depression as influential factors in her criminal conduct.930 
Voluntary intoxication can be accepted by the courts as a recognised medical 
condition. At the same time, not every medically recognised condition will satisfy the 
diminished responsibility defence. Still, it is up to the judge as to whether to put forward the 
issue of voluntary intoxication in relation to diminished responsibility to the jury.931 The 
flexibility and broadness of this element leaves it bereft of certainty and predictability.   
At the end of the day, it would appear that any medically recognised condition may be 
proffered in support of a defence of diminished responsibility. However, it is the defendant’s 
responsibility to satisfy the court that his medical condition is linked to an abnormality of 
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mental functioning that has resulted in the criminal act. The prosecution must then prove 
otherwise.932 
8.3.3. Substantially Impaired 
As previously discussed, the defendant seeking to prove diminished responsibility 
must show that the medically recognised condition is linked to a mental abnormality that 
substantially impairs rational judgment, as well as the ability to exercise self-control, and the 
ability to understand the nature of their behaviour. Chambers (1983) demonstrates the 
sentencing options for the court where there is substantial impairment (the medical evidence 
must relate to a condition that must be treated, and is covered by the Mental Health Act 
(MHA)). The judge can either make an order for hospitalisation with no fixed time, or the 
court may make an order for a fixed period of incarceration if the defendant is found to be a 
danger to society.933 In Chambers, the defendant’s responsibility was reduced, evidenced by 
an 8 year sentence.934 
Substantial impairment still refers to less than total, but more than trivial, as 
established under the case of Lloyd (1967).935 In fact, the Court of Appeal ruled in Ramchurn 
(2010) that the word substantially, in the context of diminished responsibility, will mean not 
insignificant, or go beyond “extinguished,” and will not mean more than that which is 
“required.”936 Essentially, the individual must have a substantially impaired ability (as 
                                                          
932 ibid. 
933 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (5th edn, Cambridge University Press 2010) 
120-121. 
934 E. Griew, ‘Reducing Murder to Manslaughter: Whose Job?’ (1986) 12 Journal of Medical Ethics 
18, 21. 
935 Loveless, Allen and Derry (n534) 262-263. 
936 John Stanton-Ife, ‘Total Incapacity’ in Ben Livings, Alan Reed and Nicola Wake (eds), Mental 
Condition Defences and the Criminal Justice System: Perspectives from Law and Medicine 
(Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2015) 146.  
236 
 
opposed to a trivially impaired ability) to “understand the nature of his or her conduct,” in 
order to “form a rational judgment,” or to “control him or herself.”937 
In considering these three aspects of being substantially impaired, it was determined 
that the defendant’s reliance on the defence of diminished responsibility will depend on the 
level of impairment advanced.938 The issue is a question of fact for the jury to consider.939 
Therefore, whether or not a defendant can prove a substantial impairment in terms of forming 
a rational judgment, understanding the nature of his behaviour or controlling himself is not 
specifically defined. Ultimately, it is up to a jury to determine the veracity of the defendant’s 
claim that he suffered from substantial impairment. 
Although the success of a diminished responsibility defence will largely depend on 
medical evidence, it is difficult to sustain. This is because experts may be able to show that 
the defendant did indeed suffer from some malfunctioning mentality, but it is much more 
difficult for experts to show that the defendant had a substantial impairment to his ability to 
assume responsibility.940 This is because substantial impairment is a legal term, and is not a 
medically recognised condition.941 
The inability to understand the nature of one’s conduct is not much different from the 
first part of the insanity test. One example of this element of being substantially impaired is 
the 10-year-old who plays violent video games and has no understanding that if he killed a 
human being, then they would not be able to come back to life, as they do in his video 
games.942 The problem with this example, however, is that the 10-year-old may actually have 
this substantial impairment, due to his immaturity. At this stage of his development, he 
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cannot understand the nature of his act, but it does not have to be a medically recognised 
condition within the meaning of the MHA.  
As Ormerod and Laird explain, when a judge is faced with explaining the nature of 
the defendant’s conduct, the task can be very difficult.943 This is understandable, because as 
the example above has demonstrated, the inability to understand the nature of one’s act can 
be broadly applied. However, there is a problem when one attempts to link it to a medically 
recognised condition, which may not always be possible. At the same time, the defendant 
may legitimately suffer from a mental malfunctioning. 
The second element of being substantially impaired is the inability to form a rational 
judgment, which is an appropriate way of explaining this element of the defence of 
diminished responsibility. This element of the defence should be described as the inability ‘to 
rationally form a judgment which must be impaired.’944 For instance, a woman with a mental 
disability known as “learned helplessness” comes to the conclusion that the only way to save 
the world from her husband who abused her is to set him on fire.945 The judgment here is 
impaired, and is based on a medically recognised condition. 
 The third aspect of the inability to exercise control is very broad and can open the 
diminished defence to a wide range of circumstances and conditions.946 Morse argues that the 
inability to form rational judgment would automatically indicate that the defendant is unable 
to exercise control. Having both requirements must mean that only if the defendant cannot 
satisfy the court that he is irrational, can the defendant attempt illustrate that he lacked control 
over the situation.947 Essentially, the defendant relying on the loss of self-control must be able 
to convince the court that he lacked “mental responsibility.”948 This is because the loss of 
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control, like all aspects of the substantially impaired, are not always recognisable medical 
conditions.  
8.3.4. Explanation for Conduct 
The explanation for the conduct forming the basis of the criminal offence must be 
linked to the recognised medical condition (causal link between criminal conduct and 
defendant’s condition). As previously established, the recognised medical condition can be 
listed, or not, as long as it is recognised by law. The only requirement following this is that 
this condition is capable of explaining the behaviour of the defendant, specifically, the 
defendant’s abnormality of mental functioning must be able to explain his criminal 
behaviour.949 It is insufficient for the defendant to claim that he suffered from an abnormality 
of mental functioning, but instead, the defendant must be able to link the killing to the 
abnormality of mental functioning.950 
In Dowds (2012), the Court of Appeal ruled that the condition can be temporary, as 
long as it explains the behaviour of the defendant.951 Ultimately, the main purpose of 
establishing a recognised medical condition to explain the behaviour of the defendant is to 
narrow the opportunities for defendants proposing that any trivial condition can explain their 
behaviour and warrant a lesser offence or a partial defence on the basis of diminished 
responsibility.952 
The Court of Appeals in Dowds also ruled that the recognised medical condition need 
not necessarily be included in a diagnostic list of medically recognised conditions.953 It is a 
question of law as to whether a condition is a recognised medical condition.954 It would 
certainly not be a case of diminished responsibility if the defendant were to argue that they 
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committed murder because they had defective reasoning due to irritability. This would not be 
a recognised medical condition capable of explaining why and how the defendant was 
irrational and mentally malfunctioning. In fact, the condition would not be a sufficient 
explanation for murder that could reasonably and legitimately amount to diminished 
responsibility. 
The medical condition must be capable of explaining the necessary elements of the 
offence. This means that the diminished responsibility defence will only be available if the 
elements are connected. The defendant will not be successful if he simply shows that he 
suffered from abnormal mental functioning, or a recognised medical condition. The 
defendant must be able to show that the combined effect of these elements explains the 
killing.955 If the recognised medical condition which results in the abnormality of mental 
functioning cannot explain the behaviour, it will not likely support a defence of diminished 
responsibility.  
8.4. War Veterans, PTSD, and the Diminished Responsibility Defence 
In England, the Law Commission has reviewed the offences of murder and 
manslaughter several times.956 The primary problem with respect to murder is that it carries a 
mandatory sentence, and is often impossible to establish criminal responsibility on the 
specific intent element, ‘intention to cause death or serious bodily harm.’957 This means that 
some form of variation is necessary. England has sought to introduce and apply partial 
defences to murder in response to the gaps left by the existing law. One of these partial 
defences is diminished responsibility.958 
                                                          
955 Child and Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Essentials of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 
(n849) 180. 
956 Quick and Wells, ‘Partial Reform of Partial Defences: Developments in England and Wales’ 





The origin of diminished responsibility indicates that the defence was necessitated by 
the mandatory death sentence attached to murder. It is therefore understandable that partial 
defences were part of the legislator’s attempts to reform murder.959 Therefore, the partial 
defence of diminished responsibility was subsequently introduced to allow more flexibility in 
reducing murder to manslaughter. Thus, in England, diminished responsibility will therefore 
function to reduce a criminal charge.960 However, the only crime that can be the subject of a 
diminished responsibility defence is murder (recently, in England, there have been other 
partial defences to reduce a charge of murder; e.g., loss of control, and suicide pacts). 
In order to substantiate a defence of diminished responsibility, the defendant must 
prove the statutory elements contained in section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, as amended. 
The statutory elements present are structured around the defendant’s killing. The defendant 
must suffer from an abnormality of mental functioning which must be linked to a recognised 
medical condition, must substantially impair the defendant’s ability to understand the nature 
of his behaviour, or form a rational judgment or control himself/herself.961 
It is important to recognise that there are really quite different ways in which to 
reduce the culpability of the defendant in the US and England in the realm of diminished 
responsibility/capacity. In England, a distinct partial defence reduces the offence from 
murder to manslaughter as a way of recognising reduced culpability. In various states of the 
USA, diminished capacity is used to challenge the claim that the defendant has the specific 
intent required by the crime for which he is charged. For this reason, diminished capacity can 
be a full defence to any crime with specific intent. For example, to be guilty of theft, one has 
permanently to have the specific intent to deprive the owner of the objects’ use. If someone 
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can show that their diminished capacity means they do not really understand the idea of 
permanent deprivation, then they may not have the intent needed to prove theft. 
Diminished responsibility is undoubtedly relevant as a defence for war veterans with 
PTSD. In an appropriate case, the war veteran with PTSD has an opportunity to have his 
PTSD condition diagnosed and treated, rather than enduring a mandatory sentence for 
murder. The war veteran with PTSD may also receive treatment for their medically 
recognised condition. As Morse points out, an individual convicted of manslaughter under the 
provisions of section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 can be sentenced to prison or 
hospitalisation.962 Consequently, a defendant who is a war veteran with PTSD can make an 
appropriate plea in mitigation of sentence seeking hospitalisation, and therefore treatment, for 
his condition. In order to understand how the partial defence of diminished responsibility may 
be successfully argued by the war veterans with PTSD, this part of the chapter will analyse 
each of the elements of the defence, as well as the likelihood of acceptance and rejection. 
8.4.1. Abnormality of Mental Functioning 
Morse points out just how complicated distinguishing diverse forms of mental 
instability from insanity can be. According to Morse, the court is bound to look at these 
different terms describing the behaviour of the individual, and accept that the legal question 
is related to behaviour. The question for consideration is whether the individual at stake can 
satisfy ‘the law’s rationality standard in the context in question?’963 Abnormality of mental 
functioning performs the task of distinguishing irrational behaviour from insanity. Ultimately, 
the law seeks to grade the extent to which the defendant’s psychological state of mind should 
reduce his culpability or criminal responsibility (it is important to recognise that insanity 
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requires full impairment, but diminished responsibility/capacity requires substantial 
impairment).964  
Attempts by the court to define what amounts to abnormality of mental functioning 
have demonstrated just how difficult the element of defence of diminished responsibility is. 
This difficulty stems from the fact that abnormalities of the mind are not contemplated by 
disease of the mind or mental defect, which establishes the standard for insanity.965 The 
complexity of the element of abnormality of mental functioning is evidenced by the ruling in 
R v Golds. In that case, the court indicated that diminished responsibility was available for 
those who suffered from conditions other than pure mental illnesses. Other conditions, such 
as PTSD and learned helplessness, can fall within the realm of the diminished responsibility. 
The defendant must be suffering from something that is quite abnormal. Whatever is wrong 
with the defendant must have impacted on the way that he behaved.966 
Thus, it is clear that the abnormality of mental functioning permits flexibility in its 
interpretation and application. This flexibility renders this essential element of the defence of 
diminished responsibility open to interpretation, and as a result, can include or exclude 
mental conditions that might otherwise be expected to be included or excluded. Therefore, 
identifying and proving abnormality of mental functioning is uncertain and unpredictable. For 
the time being, however, those suffering from PTSD are most likely to be able to argue that 
their PTSD is an abnormality of mental functioning. 
This can be very helpful for war veterans with PTSD who by virtue of their PTSD 
symptoms, commit homicide due to an abnormality of mental functioning directly linked to 
PTSD symptoms. Consider, for example, a war veteran with PTSD having serious flashbacks 
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of the war experience, and committing homicide under the mistaken belief that he is at war. 
These kinds of symptoms and reactions may not always be accepted as legal insanity, 
although PTSD is a recognised medical condition. The flexibility of the meaning of 
abnormality of mental functioning leaves the door open for PTSD to establish a defence of 
diminished responsibility. 
That fact is that even the medically recognised version of PTSD is consistent with the 
abnormality of mental functioning limbs of diminished responsibility. PTSD is medically 
recognised as a cognition difficulty. The PTSD sufferer has difficulty processing information 
which is directed toward threat assessments, in which non-threatening events are threatening, 
and as a result the attention span of the PTSD sufferer is impaired leaving other thinking 
abilities impaired.967 
The flashback experience of the veteran with PTSD was played out in Commonwealth 
v Mulcahy. In this case, a court in Philadelphia accepted diminished capacity as a partial 
defence for a Vietnam veteran with PTSD who had been charged with murder. In his case, 
the defendant thought that he was re-experiencing an episode of war when he murdered a 
barmaid. This allowed Mulcahy, who was charged with murder, to be convicted of a lesser 
offence.968 In other words, Mulcahy was not totally excused for his crime. In another 
jurisdiction, such as Philadelphia, the partial excuse under diminished capacity is established 
if the defendant is able to show that, due to a mental defect, he was unable to form the 
necessary mens rea. Thus, war veterans with PTSD can escape partial responsibility due to 
this mental defect. 
The case of Commonwealth v Mulcahy demonstrates that there is a clear link between 
PTSD symptoms and the medically recognised understanding of this mental condition. All 
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medically recognised manifestations of PTSD clearly establish that its symptoms result in 
abnormality of mental functioning. This aspect of PTSD is unambiguously accepted by the 
medical community, especially in terms of its impact on cognition. 
The consistency of the medically recognised version of PTSD, and the requirements 
set forth by section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, makes diminished responsibility a viable 
option for war veterans with PTSD who commit homicide. For example, section 2 of the 
1957 Act, provides that the defendant could successfully launch diminished responsibility if 
he could prove the abnormality of the mental functioning was so significant that he could not 
form the necessary mens rea. These two interconnected elements have been found to be 
consistent with a number of conditions, including many mental maladies such as alcoholism, 
volitional insanity, and psychopathy.969 Returning war veterans are therefore expected to be 
good candidates for the diminished responsibility defence, since substance abuse has been 
found to be secondary or comorbid with PTSD, both of which are prevalent among war 
veterans.970 
In addition, the impaired cognition sets PTSD sufferers up to successfully utilise the 
mental functioning aspect of diminished responsibility. Obviously, when a war veteran with 
PTSD is experiencing a flashback, the most unthreatening events appear to be threatening, 
because the PTSD sufferer is reliving the combat experience. When this happens there is little 
doubt that PTSD causes an abnormality of mental functioning. It also helps that PTSD is a 
recognised medical condition. 
In fact, in the Washington, USA case of State v Warden, the usability of abnormality 
of mental functioning was a successful part of the defence by a PTSD sufferer claiming 
diminished capacity. In this case, a woman was charged with the murder of her former 
employer. In her defence to the murder charge, the female claimed diminished capacity on 
                                                          
969 Kennefick (n924) 755.  
970 Meisler (n45) 1. 
245 
 
the grounds of PTSD which was due to abuse by her son. The defendant called expert 
testimony on her state of mind and how she lacked capacity at the requisite time, due to 
PTSD.  
However, when the presiding judge delivered the jury instructions, he only instructed 
the jury on lesser degrees of murder, and failed to offer instructions on manslaughter. When 
the case came before the Washington Supreme Court, the court ruled that the presiding judge 
erred because there was sufficient expert testimony on the mental defect in support of a 
defence of diminished capacity to put forward an option of manslaughter to the jury.971 
Furthermore, in State v Bottrell, the Washington Court of Appeals confirmed that PTSD can 
defeat the mens rea of defendant and lead to acquittal.972 Therefore, in the State of 
Washington, PTSD can form the basis of a partial defence of diminished capacity to murder, 
just as it is used in England. 
8.4.2. Recognised Medical Condition 
The introduction of a recognised medical condition as an element of diminished 
responsibility by the amendments to the Homicide Act 1957, via the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009, will no doubt focus the court’s attention on medical or expert evidence. In this regard, 
the recognised medical condition will undoubtedly require that the defendant present expert 
evidence establishing that he suffers from a recognised medical condition.973 In such a case, a 
person who commits homicide, such as a mercy killing, may be barred from establishing 
diminished responsibility on the basis of a recognised medical condition.974 
 The obvious unanswered question is – what can one expect of the diminished 
responsibility defence if the mercy killing was compassionate, but the compassion was 
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aroused by an abnormality of mental functioning due to a recognised medical condition? 
Suppose that the defendant was a war veteran who was traumatised by his mercy killing of 
another soldier when the other was so seriously injured in a combat situation, where no help 
was possible. When triggered in the post-combat stage, the war veteran has a flashback in 
which he misinterprets the fate of another, and erroneously and irrationally carries out what 
he thinks is a mercy killing. This will likely be a situation in which a recognised medical 
condition will be used to establish that the war veteran with PTSD irrationally came to the 
conclusion that he was carrying out a mercy killing. 
It is important to note that the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 does not apply to mental 
competency. Rather, the 2009 Act applies to individuals with a mental defect that basically 
renders the individual incapable of consciously and deliberately committing a crime. 
Therefore, a child’s undeveloped mind is not applicable. Rather, the individual must be 
suffering from some mental defect that impedes his ability to function normally. This can be 
clearly demonstrated in the case of the war veteran with PTSD who misinterprets information 
related to triggering events.  
While this definition/recognised medical condition complicates the defence of 
diminished responsibility, it does provide a means for veterans with PTSD to avoid full 
responsibility for a crime. The operative words in the Act of 2009 are that the mental defect 
must be medically recognised. Since PTSD is an official medically recognised mental 
disorder, war veterans would be able to amount a defence of diminished responsibility if they 
are able to link PTSD to the crime for which they are charged. 
Still, section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 alters the previous 
requirements. The essential elements of diminished responsibility under section 52 require 
that the defendant is suffering from an abnormality in the functioning of his mentality due to 
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a medically recognised condition.975 PTSD is still capable of supporting a defence of 
diminished responsibility because, since 1980, it has been listed as a medically recognised 
condition in the DSM by the APA.976 
Former soldier David Bradley of England was charged with four counts of murder in 
the shooting death of four of his family members. At the start of his trial, Bradley pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility brought on by PTSD.977 
There was evidence of Bradley’s declining health due to PTSD prior to the killing. He had 
visited a psychiatrist during the preceding month who prescribed treatment for his 
symptoms.978 Bradley pleaded guilty to manslaughter based on diminished responsibility (and 
succeeded). His reliance on PTSD was instrumental because it was clear that during the 
commission of the offences, Bradley suffered from a medically recognised condition that 
would have been backed up by medical experts treating him.  
8.4.3. Substantially Impaired 
Substantial impairment comes with three dimensions. The individual seeking to 
establish that he was not wholly responsible for the murder he is charged with must prove 
that his substantial impairment impacted on his ability to understand the nature of his 
behaviour, in order to make rational judgment and control the self.979 The defendant seeking 
to have a murder conviction replaced by manslaughter in both the US and England will 
therefore be faced with a mammoth task to confront. In both jurisdictions, the defendant will 
not be able to simply claim that he was substantially impaired due to a mental abnormality 
resulting from a recognised medical condition.  
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In England, the defendant is tasked with proving that his substantial impairment 
damaged his ability in the three ways described in the preceding paragraph. In fact, a learning 
disability which affects an adult’s cognition, so that he thinks like a child, can be sufficient to 
curve a murder conviction on the basis of a substantial impairment to understand the nature 
of one’s behaviour.980 In California, a defendant can be acquitted of first degree murder 
which requires deliberation or premeditation if he suffered from impairment due to mental 
inabilities.981 However, the diminished capacity defence was abolished under section 25 of 
California Penal Code.982 This defence was replaced by mens rea or actuality defence. Still, 
the defendant with mental inabilities could give evidence under section 28 of the California 
Penal Code, but to negate mens rea, not capacity.983    
The inability to form a rational judgment can also be established for an individual 
with PTSD. For example, an individual who suffered from PTSD due to spousal abuse may 
successfully claim that due to her substantial impairment she came to the conclusion that 
there was only one way to stop the abuse, and that was, for example, through burning the 
abuser. According to Morse’s critique of US law, it can be argued that the defendant only 
needs to show that due to impairment she experienced a loss of self-control, and irrationality 
is not altogether necessary.984 The same can be argued in favour of PTSD, in which the 
defendant is taken over by the dissociative state when experiencing a flashback, which would 
cause a loss of self-control because it is not voluntary.985 
Diminished capacity, like diminished responsibility, is not a question of insanity, but 
rather a question of a temporary loss of consciousness due to a more serious mental 
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condition. A defendant suffering from PTSD may find himself losing consciousness and 
control of his behaviour when suffering from triggers or flashbacks or substance abuse or 
when he simply goes into a dissociative state, which is common in PTSD sufferers.986  
Van der Kolk, McFarlane, and Weisaeth’s claim that there are three specific 
symptoms of PTSD that give rise to diminished responsibility requires further examination. 
The three symptoms stated by Van der Kolk, et al., are trauma addiction, which is manifested 
by sensation seeking behaviour; self-punishment, due to survivor’s guilt or guilt over the 
trauma itself; and self-numbing, through substance abuse (these symptoms will be discussed 
in detail in the following section).987 
None of these symptoms require nor indicate that the offender is unable to tell the 
difference between right and wrong. All that is required is that he is unable to fully 
acknowledge or appreciate the nature of his actions, and is unable to control his behaviour. 
Obviously, the legal test for diminished responsibility is lighter than the text for insanity, and 
therefore, what might appear to be inconsequential PTSD symptoms are in fact, capable of 
supporting a defence of diminished responsibility. 
Trauma addiction leads to sensation seeking which may on the surface seem 
inconsequential. However, according to James, Strom, and Leskela, sensation seeking due to 
PTSD among military personnel is linked to risky behaviour.988 Thus, one might argue that 
PTSD is an impairment of the mind which leads to irrational decisions, such as sensation 
thinking due to trauma addiction. Blinded by trauma addiction and the propensity for 
sensation seeking, the risky behaviour that follows is a consequence of an inability to make 
rational decisions and control one’s behaviour. 
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Self-punishment may only really serve to support a defence of diminished 
responsibility in the event that the defendant harms others while attempting to cause self-
harm. In such a case, the requisite mens rea is difficult to substantiate since the defendant 
may have harmed others, but his intention was to cause self-harm. For instance, a defendant 
may decide to drive his truck over a cliff, and in doing so, inadvertently run over a pedestrian 
in his path. Thus, self-punishment may amount to diminished responsibility because the 
defendant clearly only intended to cause self-harm. It is also clear that the defendant was 
unaware of the nature of his actions since he failed to take into account the possibility that he 
may harm others, and was therefore unaware of the nature of his crime. 
Ultimately, one would expect that diminished responsibility requires some level of 
consciousness on the part of the offender. After all, diminished responsibility suggests that as 
a partial defence, the offender is somewhat capable of understanding the nature of the crime. 
This might occur among war veterans with trauma or combat addiction who seek to relive the 
war experience. They might very well be aware of the nature of their crimes, but are entitled 
to a diminished responsibility defence since the sensation seeking proclivity is connected to 
PTSD symptoms, a trauma contracted during exposure to war.  
8.4.4. Explanation for Conduct 
The amended section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 states that when the individual 
claiming diminished responsibility alleges that he was suffering from an abnormality of 
mental functioning, that abnormality must be an explanation for the crime, either causatively 
or contributory. These sorts of reformations are intended to clarify when and how diminished 
responsibility may be established.989 In other words, there must be a direct link between the 
abnormality of mental functioning and the behaviour.   
                                                          




This is definitely an improvement on the old law where responsibility could have 
been evaded simply because the defendant was labouring under a mental condition at the time 
of committing the offence in question. The legislators installed the explanation link as a 
means of eliminating “random coincidence” defences, where there is no association between 
the crime and the mental dysfunction.990 
In other words, it would not be sufficient for a defendant suffering from PTSD to 
claim diminished responsibility simply because he suffered from PTSD. The condition, 
although medically recognised, may be under control and in no way connected to the murder 
in question. In fact, just because a defendant suffers from PTSD does not mean that he always 
makes irrational decisions and cannot understand the nature of his behaviour or always loses 
self-control. Similarly, just because an individual suffers from PTSD does not mean that they 
always suffer from an abnormality of mental function. Therefore, the requirement that one 
links the mental abnormality to a medically recognised requirement can act as a safeguard 
against using PTSD and other mental abnormalities as an excuse for criminal behaviour. 
Still, Pittman and Sparr caution that even where there is compatibility between PTSD 
symptoms and diminished responsibility, the defendant still has an uphill battle.991 This is 
because it is very difficult to illustrate that there is a connection between the criminal conduct 
and PTSD.992 In the first place, the defendant claiming PTSD and diminished responsibility 
must establish a connection between the psychiatric symptoms and the traumatic stressor, and 
secondly, the defendant must establish a connection between the criminal conduct and 
psychiatric symptoms.993 
In the US case of United States v Cebian, the court’s ruling indicated that a defendant 
with PTSD suffering from battered woman’s syndrome could avail herself of the defence of 
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diminished capacity on a drug offence where specific intent is negated.994 This is a very 
different use of the explanatory clause in England’s diminished responsibility defence, as the 
defendant may only use diminished responsibility in murder cases. It is indeed difficult to 
understand how one might be able to prove that a mental dysfunction explains how and why 
the defendant had resorted to crimes involving illicit drugs, but lacked the requisite specific 
intent. This is because most of the criminal explanations offered with respect to medically 
recognised offences are violence oriented.  
It is also interesting to see how far the courts in the US will go to allow a defence of 
diminished capacity in order to offer an explanation for the crime. Linda Cebian claimed 
diminished capacity on the basis of PTSD in respect of a cocaine offence. The defendant 
argued that she did not have the capacity to form the specific intent needed for the crime. The 
defendant went further to argue that her husband was a drug dealer, and she was unable to 
form an independent decision. An expert was called to testify as to her PTSD. The defendant 
was convicted, but appealed her conviction. At the appellate court, the defendant did not have 
her conviction overturned. However, the appellate court did not rule against the admissibility 
of the expert testimony, and therefore implicitly confirmed that the defendant’s defence of 
diminished capacity was admissible on an illicit drug charge.995 
In Gray v Thames Trains and Others, the defendant’s explanation for his crime was 
also that he suffered from PTSD due to a train wreck that he experienced. Subsequently, he 
became involved in an altercation with a man, and then left the altercation, went to his 
girlfriend’s house, retrieved a kitchen knife, returned to the location where he had the 
altercation, and stabbed the man with whom he had been arguing. Based on the evidence of 
this PTSD, a plea of manslaughter was negotiated and accepted.996 
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It is very difficult to understand how diminished responsibility can be sustained for an 
offence that takes time, planning, and thinking in order to carry out.  It is not as if the effects 
of drugs diminished Cebian’s capacity during the commission of a crime. Diminished 
responsibility is not a permanent unstable defect of the mind. The image of flashes of 
irrationality comes to mind. The individual was usually quite normal, save for triggering 
events and other out of the ordinary experiences that brought on the symptoms of PTSD.  
8.4.5. Rejection and Acceptance of the Diminished Responsibility Defence 
Diminished responsibility/capacity provides a defence for individuals suffering from a 
mental impairment that would not necessarily suffice to support a defence of insanity. For 
example, an individual may suffer from a mental defect that impairs his judgment, but the 
defect is not serious enough to completely absolve the individual’s criminal intent. When 
considering murder, diminished responsibility is an entirely acceptable solution. This is 
because the Law Commission in England had tried to divide responsibility for murder into 
reasonable structures. The rationale for this attempt is to divide up responsibility so that all 
offenders are not lumped together as one type of killer. This is especially important when 
murder requires a mandatory sentence applicable to all convicted of the offence.997 
In other words, diminished responsibility in England is intended to recognise that 
there are diverse levels of criminal responsibility in the case of murder. For example, a fully 
sane individual who commits a crime is responsible for the crime. An individual who is 
legally insane would be totally absolved of criminal responsibility. Somewhere in between, 
an individual will have diminished responsibility. Take the example of a child under the age 
of 10 who commits a serious crime. The child is not insane, but at the same time, the child 
lacks the mental capacity to form the necessary intention for the commission of the crime. 
Likewise, the individual who suffers a flashback due to combat-related PTSD, although he 
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suffers from a medically recognised condition, he may not be regarded as legally insane. 
Such an individual should not be convicted on the same level as a legally sane individual who 
sets out to commit a murder and carries it out completely. Fortunately, diminished 
responsibility allows for this gap to be filled in the criminal justice system.  
The gap-filling intention of diminished responsibility on the basis of structuring 
liability for murder is observed in England in the case of Aaron Wilkinson. Wilkinson, a 
former soldier deployed to Afghanistan who returned to England with PTSD, successfully 
pleaded diminished responsibility.998 Wilkinson’s case was resolved at the trial of first 
instance because his plea of diminished responsibility was accepted by a jury who convicted 
him of manslaughter rather than the original charge of murder.999 Wilkinson’s defence of 
diminished responsibility also resulted in an indefinite sentence with an opportunity for 
parole within five years, provided he was no longer a threat to public safety.1000 
While reports on the Wilkinson case do not cover the details of the plea in mitigation, 
it is more likely than not that his plea took into account each of the elements of the 
diminished responsibility defence. No doubt Wilkinson’s defence centered on the 
abnormality of the mental functioning which is linked to PTSD (a recognised medical 
condition) and substantially impaired Wilkinson’s ability to understand the nature of his 
behaviour or to form a rational judgment or to control oneself (with the lack of detail 
available about Wilkinson’s defence it can only be concluded that PTSD was shown to be 
able to establish the requisite medically recognised condition that is linked to substantial 
impairment). 
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Savla reports that in England, diminished responsibility is usually helpful for PTSD 
sufferers claiming battered women’s syndrome.1001 In the US, Berger, McNiel and Binder 
observed that ‘courts have not always found the presentation of PTSD testimony to be 
relevant, admissible, or compelling,’ especially where expert testimony falls short of 
demonstrating how PTSD has satisfied the standards for the defence.1002 Where the standards 
falls short, the defendant has the option to raise the partial defence of diminished capacity or 
other defences, which are also not always successful.1003 Therefore, it would appear that 
where the defendant’s PTSD is not sufficient for establishing insanity, it can also fall when it 
comes to the defence of diminished responsibility. This means that diminished responsibility 
is not always a solution or an acceptable defence, even in cases where it might be justifiably 
used. 
In the US, diminished capacity is typically used to counter the prosecution’s claim 
that the defendant had the requisite mens rea.1004 Yet, the US provides for the defence to be 
used as partial or absolute.1005 In the meantime, the US MPC is very specific about the impact 
of the mental condition on criminal intent as the basis for substantiating a defence of 
diminished capacity. For instance, the US MPC has simplified its language to leave no doubt 
as to the criminal mental element. Phrases such as “conscious object” and “knowledge” serve 
to clarify the mental element within the Penal Code.1006 
In California, diminished capacity was replaced by what is now called “diminished 
actuality.” 1007 Rather than seek to prove that the defendant suffers from a mental infraction, 
the issue for consideration at trial is whether the defendant has actually formed the necessary 
intent to commit a crime. The best that a defendant can hope for is a conviction on a lesser 
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included offence.1008 Therefore, diminished actuality is a partial defence in California. Other 
states also offer diminished capacity as a partial defence. 
As with California, in Washington, diminished capacity can be successful if the 
defendant is suffering from a mental malady or voluntary intoxication at the time of the 
offence. Moreover, in Washington, the defendant can either benefit from a conviction of a 
lesser included offence, or from an outright acquittal.1009 
England’s statutory provision under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 is broader, 
requiring abnormally of mental function that forestalls rational judgment, and so on. The 
broad-based definition of diminished responsibility, however, creates problems with 
satisfying each of the pivotal elements while attempting to draw a line between insane and 
non-insane criminal responsibility. 
In England, diminished responsibility is a partial defence which can result in a verdict 
on a lesser included offence, specifically, a successful defence of diminished responsibility 
can reduce murder to manslaughter. The defence is only available on a charge of murder, but 
in other jurisdictions, such as the US, diminished capacity is not restricted to a murder charge 
and has also acted as a complete defence in the US.  
8.4.6. Diminished and Individuals Suffering from PTSD 
As mentioned earlier, Van der Kolk, McFarlane and Weisaeth have stated that PTSD 
is quite compatible with the partial defence of diminished capacity.1010 Three specific areas of 
PTSD may bring on diminished capacity: 
1- The “addiction to trauma” which is characterised by “sensation seeking.” 
2- The desire for self-punishment as a means of quelling the “guilt connected with the 
traumatic event.” 
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3- The abuse of substances as a means of numbing reflection on trauma and the “resultant 
disinhibited actions.”1011 
The three symptoms above are prevalent among individuals with PTSD, and as a 
result, are more consistent with diminished capacity (as opposed to insanity).1012 For instance, 
sensation seeking is the result of PTSD, an impairment of the mind, and can lead to risky 
behaviour which can lead to criminal offending. This kind of behaviour may not be capable 
of substantiating the disease of the mind requirement of insanity, but can fulfill the 
abnormality of mental functioning requirement of the diminished responsibility defence. This 
may amount to diminished responsibility/capacity because the sensation seeking aspect of 
PTSD may be uncontrollable. 
Self-punishment may also impair the ability to recognise the nature of the crime since 
the desired outcome is punishment to the self. Moreover, self-medicating through the abuse 
of substances can certainly impair the mind and lead to irrational decision-making (however, 
self-punishment does not rise to the level of psychosis frequently required to substantiate an 
insanity defence). Self-punishment is far more compatible with the abnormality of mental 
functioning of diminished responsibility and the inability to form rational judgment, or to 
control the self or to understand the nature of one’s behaviour, because the defendant is so 
focused on self-harm. 
Similarly, substance abuse will not permit a defendant to claim insanity, whether the 
abuse is voluntary or involuntary. Diminished responsibility is more likely to be successful 
for the war veteran with PTSD who is not receiving treatment, and is trying to ease the 
symptoms of PTSD through self-medicating via abuse of substances. In such a case, the 
defendant will be able to argue impairment much more convincingly than disease of the mind 





(this symptom may apply in the realm of diminished capacity in the USA, but not in England, 
where the acceptable defence is intoxication). 
8.4.7. Diminished or Insanity 
Diminished responsibility provides a defence for individuals who might otherwise 
seek an insanity defence. Many of the requirements for proving diminished responsibility are 
similar to the insanity defence, with the only difference being that the former defence will 
apply if the defendant is incapable of forming rational decisions, controling his behaviour, or 
understanding the nature of his crime, as the defence of insanity requires that the defendant 
lacks these elements altogether. Diminished responsibility only requires that these elements 
are diminished or impaired due to mental impairment. 
While insanity warrants a complete absolution, diminished responsibility permits a 
reduced charge, however, both defences rely on a defence that involves a medical condition.  
The issue for consideration in this section is when and how does one decide that the medical 
condition is more appropriate for diminished responsibility as opposed to insanity. To begin 
with, as discussed throughout the insanity chapter, the defendant seeking to rely on the 
insanity defence must prove that his mental malfunctioning occurred due to a disease of the 
mind. This would, therefore, limit the opportunities for launching an insanity defence.  
Proving a disease of the mind can be difficult to substantiate because not all diseases 
of the mind recognised by science are accepted in law. As a result, the defence of diminished 
responsibility arises to reduce responsibility rather than remove it altogether. Ultimately, 
criminal responsibility is built around the belief that not all people who commit crimes are 
absolutely responsible, due to some mental incapacity.1013 
When considering which option is more appropriate, one may pause with regard to the 
requirement for both defences to show that the defendant did not have the ability to 
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understand the nature of his offence. One might argue that if the defendant is unable to 
understand the nature of his offence, he can launch an insanity defence and accept full 
absolution. However, the problem for the defendant is the low success rate of the insanity 
defence, and the likelihood of spending a number of years in prison untreated for a condition 
such as PTSD. PTSD has a significant risk of recidivism.1014 This means that while in prison, 
the absence of treatment for PTSD will only heighten the risk. 
When the defendant, who is a war veteran suffering from PTSD, is sent to prison 
because he was untreated and undiagnosed, but was self-medicating and therefore abusing 
substances, the insanity defence will not be available. However, diminished responsibility 
may be a more viable option since the defendant may have a dependency on substances (not 
meaning the consumption of a substance at the particular time of the crime, but rather 
substance abuse as a condition which might lead to the abnormality of mental functioning). 
This is a medically recognised condition which can cause abnormalities of mental 
functioning, thus, diminished responsibility/capacity would be a more fitting defence for the 
war veteran with PTSD. At the very least, the defendant will spend fewer years in prison as 
opposed to the life sentence when an insanity defence fails. In such a case, the defendant is at 
a lower risk of recidivism. 
8.5. Conclusion 
Diminished responsibility is a seemingly straightforward concept indicating that in 
certain circumstances, an individual should not expect to be entirely bereft of the 
responsibility for the crime. Rather, the individual may receive some sort of partial waiver on 
responsibility as he is not altogether capable of forming criminal intent. This is because 
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diminished responsibility upholds the theoretical assumption that not all individuals who 
commit crimes are equally blameworthy or responsible. 
In some jurisdictions, diminished responsibility takes on a higher level of importance 
because murder is the only offence for which this defence is available. This is an important 
defence because not all killers are murderers of the same degree. For example, in England, 
everyone convicted of murder will receive the same mandatory sentence. This is not a fair 
outcome when some individuals suffer from a mental defect that does not give rise to 
insanity. As a result, diminished responsibility is an important defence for individuals who 
are not entirely sane, but also not entirely insane. This is especially important for war 
veterans with PTSD who suffer from a debilitating mental malady, but are not able to 
convince a jury that they are insane. Diminished responsibility provides the defendant with 
the opportunity to present lesser included offences of murder to the jury. 
Diminished responsibility is a partial defence for the most part, meaning that war 
veterans with PTSD do not necessarily obtain redemptive relief. In fact, there is no 
vindication if the defendant war veteran with PTSD obtains a reduced crime. This is because 
war veterans with PTSD are not getting treatment for the disease as an alternative response to 
offending, and will be imprisoned and released as any convicted criminal would. The only 
difference is that they will not receive the maximum punishment due to diminished 
responsibility. 
In England, the fact that diminished responsibility is only available for a charge of 
murder is problematic, and suggests that only the worst crime can be mitigated. This is 
especially true for war veterans with PTSD who return from battle with this mental condition, 
and go on to commit violent crimes, and abuse substances. When the insanity defence is 
unavailable, the defendant really has to confront incarceration, with little treatment, and most 
likely recidivism. The outcome is harmful to the veteran with PTSD, as well as to society. 
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Chapter Nine: Sentencing and 
Mitigation 
 
9.1. Sentence Stage 
9.1.1. Introduction 
The sentence is a penal remedy issued by the court upon the conviction of a criminal. 
Sentencing may include imprisonment, penal fines, both of these, or another alternative 
remedy.1015 Unlike conviction, which is (in the main) a binary matter – the defendant is either 
guilty or not guilty – sentencing offers a variety of outcomes. Moreover, as we have seen, the 
legal rules governing defences are complex and, of necessity, general. In contrast, sentencing, 
other than in cases of mandatory outcomes, is individualistic and can take into account far 
more background factors than are allowed in the determination of guilt. It might be thought 
therefore that sentencing offers the best chance of responding to the arguments of Chapter 
Four and the “special status” of war veterans with PTSD. As will be shown below, to an 
extent this is true, but sentencing, and diversions from the criminal justice system, are 
complicated matters and their application to war veterans with PTSD is not always consistent.   
This is a complex issue because the appropriate sentence depends on mitigating and 
aggravating factors. Moreover, sentencing is required to coincide with the penal policy in 
operation. Penal policies may be aligned with deterrence, incapacitation, retribution and 
rehabilitation (or restorative justice). In addition, the extent to which mitigating factors may 
apply will depend on the significance of aggravating factors. In other words, sentencing is not 
as simple as meting out culpability or just deserts. What is just will depend on the mitigating 
and aggravating factors. 
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This part of Chapter Nine addresses the issue of sentencing for war veterans with 
PTSD. The main concern is whether sentencing should be an opportunity for diagnosis and 
treatment, or whether war veterans with PTSD should be incarcerated and punished like any 
other criminal offender. This part of chapter critically examines the possibility of an 
alternative to incarceration for war veterans with PTSD.    
The main issue for consideration here is whether war veterans with PTSD can claim 
both service, and PTSD which was inflicted during service, as mitigating factors in 
sentencing. After all, it is almost certain that the war veteran would not have PTSD and it is 
possible, even probable, that he would not have committed an offence had he not been risking 
his life in service for his country. In addition, it is also likely that the war veteran with PTSD 
would not overcome his condition without treatment, thereby, leaving society in an unsafe 
position.  
This part of the chapter will therefore critically examine what sentencing is and what 
it aims to achieve. Moreover, this part of the chapter will look at what amount to aggravating 
factors and what amount to mitigating factors. Thus, a thorough understanding of sentencing 
will help to establish just how and why war veterans with PTSD and society at large can 
benefit from a more lenient approach to the sentencing of service members whose war-related 
injuries are linked to their criminal offending. 
Once we have a better understanding of what sentencing is, and what it aims to 
achieve, we are in a better position to determine just when and how PTSD in war veterans is 
a mitigating factor. Or perhaps we are positioned to argue that because the war veteran 
incurred PTSD, his war experience is a mitigating factor. 
9.1.2. Brief Introduction to the Sentence 
The history of sentencing in the US is very interesting. During the colonial era, and 
prior to the construction of prisons in the 1700s, the power of sentencing was vested in the 
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hands of jurors.1016 The majority of offences were capital, so that if convicted the defendant 
received the death penalty. Ultimately, due to the absence of prisons, the defendant was either 
put to death or freed.1017 It was therefore understandable why the death penalty drew little or 
no criticism, because there were no alternative sentences for serious offenders.1018 
By the time of the American uprising, England and various European countries were 
already imprisoning serious offenders.1019 Therefore, unlike the US, England had alternative 
sentences for serious offenders, and the question of abandoning the death penalty was 
seriously debated, even back then.1020 The alternative sentencing was imprisonment and 
corporal punishment. In fact, in 1947, the British government debated the abolition of both 
corporal punishment and the death penalty.1021 
It was as early as the 19th century that England’s government set about reforming its 
laws, with old sentencing laws and practices being targeted.1022 Sentences such as hard 
labour, the widespread use of the death penalty, and corporal punishment were high on the 
list for reform. These reforms were necessitated by England’s desire to modernise its legal 
system under the pressure of humanitarianism.1023 
Sentencing originated out of a desire to avenge bad and harmful behaviour.1024 
Punishment was “savage” and marked by instinctive retaliation.1025 Eventually, the penal 
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systems were reformed and modernised. However, arguably penal systems today are still 
reflective of human instincts toward retaliatory justice.1026 
9.1.3. Controversies over the Sentence 
The presumptive theory of sentencing and penology believes that for some crimes, 
there is a fixed penalty. From there, the judge can go up or down, depending on aggravating 
and mitigating factors.1027 This can be controversial because it leaves discretion to the judge 
and as a result, sentencing for the same offence can differ, depending on the mitigating and 
aggravating factors. Although this may be a fair method of sentencing, it creates 
“unpredictability” and “uncertainty” in the criminal justice system. 
Until the 1970s, in the US, the rehabilitative theory guided sentencing, so that judges 
exercised broad discretion to impose wide-ranging sentences based on the offender’s 
rehabilitative capabilities.1028 In the meantime, the parole board had equally broad discretion 
in releasing prisoners.1029 During the 1970s, state and federal statutes and guidelines in the 
US turned away from mitigation and the rehabilitative theory of sentencing towards 
developing determinate sentences for offences.1030 In more recent times, a concern about 
prison overcrowding has resulted in some states returning to more judicial discretion in the 
mitigation of criminal sentencing. Now, based on legislative acts or lack of action in the 
context of sentencing guidance, there is a mix between judges who look for aggravating 
factors and those who look for mitigating factors. To this end, a retribution-minded judge is 
likely to view a defendant with diminished criminal responsibility as less criminally culpable, 
and will therefore mitigate the sentence.1031 
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The rehabilitative theory became controversial because it produced a number of 
models and frameworks for punishment. It was also not entirely clear which frameworks and 
models actually worked.1032 As a result, it was never clear as to which principles guide 
rehabilitation, nor was it clear who was eligible for rehabilitation. The main choices were the 
risk-need-responsivity model and the good-lives-model (introduced in 1990).1033 Still, it was 
never clear who would fit within the ambit of which model, nor how to rehabilitate prisoners 
under each model.1034 
Retribution theory holds that an individual should be punished according to the 
severity of the crime and criminal responsibility.1035 Utilitarian theory holds that criminals 
should be punished in order to deter other criminal behaviour and to prevent recidivism.1036 
Disease theory holds that while an individual’s hardship and disturbed social environment 
should not excuse a crime, it should be considered when punishing the individual.1037 Such an 
individual should be helped and not merely punished. The disease theory supports mitigation 
in sentencing more so than utilitarian and retributive theories of sentencing.1038 
The controversy over the retributive justice theory is that it is an assertion of power 
over the prisoner.1039 Moreover, it is a one-way approach to sentencing. Punishing the 
offender is perceived as simply imposing a sanction on him. This is quite different from 
restorative justice, which actually brings the victim and the offender together.1040 
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In Baier’s examination of the pure theory of retribution, he points out that sentencing 
is inherently wrong because it requires two undesirable and unhealthy motives. First, the 
punisher must deliberately hand out a sentence that the recipient does not want, and even if 
he does want it, the punishment is meted out irrespective of that. Secondly, the punishment is 
deliberately aimed at imposing a suffering outcome, and this too is inherently wrong.1041 
9.1.4. Sentencing 
In England, sentencing guidelines establish aggravating factors that will increase the 
sentence of criminals, and mitigating factors that can reduce the sentence.1042 For instance, a 
burglary sentence can be reduced or increased, on the basis of the value of property stolen, 
the harm done, and the mental ability or disability of the offender.1043 
Essentially, courts have the authority to exercise discretion in considering both 
mitigating and aggravating factors in determining how to appropriately sentence a criminal 
offender.1044 For example, remorse or a display of guilt can mitigate a sentence, and a lack of 
remorse may aggravate a sentence.1045 This tendency toward mitigating the sentence of a 
remorseful criminal is consistent with Yamada, et al.’s contention, that sentences are 
mitigated in circumstances where the defendant’s background and demeanor activates 
sympathy on the part of his judge or jury.1046 
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Still, Hessick argues that for the most part, the majority of jurisdictions emphasise the 
aggravating factors for sentencing.1047 Few jurisdictions place significant emphasis on 
mitigating factors, so that donations to charity and military service will make little or no 
difference in a sentencing decision.1048 In other words, where there are aggravating factors, 
there is a tendency to allow those aggravating factors to prevail over mitigating factors, and 
not the other way around. 
There is also a concern that convicts from a disadvantaged background are treated 
unfairly, compared to those from advantaged backgrounds.1049 This explains in part why there 
are far more underprivileged persons in prison than privileged persons. The reality is that 
individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds are given custodial sentences far more often 
than their advantaged cohorts.1050 
9.1.4.1. Purpose of Sentencing 
The purpose of sentencing depends largely on policies and practices for imposing law 
and order, and in turn, crime control. For example, if there is a high level of violent crime in 
one neighbourhood, one might see a tough stance of this particular kind of crime to reduce 
offending. Therefore, over time, the purposes of sentencing have changed with four main 
goals emerging: retributory justice, rehabilitation of offenders, incapacitation, and 
deterrence.1051 Each of these main goals will be discussed in the context of the purpose of 
sentencing.  
Retribution (from one version of retributivism) is based on the theoretical perspective 
of just deserts, and argues that criminals deserve to feel the pain and suffering that they 
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inflicted on their victims.1052 Rehabilitation is a sentencing approach designed to help the 
defendant re-enter society as a productive member.1053 Incapacitation is a sentencing policy 
that follows the assumption that imprisoning offenders who are most likely to re-offend is the 
best insurance against re-offending.1054 Deterrence, which is geared toward the prevention of 
crime and follows on from new sentencing objectives to “get tough on crime” guides most 
sentencing decisions today.1055 
 One conventional theory of criminal punishment deriving from the social contract 
theory states that punishment is a necessary response to those who break the law. Within the 
social contract, individuals necessarily agree to concede some rights in order to co-exist 
peacefully within society. Therefore, the state has acquired the right to identify and enforce 
certain punishments for certain crimes.1056 
This is where the proportionality principle comes in. It is the most popular guiding 
principle in sentencing. Under the proportionality principle, criminal justice systems attempt 
to pass a sentence that is consistent with the gravity of the crime committed.1057 This might 
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9.1.4.1.1. Just Deserts 
With consistent harsh sentences over the last few decades, there has been a shift in 
attention toward the efficacy of just deserts.1058 The philosophy of just deserts argues that a 
criminal does not deserve a sentence that is greater than the severity of his crime. Obviously, 
there is no disputing that a criminal who commits theft should not receive a sentence similar 
to one who commits murder. The disparity arises in considering just how much punishment 
one should give a thief to achieve just deserts.1059 
In England, it has become increasingly clear that just deserts is the primary purpose of 
sentencing policies and practices. Sentencing is based on the retributive standards which 
came into play with the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, which adopts the 
White Paper Crime, Justice, and Protecting the Public 1990. This paper specifically suggests 
sentencing policies aimed at ensuring that the offender receives his just deserts.1060 
9.1.4.1.2. Incapacitation  
Incapacitation is an individualised outcome in England’s criminal justice system, 
aimed at the most dangerous criminals.1061 Thus, incapacitation explains the existence of 
maximum security prisons where criminals who have committed the most serious crimes are 
typically housed. Otherwise, there is nothing in the sentencing system reflective of a 
distinction between modes of incapacitation for the most serious crimes and less serious 
crimes. 
Incapacitation is also used in connection with deterrence. For example, Frelberg and 
Gelb state that one of the main reasons for a US 1978 sentencing law was to succeed in 
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achieving “retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.”1062 It can therefore be assumed that 
sentencing policies and practices believe in incapacitation insofar as they ensure that the 
criminal will not commit further crimes outside of prison after conviction for a crime. 
9.1.4.1.3. Deterrence 
 
In England, sentencing is described as a method for purposely reducing crime through 
the medium of deterrence, in addition to other objectives such as retribution, offender 
rehabilitation, public protection, and victim reparation.1063 Deterrence is founded on the belief 
that a person contemplating a crime will reflect on the penal consequences of committing a 
crime. However, the majority of crimes are conducted spontaneously with little or no time to 
reflect on the outcomes. Still, there are two types of deterrence: general and individual.1064 
9.1.4.1.3.1. General Deterrence 
Christie uses the term “general prevention” to describe deterrence and states that it is 
aimed at the general population.1065 The idea is to take action that would change criminal 
behaviour in the future. However, it is not certain what effect deterrent policies will have on 
the general population. They may decide to actually commit a different crime, or they may 
just move to another jurisdiction.1066 
Unlike individual deterrence, the sentencing policy behind general deterrence is not 
concerned with how the sentencing strategy will affect the individual. Rather, the individual 
is used as a scapegoat because ultimately general deterrence is only concerned with deterring 
other potential criminals. Therefore, the sentence for the individual under a general 
deterrence policy will be strenuous.1067 In this regard, the individual punished is actually a 
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scapegoat because it is hoped that by handing out a tough sentence, others would be mindful 
of the consequences of a crime, and will be guided accordingly.  
9.1.4.1.3.2. Individual Deterrence 
Individual deterrence is much like retribution because it focuses on penalising the 
criminal while seeking a future outcome of no re-offending.1068 Individual deterrence refers 
to specific interventions in respect of a specific defendant, rather than the entire 
population.1069 The goal of sentencing in this instance is obviously to deter the individual 
from future offending. One would, therefore, expect the sentencing court to consider the 
individual’s own specific aggravating and mitigating factors as a means of establishing the 
appropriate sentence for achieving individual deterrence. 
In a sentencing system where an individual is a repeat offender, individual deterrence 
would result in custodial sentences where none was used before. Where custodial sentences 
had been used in the past, the individual would then receive longer custodial sentences in the 
future. However, there is evidence that longer custodial sentences do not reduce re-
offending.1070 It is, therefore, difficult to come to terms with individual deterrence policies, 
such as the three strikes policy, that see long-term incarceration as a means of deterring an 
individual’s risk of recidivism.1071  
9.1.4.1.4. Rehabilitation 
 
Rehabilitation relies on the criminal’s ability to do some soul searching and invoke 
his conscience in order to rehabilitate his thinking, to where he is determined not to re-offend. 
The original belief was that punishment, to the extent that the criminal was forced to sit in 
prison with his own thoughts haunting him, his conscience would automatically come 
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alive.1072 The idea is that the individual’s conscience will guide his future behaviour once 
released from prison. 
Rehabilitation refers to the reformation of the criminal mind and behaviour, and 
therefore, the idea of rehabilitation has always been guided by a general desire to reform 
criminals.1073 During the early part of the 1900s, this was a well-woven theme in criminal 
justice as well as guided corrections institutes and practices.1074 However, by the 1970s, it 
had fallen out of favour due to the belief that it was only used as a means of unleashing unjust 
levels of punishment on offenders.1075 
9.1.4.2. Aggravating Factors 
Under section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, judges must take into consideration 
‘all such information about the circumstances of the offence (including aggravating and 
mitigating factors) as is available.’1076 There are a number of factors than can constitute 
aggravating factors, such as, if the victim is deaf or somehow disabled this will likely amount 
to an aggravating factor. 
Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the concept of “dangerousness” is an 
aggravating factor.1077 Here the court may impose a custodial sentence on an offender based 
on the seriousness of the crime and obviously the offender’s antecedents. In addition, the 
judge is also required to consider whether the offender poses a significant risk of harm to the 
public.1078 It is also important to note that the Criminal Justice Act 2003 contains five 
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sentencing purposes which are – ‘deserved punishment, reduction of crime, rehabilitation, 
public protection, and reparation to the victim.’1079 
These five factors put the aggravating factors into context because among the 
purposes is an attempt to take into consideration the interest of the victim, society and the 
punishment of the offender. The community is also at the heart of considering aggravating 
factors which are lined up with sentencing purposes of reducing crime, rehabilitation, and the 
protection of the public. Deserved punishment also points toward the seriousness of the crime 
acting as an aggravating factor. However, mitigating factors may offset aggravating factors.  
9.1.4.3. Mitigating Factors 
Although the rules differ in different jurisdictions, several applicable general factors 
that judges may take into account in the mitigation of sentences can be identified, which 
include the offender’s acknowledgement of responsibility for the crime, remorse, victim 
forgiveness, a low degree of culpability, good character, no antecedents/capable of 
rehabilitation, good deeds, hardship, and so on.1080 
In England, unlike aggravating factors, there is only one statutorily directed 
mitigating factor that courts may take into account when sentencing a criminal, which is that 
the defendant pleads guilty to the offence.1081 However, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does 
confer discretionary powers on the court to take into account any other mitigating factors that 
the court deems appropriate.1082 Therefore, the court has wide discretionary powers that 
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enable the use of alternatives to incarceration. These discretionary powers are now covered 
by the Sentencing Council’s Sentencing Guidelines for use in Crown Court.  
By virtue of section 166 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the court has a wide 
discretion. Section 166 (1) says that nothing in the Act itself will deprive the court of the 
power to take into account any factor it deems capable of acting as mitigation.1083 This means 
that the court might consider something mitigating, although it has not been considered 
mitigating by a previous court. What makes this wide discretion important is that there is 
nothing of a similar nature according to courts when considering aggravating factors.1084 This 
means that the court’s leverage with regard to mitigating factors is more promising for a 
defendant. If the court had the same leverage with regard to aggravating factors, a plea in 
mitigation of sentence would be far more difficult to make. 
When a defendant pleads guilty, this is automatically treated as a mitigating factor. 
This is because not only does a guilty plea save taxpayers and the court the time and expense 
associated with a trial, but it is also demonstrative of the defendant taking responsibility for 
his crime, and in addition, the defendant is arguably showing remorse. It is also clear that by 
pleading guilty, the defendant is sparing the victim the pain of having to testify and relive the 
crime.  
9.1.5. War Veterans, PTSD, and Sentence 
This section examines how PTSD is used in practice to mitigate the sentences of 
individuals with PTSD who have been convicted of a crime. Although PTSD has not been 
particularly successful as a defence, nor historically as a mitigating factor in sentencing, it has 
been more recently recognised as such due to its medical diagnosis and familiarity.1085 
                                                          
1083 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 166 (1). 
1084 Walker, Aggravation, Mitigation and Mercy in English Criminal Justice (n1076) 39. 
1085 Grey (n24) 62. 
275 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that over time, PTSD has been successfully used as a mitigating 
factor in criminal trials.1086 
The main problem for anyone with PTSD is that there is a stigma associated with this 
mental illness. This stigma often prevents the individual from seeking proper treatment until 
such time that he finds himself in trouble in the criminal justice system.1087 Unfortunately, a 
plea in mitigation of sentence appears to be the best option for PTSD sufferers who have 
failed to seek treatment. 
In several jurisdictions, there are case laws and/or statutory laws that provide for 
PTSD to act as a mitigating factor in sentencing convicted criminals. For those convicted of 
capital offences, PTSD can be used to commute a death penalty to a life sentence or to 
shorten an otherwise lengthy sentence.1088 When considering war veterans with PTSD, the 
commutation of the death penalty, or the shortening of a lengthy sentence, may not be a 
viable solution when these sentences do not include treatment for PTSD. Therefore, this part 
of the chapter is really concerned with alternative sentences as opposed to incarceration.  
The main issue, however, is the extent to which the judge may use his discretion to 
allow the PTSD of a war veteran to mitigate sentencing, so that it allows for an alternative 
sentence as opposed to incarceration. This part of the chapter considers this broader issue in 
the context of the purpose of sentencing, mitigating and aggravating factors, the rejection and 
acceptance of sentencing, as well as PTSD as a mitigating factor in the sentencing of war 
veterans. 
9.1.5.1. Purpose of Sentencing 
Sentencing is designed to prevent the convicted individual from re-offending and 
possibly to rehabilitate him, so that he becomes a productive, law-abiding citizen. This is of 
                                                          
1086 Smith, ‘Impact of Veteran Status and Timing of PTSD Diagnosis on Criminal Justice Outcomes’ 
(n495) 1. 
1087 ibid. 
1088 Gansel (n18) 164. 
276 
 
course very important when it comes to war veterans with war-related PTSD who have not 
received treatment for their condition. Custodial sentences will increase the risk of these 
individuals emerging as non-productive recidivist criminals.  
Sentencing is also intended to prevent others from offending. When we think of war 
veterans with war-related PTSD, an alternative to custodial sentencing may be called for 
because untreated PTSD almost guarantees recidivism. In other words, to the degree that the 
purposes of sentencing are rehabilitation, deterrence (both generally and individually) then 
rehabilitation and deterrence cannot actually occur when a war veteran with PTSD is 
imprisoned and not treated. 
 Sentencing is also aimed at achieving just deserts under the proportionality 
principle.1089 Moreover, sentencing functions to condemn the crime and the criminal who 
commits the crime.1090 It seems unfair and inconsistent with the ends of justice to condemn a 
war veteran with PTSD with a sentence that does not accept war-related PTSD as a 
mitigating factor. 
It has also been argued that the purpose of sentencing is punishment via 
incapacitation.1091 Obviously, when an individual such as a war veteran with PTSD is 
incapacitated, he will not be able to exercise the right to freedom of movement. Ultimately, 
the purpose of sentencing will correspond with the ends of justice intended by the criminal 
justice system at any given time. This in itself is punishment, and does nothing to address the 
root cause of an offender with PTSD. Placing a war veteran with PTSD in prison does 
nothing to meet the ends of justice, which is primarily to reduce re-offending. 
In this section, the purposes of sentencing will be discussed: just deserts, 
incapacitation, deterrence (general and individual), and rehabilitation. The discussion that 
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follows is primarily concerned with how the purpose of sentencing impacts war veterans with 
PTSD who have been convicted.  
9.1.5.1.1. Just Deserts  
Just deserts refers to the understanding that the criminal justice system should be 
structured so as to ensure that criminals receive the punishment that they deserve. Just deserts 
walks a fine line when it comes to the war veteran with PTSD who commits a crime solely 
due to PTSD, which was in turn is caused by war-induced trauma. It is difficult to measure 
proportionality in a conventional sense. It is also difficult to imagine how the imposition of a 
sentence that is proportionate with the crime is fair when considering that the war veteran 
may not have turned to crime had it not been for his sacrifices for the protection of the state.  
 Arguably, war veterans with PTSD are a special class of criminals (as discussed in 
Chapter Four), and just deserts would imply an unconventional outcome. The punishment for 
this class of criminals was accomplished before the commission of the offence when they 
were exposed to trauma and developed PTSD. It is, in turn, the PTSD that created the 
conditions for criminal conduct. Thus, a fair process seeking to mete out just deserts would 
recognise the special position of war veterans with PTSD.  
The special court for the treatment of veterans who have been exposed to trauma is an 
example of the kind of special treatment just deserts demands for war veterans with PTSD 
(this kind of court will be discussed in a subsequent section). The special court connects war 
veterans who are caught up in the criminal justice system with treatment services. Returns on 
this kind of court have shown rehabilitation success.1092 
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 Incapacitation is justified on the basis of a special necessity for constraining a 
dangerous criminal, or for the purpose of preventing future offending.1093 Thus, incapacitation 
is either special or general. Special incapacitation assumes that the individual in question is a 
dangerous criminal who will commit crimes if given the opportunity.1094 This would be the 
outcome for war veterans with PTSD who are imprisoned and not treated for PTSD. General 
incapacitation purposes arise for deterrence purposes when the individual in question is a 
repeat offender and it is predicted that rehabilitation is not an option, and that the individual 
is prone to commit future offences.1095 The war veteran with PTSD will be a persistent 
offender until he is treated for PTSD, and therefore alternatives to incapacitation should be 
considered for war veterans with PTSD. 
Regardless of whether incapacitation is justified on special or general grounds, it does 
not appear to be a viable option for those with PTSD, especially the war veteran who 
commits a crime, or a series of crimes, while triggered by untreated, and in some cases, 
undiagnosed PTSD. Obviously, incapacitation through incarceration without treatment is not 
justified in the case of any offender with PTSD, yet, society owes it to war veterans with 
PTSD to at least ensure that incapacitation through incarceration comes with treatment for the 
worst offenders. When simply incapacitated without treatment, such an individual will only 
re-offend if their PTSD goes untreated. In fact, according to the results of a study by Sadeh 
and McNiel, PTSD is linked to the risk of recidivism, and appropriate interventions can 
reduce this risk.1096 In other words, simply imprisoning an offender with PTSD will not 
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improve his risk of re-offending, and only interventions/treatment can reduce the risk of re-
offending. 
In addition, incapacitation can only work to prevent an offender from re-offending for 
the period of time that the offender is restrained (and many offenders re-offend in prison). 
Still, the problem is always going to be predicting who is a candidate for re-offending. 
Incapacitation is not meant to act as a method to change the individual, but merely to ensure 
that the public is safe from a particular offender for the duration of incarceration.1097 Where 
an offender has PTSD and is incarcerated for a period of time without treatment for his 
condition, how safe can society be knowing that this individual will be released with PTSD at 
some time in the future? 
9.1.5.1.3. Deterrence 
Historically, deterrence has always been associated with sentencing aims.1098 Ideally, 
sentencing should be structured so that it is either a warning to other would be offenders, or 
the offender himself of the consequences of offending. Such a warning should cause the 
individual to think twice about committing crimes, and in doing so, should prevent offending. 
Thus, there are two types of deterrence policies: general and individual. With the war veteran 
with PTSD, the purpose of sentencing should be to inform the veteran that if they do not get 
help, then they will be forced into treatment if they commit crimes due to their condition. 
This should act as an incentive to seek treatment before committing crimes and being forced 
into treatment.  
In the context of PTSD, it is very difficult to imagine how a veteran who has 
responded to triggers due to undiagnosed and untreated PTSD will be cautioned by the threat 
of punishment. War veterans with untreated PTSD are always on the look-out for threats 
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which are interpreted as war-related threats that trigger symptoms that may lead to offending 
behaviour. Take for example, war veteran Jessie Bratcher, who would always carry out his 
gardening with his firearm hanging from his shoulder. He shot and killed a man who he 
mistakenly thought was attacking his girlfriend.1099 It shows that individual deterrence 
through sentencing is not a viable solution. 
A war veteran with untreated PTSD will not respond to the threat of punishment in 
the same way a person who is not suffering from war-related trauma or traumatic mental 
illnesses will respond. Therefore, deterrence theories are not expected to have an impact on 
recidivism rates among PTSD sufferers, especially war veterans who interpret threats to be 
war-zone related. In fact, it can be argued that deterrence policies are likely to have the 
unintended opposite impact on war veterans with PTSD. According to Pratt, war veterans 
who have been treated for mental disorders rarely go on to re-offend. This indicates that war 
veterans can be rehabilitated, and would benefit from a reduced sentence and treatment.1100 
Obviously, war veterans with PTSD will benefit from reduced prison sentences combined 
with treatment. 
9.1.5.1.3.1. General Deterrence 
 
General deterrence and deterrence theory in general is akin to the rational choice 
theory since both assume that the individual will make a rational choice before taking action 
or refusing to take action.1101 To assume that an individual who is already thinking about 
committing a crime, or who has already committed a crime, is likely to make rational choices 
is erroneous to start with. While there will always be individuals who will make rational 
choices, it is unrealistic to expect this kind of behaviour from one predisposed to criminal 
behaviour. 
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The idea of an individual with PTSD making rational choices and thinking about the 
consequences of his behaviour as a means of deciding not to respond to PTSD symptoms and 
triggers, is even more unrealistic. Imagine the triggered war veteran with PTSD who is in the 
throes of reliving combat-related trauma, pausing for a moment to consider that he might end 
up in prison if they carry on in a dissociative state. This is not going to happen because 
individuals in a dissociative state are out of touch with reality. Therefore, general deterrence 
is not going to have much of an effect on the PTSD sufferer who is responding to symptoms, 
and especially one who is in a dissociative state. The PTSD sufferer who is triggered is only 
concerned with the consequences of the traumatic event that caused PTSD in the first place. 
9.1.5.1.3.2. Individual Deterrence 
Specific or individual deterrence occurs when general deterrence has failed to deter 
the offender.1102 In this case, despite general deterrence policies and practices, the individual 
is found to be a repeat offender. Individual deterrence, therefore, turns to imposing the 
experience of actual punishment on the repeat offender.1103 It is not possible to accept that 
individual deterrence will work on a PTSD sufferer who is unmoved by general deterrence, 
which is the same reason that the individual who may be unaffected by general deterrence is 
expected to persist with individual deterrence. 
Individual deterrence is expected to fail when relying on a PTSD sufferer who 
responds to symptoms such as hyper-vigilance, dissociative states, panic attacks, nightmares, 
flashbacks, and so on. Such a person is not in a position to think about the consequences of 
his behaviour, beyond thinking that they are in danger and must act immediately. This is 
especially likely for a war veteran having war-related traumatic flashbacks or a dissociative 
state, or any other symptom. 
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Specific or individual deterrence is not going to have a better deterrent effect on an 
individual who is suffering from PTSD and commits an act due to the PTSD which results in 
a criminal conviction. When a person carries out a criminal act due to PTSD, he is arguably 
not entirely guilty of a crime in the conventional sense. Therefore, imposing specific 
deterrence punishment on a mentally ill individual is tantamount to punishing someone who 
is not guilty of a crime per se. The deterrent values promoted by general and individual 
deterrence cannot be accomplished through the incarceration of individuals who are not 
exactly guilty of a crime.1104 Moreover, where a defendant suffers from a mental disorder of 




Rehabilitation differs from deterrence and the protection of the community, as these 
sentencing purposes are focused on incapacitation and punishment. Thus, deterrence and 
community protection are sentencing objectives aimed at prioritising the safety of the 
community.1106 Rehabilitation, on the other hand, is more concerned with altering the way the 
convict thinks with a view to decreasing the risk of recidivism.1107 As a result, rehabilitation 
is focused on the offender rather the community, although the community gains when a 
criminal is rehabilitated. 
In United States v Krutschewski, a former Vietnam veteran with PTSD tried to have 
his sentence for a drug related offence reduced because of PTSD, but was denied. The crime 
itself was difficult to link to PTSD because it involved drug possession for importing and 
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distributing.1108 Moreover, smuggling marijuana is not the type of crime readily linked to the 
trauma of war or trauma that can cause PTSD. The judge also felt that an alternative sentence 
would not necessarily have a predictable outcome.1109 
Still, Seamone argues in favour of a rehabilitative approach to sentencing war 
veterans with PTSD, as well as other forms of head trauma, which is manifested in mental 
illness. Seamone argues that war veterans who suffer from PTSD will usually be prone to 
criminal behaviour as a result.1110 A rehabilitative approach to sentencing would provide 
these veterans with an opportunity to become involved in a very serious treatment 
programme. Hence, the obvious concern is that when war veterans with PTSD are sentenced 
to terms of imprisonment, they will not receive the treatment necessary for controlling the 
symptoms of PTSD that lead to criminal behaviour (sentencing options which take account of 
rehabilitation outcomes for war veterans with PTSD will treat the cause of criminal 
behaviour). 
9.1.5.2. Aggravating Factors 
Aggravating factors can be something as simple as the age of the victim. Aggravating 
factors can also be more complex, such as the severity of the offence.1111 A PTSD sufferer 
who unknowingly commits a serious crime because he believes he is reliving the trauma that 
caused his PTSD, is not going to actually appreciated the nature of the crime, nor the age of 
the victim. Failure to consider the various aggravating factors is not a personal or voluntary 
choice, and therefore they are not really aggravating factors, but rather, the age of the victim, 
the seriousness of the offence, and so on, may just be collateral damage in relation to PTSD. 
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The PTSD sufferer who is triggered by a light or sound that takes him back to the 
combat zone, where he believes a passerby is an enemy who is about to attack him, will not 
know that the passerby is actually an elderly person or a child. While the PTSD sufferer’s 
reaction is to shoot and kill the passerby is tragic, and all the more so because the victim 
could be either a child or an elderly citizen, the intention to commit a crime is not present. 
The PTSD sufferer cannot be held accountable for the aggravating factors of age and severity 
of the crime (however, PTSD sufferers could be perceived as being a danger if they are 
thought to be more likely to commit offences due to their PTSD, so PTSD could be seen as 
an aggravating factor). 
In Rollingcloud v State of Indiana, Indiana’s Court of Appeal refused to reduce the 
sentence of a repeat offender with diagnosed PTSD.1112 In this case, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia, and invasion of privacy. It would 
appear that at the trial of first instance, the defendant’s PTSD and other mental health 
disorders were considered, as his sentence was suspended conditionally upon his completion 
of a drug rehabilitation programme. However, he fled the programme housing arrangement 
and violated the court order in other ways, and was therefore sentenced to a jail term for his 
offences. The defendant appealed on the grounds that the sentencing judge did not take his 
mitigating circumstances into consideration. The appellate court ruled that the defendant’s 
PTSD, and other mental health diagnosis, were not described, and their connection to his 
crimes was unknown. Moreover, the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.1113 
          The case of Kenneth Rollingcloud indicates that in the US, the defendant may succeed 
in reducing sentencing if he has PTSD which is connected to the crime, and does not have a 
history revealing that treatment will not lead to rehabilitation. In Rollingcloud’s case, it was 
obvious that the alternative programme accorded to him did nothing to rehabilitate him as he 
                                                          




continued to disobey the court’s orders. Moreover, despite the previous alternative 
sentencing, the defendant was a repeat offender. In addition, the possession of unlawful drugs 
and drug paraphernalia were difficult to connect to PTSD symptoms. Certainly, it might have 
been possible for the defendant to be self-medicating due to his symptoms, but still, it is 
difficult to connect these kinds of crimes to trauma, and thus any repeat offences or failure to 
comply with a court order will be considered as aggravating factors.  
A repeat offender unsuccessfully entered a plea in mitigation of the sentence on the 
grounds of PTSD in United States v McDonald.1114 In this case, the defendant was 18 years 
old and acted together with another. Although diagnosed with PTSD and other mental 
disorders, the defendant did not receive a mitigated sentence since there was an aggravating 
factor in terms of premeditation.1115 Premeditation makes it difficult to link the crime to the 
trauma, as there would have been cooling off periods. If PTSD was found to be a mitigating 
factor in the McDonald and Rollingcloud cases, it would have been tantamount to excusing 
criminal behaviour because of PTSD when there are no established links between PTSD and 
the crimes committed. 
In England, a trial judge ruled that PTSD induced as a result of an attempted murder 
was an aggravating factor in sentencing a 14-year-old defendant.1116 In this case, the victim 
incurred minimal physical injuries. However, the judge emphasised that PTSD was a 
significant psychological injury and would typically invoke a life sentence. However, due to 
the defendant’s youth, the culpability would be reduced.1117 This case is important because the 
victim’s consequent PTSD was perceived to be an aggravating factor against the perpetrator. 
This indicates that PTSD is grave enough to invoke sympathy for the victim. Likewise, in 
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England, one can expect that where the defendant has PTSD, his condition will invoke 
sympathy, and therefore serve as a mitigating factor in sentencing. 
9.1.5.3. Mitigating Factors 
It is frequently correct to assume that aggravating factors in sentencing are the 
opposite of mitigating factors.1118 For example, premeditation is an aggravating factor and 
acting on impulse is a mitigating factor. Premeditation and impulse are polar opposites.1119 
The impulse and premeditation comparisons provide an accurate explanation for how PTSD 
can be a mitigating factor. When the PTSD sufferer is triggered by an unforeseen event, and 
responds due to flashbacks or the sudden onset of a dissociative state, there is no time to 
premeditate and in fact, the PTSD sufferer is then acting purely on instinct and impulse. 
Perlin argues that the expansion of the symptoms of PTSD by the APA in the DSM-5 
highlights the utility of this disorder in criminal law practices, especially at the sentencing 
stage.1120 Although DSM-5 has been expanded to prevent malingering through the primacy of 
traumatic stressors, it continues to highlight hyper-vigilance. This symptom of PTSD can 
support sentence mitigation and/or a claim of diminished responsibility.1121 The PTSD 
offender can claim that the aggression was a reckless outcome of hyper-vigilance due to 
PTSD and resulting traumatic stressors.1122 
  At a conference in the Western Zone Aboriginal Legal Service NSW/Act in Rydal, 
Australia in March 2013, Barrister Feiner explained why mental disorders are mitigating 
factors.1123 The explanation is relevant to this chapter since PTSD is also a mental disorder.1124 
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Citing two Australian judges, Feiner explained that when a mental disorder is partially or 
wholly responsible for the criminal conduct, the defendant may not be as culpable as an 
average, mentally fit defendant.1125 In such circumstances, the need to denounce and punish is 
not as important as ordinary cases with mentally fit defendants.1126 
In addition, sentencing individuals with mental disorders may be more harmful than 
helpful to the individual.1127 In such a case, the length of a prison sentence may be more 
stressful for the individual with a mental condition and thus, a reduction of the sentence may 
be appropriate.1128 When an offender is found to have a mental illness that is significantly 
linked to the crime in question, the mental illness will mitigate sentence because it reduces 
criminal responsibility.1129 
In other words, unless the mental illness is connected to the crime in question, it will 
not be a mitigating factor. For example, a PTSD victim, independent of the condition, may 
decide to commit theft, where the decision to commit theft is not brought on by PTSD 
symptoms, or is not committed while suffering from a PTSD symptom. In such a case, the 
PTSD sufferer cannot simply receive a reduced sentence just because he happens to also have 
PTSD. Still, PTSD can cause the victim of this condition to lose touch with reality, and in 
those states the commission of a crime linked to the traumatic event that caused PTSD can be 
a mitigating factor at sentencing. 
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According to Wayland, trauma related mental illnesses are very important mitigating 
factors, because trauma related incidents can render the sufferer “disabled.”1130 Then again, 
many veterans dealing with PTSD resort to self-medicating their symptoms, which can lead 
to drug or alcohol abuse and related offences. In fact, a national survey conducted by Harris 
and Edlund found that substance abuse was linked to attempts to alleviate mental health 
issues that were left untreated.1131 
There are two reasons that self-medication which is found to be linked to criminal 
behaviour can be a mitigating factor in a trial of a PTSD sufferer. First, mitigation is evidence 
of an empathetic factor.1132 It is easy to feel empathy for a defendant whose crime is induced 
by substance abuse brought on by attempts to ease the symptoms of a trauma induced mental 
disorder. Secondly, by merely punishing the offender who has PTSD, the criminal justice 
system is not responding to the condition that contributed to criminal behaviour, but is rather 
simply responding to the criminal behaviour. This is why there are currently programmes 
within the adjudication process that mitigate the sentences of the mentally ill by focusing on 
the root cause of the problem.1133    
    When the offender is found to be suffering with substance abuse due to PTSD, 
there is always the risk that the court will focus on substance abuse if the crime is related to 
unlawful substances. In this kind of situation, the offender may be ordered to enter a drug or 
alcohol rehabilitation programme, and no order for PTSD treatment may be made. This 
leaves the drug or alcohol treatment programme with tenuous value since the root cause of 
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substance abuse is PTSD. Therefore, substance abuse may not be a valuable mitigating factor 
when the offender’s primary problem is untreated PTSD. The best approach here is the 
combination of PTSD and substance abuse as mitigating factors. 
          A convicted kidnapper was able to successfully have his life sentence overturned by 
the Court of Appeal, Fourth District of California, when PTSD was submitted in combination 
with age as mitigating factors.1134 The Court of Appeal considered the fact that the offence 
was committed when the convict was only 14 years old, and suffering from PTSD. The Court 
of Appeal ruled that life without the possibility of parole in the case of a minor amounted to 
cruel and unusual treatment and punishment. In addition, the appellant’s background in which 
he grew up in fear of violence in the surrounding neighborhood and his exposure to the abuse 
of his alcoholic father, were all sentence mitigating factors.1135 Therefore, a case could be 
made for the mitigation of combat exposure for veterans with PTSD who go on to commit 
serious crimes. 
Still, the discretion accorded to the judges, together with the lack of clarity in 
sentencing guidelines and statutes worldwide, leaves the status of mitigation in a disorganised 
state.1136 While sentencing guidelines typically inform courts what factors might mitigate 
sentences, there is no clarity as to when those factors might be applicable or not. There is 
vagueness as to how those factors may be “weighted” in a particular case.1137 
Throughout the criminal trials in death penalty cases in the US, competent defence 
attorneys are focused on mitigation.1138 The defence attorney starts out by gathering and using 
evidence of the defendant’s life, including information about his education, vocation, medical 
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background, legal background, and so forth. The idea here is to not only identify a defence, 
but to also develop and prepare for mitigation of sentencing.1139 
In fact, the US Supreme Court pointed out in Porter v McCollum, Attorney General of 
Florida, et al. that a veteran who fought on the frontlines of the Korean War and suffered 
from PTSD was entitled to leniency in his conviction for double homicide.1140 In this case, the 
appellant was sentenced to death for one of his murder convictions, and in his sentencing the 
judge found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The appeals did 
not go well for the appellant, and he finally appealed to the US Supreme Court. The US 
Supreme Court decided that where a veteran served on the frontlines, and endured the kind of 
stress that the appellant endured, he was entitled to mitigation if he suffered from PTSD as a 
result. The US Supreme Court therefore reversed the appellate court’s rejection of the appeal 
and sent the case back for sentencing, in accordance with the opinion expressed by the US 
Supreme Court (the researcher was unable to locate the subsequent sentencing, but has no 
reason to suspect the ruling of the US Supreme Court did not factor into the sentencing if it 
has already occurred).1141 
PTSD will not only help in the reduction of death sentences for military veterans, but 
also in the reduction of sentences for lesser offences. For example, in Brown v State of 
Alaska, the defendant’s sentence for possession of pornography was withdrawn and the 
matter passed on to the lower court for resentencing.1142 The appellate court took account of 
Brown’s defence, that his combat-related PTSD negatively impacted his daily functioning 
and in the process fractured his ability to make sound decisions. The appellate court agreed 
that these were mitigating factors.1143 
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The presiding judge’s sentencing of Jonathan Dunne illustrates that the courts in 
England take a similar approach to the sentencing of war veterans with PTSD as that taken in 
the US. The presiding judge sentenced Dunne to one year of community service, and 100 
hours of supervision and work without pay. Dunne had been convicted of an assault which 
occurred during a flashback, and was a war veteran with PTSD. The presiding Judge 
emphasised that the community service in lieu of jail was intended to ensure that Dunne seek 
treatment for war related PTSD. The judge expressed a concern that more and more veterans 
are appearing before his court with PTSD, and called for more assistance to veterans.1144 The 
next section considers where PTSD fits in with the broad range of mitigating factors for war 
veterans. 
9.1.5.4. Rejection and Acceptance in a Sentence 
This chapter establishes that sentencing policies, practices and purposes will depend 
on the overarching theory of the sentencing guiding the criminal justice system. Theories of 
sentencing are therefore primarily based on conceptualisations of rehabilitation, retribution, 
deterrence, and restorative practices. Regardless of which theory guides punishment and 
sentencing, there are yet two overarching theories used to justify approaches. The two 
overarching theories are deontological and utilitarian theories, or a combination of the two 
theories.1145 
Utilitarian theories of sentencing and penology take the view that moral choices are 
defined by the consequences of one’s conduct. Utilitarianism also argues that it is always best 
to act in ways that will produce the best outcome.1146 In other words, utilitarian justifications 
for sentencing will call for doing that which will produce the best outcome for all when an 
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offender is brought before the court. In such a case, the right thing to do will usually be 
identifying and meting out culpability. When considering whether and how to sentence a 
PTSD sufferer who has committed a crime because of PTSD, the right thing/utilitarian thing 
to do would be to submit the offender to a treatment programme, which would be the best 
outcome for everyone. This is especially true when the PTSD sufferer’s condition has been 
induced by war-related trauma. 
The deontological approach looks at moral factors separately from consequential 
factors, and assumes that moral conduct is carried out for its ‘own sake rather than in order to 
achieve any particular end.’1147 Therefore, deontological approaches to sentencing will not 
necessarily be carried out for deterrence, restoration, or rehabilitation. Sentencing will be 
carried out because it is simply the right thing to do when someone breaks the law. Similarly, 
it can be argued that when a war veteran with PTSD commits a crime, the right thing to do 
would be to submit the offender to a PTSD treatment programme, especially since PTSD has 
been induced by the offender’s service to this country, and in turn, linked to the criminal 
offence.  
  When considering the war veteran with PTSD who commits an offence in response to 
his PTSD symptoms, the theories justifying punishment should not apply. It does not serve 
the ends of justice to punish the war veteran with PTSD because it is the right thing to do or 
because it is necessary for the sake of dealing with crime. The war veteran with PTSD can be 
rehabilitated by simply sentencing him to treatment for PTSD. Neither the community nor the 
offender with PTSD benefits when such an individual is punished for the sake of doing so. It 
is certainly not thought of as the right thing to do. 
 
 




9.1.5.5. PTSD as a Sentencing Mitigating Factor for Convicted War Veterans 
When the court is presented with a war veteran with PTSD which is linked to the 
commission of the crime, there are two primary mitigating factors: war service, and a 
traumatic condition induced by war service. This might be a simple exercise for the court. 
Yet, the court must ensure that criminal offences are not excused based on irrelevant 
mitigating circumstances. For instance, a veteran with PTSD may have committed a crime 
independent of his PTSD.  
 In other words, although PTSD and war service are both mitigating factors, PTSD 
must be linked to the crime, otherwise, when a criminal offence is committed independently 
of PTSD, the defendant will not be rehabilitated if he is excused for an unrelated condition. 
For instance, a PTSD sufferer robs a bank because he wanted to get wealthy quickly and 
could not find a legitimate means of accomplishing this goal – this decision was not made 
while suffering from a PTSD symptom, and therefore, it would be illogical and unjust to 
reduce the offender’s sentence just because he happened to have PTSD.  
          Still, a strong case can be made for PTSD to serve as a mitigating factor in the 
sentencing of convicted war veterans. The effects of war can be debilitating and are 
common.1148 The problem for veterans is that they incur these consequences when serving 
their country.1149 Making matters worse, many war veterans end up with this debilitating 
disease without proper diagnosis and treatment.1150 As a mitigating factor, war veterans can be 
properly diagnosed and treated via a sentencing order.1151  
  In the context of criminal defences and sentencing, PTSD is distinguished from other 
mental conditions. With other mental disorders, a defendant is only required to prove that he 
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has a diagnosed mental disorder, and that the disorder is connected to the criminal conduct.1152 
With PTSD, the defendant is required to prove a diagnosis as well as the trauma that 
triggered PTSD symptoms, and that those symptoms are linked to the crime.1153 Thus, it is not 
surprising that courts tend to be more amenable to mitigating the sentences of returning 
veterans who claim that PTSD caused the criminal conduct, and was triggered by combat 
experiences.1154 
According to Giardino, combat veterans who incurred PTSD or traumatic brain 
injuries during their service should be exempt from capital punishment.1155 The combination 
of military training, service, and PTSD should serve as mitigating factors during the 
sentencing phase of a capital trial.1156 According to Giardino, a model for mitigating a death 
sentence for war veterans can be found in two US Supreme Court Cases: Atkins v Virginia 
and Roper v Simmons.1157 
In Atkins v Virginia, the US Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty for a mildly 
retarded convict amounted to cruel and abnormal punishment and treatment. The death 
penalty for the mentally incapacitated was, therefore, a violation of the Eighth Amendment to 
the US Constitution.1158 The case of Roper v Simmons similarly involves the contravention of 
the Eighth Amendment in the execution of any capital offender under the age of 18.1159 
The Atkins case looks at the constitutionality of executing a mentally disabled person, 
and the same standard can be applied in a plea of mitigation in respect of a war veteran 
suffering from PTSD at the time of the commission of the crime. This is because when 
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military veterans are diagnosed with PTSD, they qualify for disability benefits.1160 Indicating 
that PTSD is mentally disabling, Giardino argues, however, both cases establish grounds for 
military veterans with PTSD to argue for a waiver of the death penalty.1161 Mitigation can 
occur through the production of evidence of their PTSD symptoms and the fact that the 
trauma inducing PTSD occurred while exposed to combat in service of the country. 
Similarly, in State v Gregory, a Vietnam veteran suffering from PTSD was able to 
negotiate a light sentence due to his service-related mental illness.1162 In Gregory’s case, he 
had been exposed to significant combat action during his service in the Vietnam War. 
Gregory had experienced flashbacks during his crime in which he held individuals hostage at 
a bank in Maryland for several hours. The court sentenced him to a probationary period, so 
that he could be treated for PTSD.1163 
Therefore, there is no doubt that military veterans and active duty service members 
might be accorded leniency when there is proof of PTSD that is linked to the crime. For 
instance, in the case of Thomas Dennis, a possible three-year jail term was avoided for a 
traffic fatality in which Dennis was found to be at fault. Dennis, a war veteran with PTSD, 
was intoxicated.1164 His alcohol consumption was linked to his PTSD which was in turn 
linked to his military service. Rather than sentencing Dennis to a jail term, the presiding 
judge placed him on probation. In the meantime, Dennis was scheduled for treatment 
provided by the VA.1165 
In another case, in Ohio, the appellant appealed against a felony sentence on the 
grounds that the judge did not understand nor give sufficient weight to his combat-related 
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PTSD.1166 The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal without going into detail about 
the service-related PTSD.1167 In a dissenting opinion, Lanziger J. expressed disappointment 
with his colleagues, arguing that they had squandered an opportunity to establish standards of 
review for accepting and applying service-related PTSD as a mitigating factor during the 
sentencing phase.1168 Justice O’Neill also dissented, and in doing so, said that the majority of 
the Ohio Supreme Court did “not get it,” and that PTSD is not “an excuse,” but rather “an 
explanation.”1169  
The proper diagnosis and treatment of convicted war veterans was demonstrated in 
the sentencing of John Brownfield.1170 Brownfield pleaded guilty to bribery of a public 
official in connection with the smuggling of contraband into a correctional institute where he 
was a staff member in his post-deployment days. The maximum sentence for this offence was 
15 years imprisonment. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado was 
satisfied that Brownfield, who had joined the military when he was 17 and was deployed to 
combat zones three times, was suffering from combat-related PTSD or some other service-
related, mental illness. The court therefore ordered a psychiatric evaluation. However, the 
psychiatrists evaluating Brownfield stated that while they suspected PTSD, they were unable 
to make a full diagnosis unless and until Brownfield overcame alcoholism. The court 
therefore ordered a 5-year probationary period, conditional upon the achievement of sobriety, 
psychiatric evaluation, and submission to treatment. The court emphasised that it had the 
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authority to decrease the sentence for war veterans suffering from combat-related psychiatric 
conditions, including PTSD.1171 
9.1.5.6. Evaluation of PTSD as a Sentencing Mitigating Factor 
The main strength of PTSD as a mitigating factor is its ability to allow for the 
diagnosis and treatment of war veterans. In the absence of mitigation, war veterans would go 
untreated and merely be incarcerated. Its availability for US war veterans through the 
criminal justice systems ensures that they receive the treatment that they need, and that 
society is safer because of it. In England, a similar trend is apparent as politicians, and at least 
one judge who has dealt with many cases involving veterans with PTSD, have expressed 
concerns about the lack of treatment. 
The weakness of PTSD as a mitigating factor is that there are no strict universal rules 
for identifying and applying the appropriate PTSD symptoms for veterans. It would appear 
that service and PTSD should be enough in most states. The US Supreme Court’s ruling also 
fails to provide sufficient details of applicability. In addition, the broad possibilities for using 
PTSD as a mitigating factor widens the risk for malingering, making it more difficult for 
those who are genuinely afflicted with PTSD to prove their cases when attempting to use it in 
mitigation of sentence.  
Ultimately, the ability to use PTSD symptoms in mitigation of sentence is fair and 
just, especially for war veterans who were inflicted with PTSD during their service at war. 
However, it is only fair and just to use PTSD as a mitigating factor in sentencing when the 
crime is committed due to PTSD symptoms. For example, the PTSD victim is triggered by an 
incident or object, and as a result enters into a dissociative state where he begins to relive the 
trauma that induced the PTSD. In the dissociative state, the PTSD offender loses touch with 
reality, and unknowingly commits a crime. While unable to convince a jury of the connection 




between PTSD and the crime, the offender has an opportunity to do so in sentencing. This is 
especially fair and just for PTSD sufferers, who are also war veterans, having a very difficult 
time adjusting to civilian life after deployment.  
 9.1.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has so far examined the role of PTSD in mitigation of sentencing. The 
next sections will explore systems or statutes and VTCs in greater detail. The main focus of 
this chapter is the military veteran. This chapter has found that PTSD can be, and has been, 
used as a sentence reduction legal technique, yet it appears that the sentencing procedures and 
practices have been inconsistently applied, so that war veterans with PTSD have been 
sentenced to death.  
The death sentence of military references does not appear to be appropriate for men 
who have sacrificed great deal for their country. With respect to other offences, war veterans 
have been more successful in having sentences reduced, and in fact, PTSD has been found to 
be a suitable mitigation factor for veterans, as this group of cohorts appears to harvest 
sympathy and compassion due to their military service and their need for treatment.  
Given the military and its service channels’ shortfalls on the diagnosis and treatment 
of PTSD in respect of both active and past soldiers, a plea in mitigation appears to be the 
most reasonable method of treatment. Lawyers representing veterans with PTSD are tasked 
with the role of identifying the symptoms of their clients and bringing those symptoms up in 
trial in terms of defences and/or sentencing.1172 
It would therefore appear that mitigation of sentence for war veterans and active duty 
soldiers would not only benefit the individual convicted of the crime, but also society at 
large. This is because at sentencing the individual war veteran with PTSD will be diagnosed 
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with the mental disorder and if the court accepts the diagnosis, will very likely order some 
form of treatment for PTSD. 
Despite precedents for applying PTSD as a mitigating factor in sentencing for military 
servicemen, many veterans with PTSD have been executed, and many more remain on death 
row awaiting this fate. There is a need for further clarification as to whether PTSD is a 
mitigating factor in all cases in which the defendant is a war veteran or an active duty soldier. 
For the time being, it is clear that only when PTSD is linked to the crime in question, it will 
be a mitigating factor in the sentencing of the offender. What is unclear at this point is 
whether the mere fact that PTSD was contracted during war time service but is not linked to 
the crime, is also a mitigating factor.  
There is no real justification for excluding war-related PTSD as a mitigating factor 
simply because it cannot be linked to the crime in question. There are many mitigating factors 
that are not connected to criminal behaviour, but are used in mitigation. For example, the 
defendant or victim’s age can be a mitigating and aggravating factor respectively. Likewise, a 
mentally or physically disabled offender can use those factors in mitigation whether they are 
connected to the crime or not. PTSD sufferers, especially war veterans, should be accorded 
the same leverage. 
9.2. Treatment versus Incarceration of War Veterans with 
PTSD in the Criminal Justice System  
9.2.1. Sentencing Statutes 
9.2.1.1. Introduction 
          In the US, each state maintains a criminal code that defines criminal offences and often 
the appropriate sentence.1173 These sentencing statutes usually designate penal sentences 
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pursuant to the nature of the crime.1174 Misdemeanours typically attract fines, and/or 
incarceration in county jails for relatively short periods of time. Felonies will usually involve 
custodial sentences in excess of one year.1175 Still, courts are at liberty to take into account 
the defendant’s background when determining appropriate sentencing.1176 At the federal 
level, sentencing guidelines are reviewed and published by the United States Sentencing 
Commission.1177 
          In England, there are several criminal statutes establishing minimum sentences (there is 
also the Sentencing Council, which carefully works through the list of crimes establishing 
sentencing guidelines). Some of the statutes include the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 which 
establishes a minimum sentence for weapons offences; the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which 
issues a minimum sentence for specific offences in which knives and other similar offensive 
weapons are used; the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 which establishes a minimum 
sentence for violence involving a weapon, and so on.1178 Judges have discretionary powers to 
increase or reduce statutory sentences based on a variety of mitigating or vitiating factors 
such as age, possibility of rehabilitation, the interests and safety of the public, and the 
possibility of reparations.1179 However, where a mandatory penalty is fixed by law, mitigating 
factors are not applicable.1180 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the main background factor is PTSD with a 
special emphasis on war veterans with the condition. The issue is whether in exercising their 
discretion, the courts should benefit returning war veterans suffering from PTSD, and 
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whether war-related PTSD should receive special leniency on the grounds that exposure to 
war is very different from any other trauma-related PTSD.1181 
            This part of the chapter discusses sentencing statutes, and will therefore discuss the 
foundations of sentencing statutes, their purpose, how they operate, and barriers to realising 
their stated purposes. The advantages and disadvantages of sentencing statutes will also be 
discussed. 
9.2.1.2. Foundational Basis of Sentencing Statutes 
The United States Sentencing Commission has now been in existence for thirty 
years.1182 During this time it has scrutinised the need for increasing alternatives to 
incarceration.1183 The Sentencing Commission’s main concern is the expansion of the 
alternatives beyond community service and probation for minor offences.1184 Moreover, 
increasingly, courts have established that sentencing guidelines are guides, and do not fix 
sentences.1185 Rather, the judge is entitled to take into account the convicted person’s specific 
circumstances and the nature of the crime itself. This may also include the extent to which the 
most serious elements of the crime have been established.1186 
The move to treat the federal sentencing guidelines as an advisory instrument, and to 
bestow upon judges a greater flexibility in sentencing, has increased the alternative to 
incarceration sentencing trends, however, this has resulted in significant differences in 
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sentencing for similar offences across the US.1187 In the meantime, many federal court 
districts in the US have created alternative-to-incarceration programmes, but primarily for 
individuals with substance abuse disorders.1188 
Some states have introduced alternative-to-incarceration programmes, which vary 
from state to state. For example, Maine has introduced mental health courts which provide an 
alternative to the incarceration sentencing protocol.1189 Connecticut introduced the 
alternative-to-incarceration programme in 1987, based on a restorative justice system.1190 It 
therefore appears that some states are increasingly approaching sentencing with a view to 
rehabilitating those who are candidates for rehabilitation, or who would certainly fail to 
benefit from imprisonment. 
In England, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Courts Act 2003, and the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Act 2003 have been calculated to change criminal justice in support of the 
community at large and victims of crime.1191 Further changes were introduced under the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009.1192 The 2009 Act created the Sentencing Council for England 
and Wales which is responsible for the creation of sentencing guidelines. As with the US and 
other common law jurisdictions, judges exercise wide sentencing discretion except for 
instances where certain serious offences require compulsory custodial sentences.1193 
          The revamped criminal justice system now increases opportunities for alternative to 
incarceration outcomes. One such system is the restorative justice programme, which 
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typically involves in-person communications between the victim and the offender with a 
mediator present.1194 Another alternative to incarceration is community service, which is a 
programme that can involve electronic monitoring and curfews, community work without 
pay, participation in a behavioural programme, limits on freedom, mental health treatment, 
substance abuse treatment, supervision, participation in organised activities and/or approved 
residence.1195 
          The World Health Organisation and the International Committee of the Red Cross have 
expressed grave concern about the rate of incarcerating individuals with mental health 
disorders worldwide.1196 Quite possibly, this rate of incarceration is due to the serious nature 
of offending. However, both organisations point out that the tendency to incarcerate the 
mentally ill is due to society’s intolerance for bad behaviour, and the impulse to dump the 
mentally ill on the prison system in order to relieve society of the threat associated with their 
behaviour and/or the costs of proper treatment.1197 This behaviour occurs when treatment has 
not been sought, and is absent. The criminal justice system can help by ordering treatment 
over incarceration. This is especially important because many mentally ill people find that 
their condition worsens when incarcerated.1198  
          Where the US has passed individual bills on a state by state basis, recognising the 
mitigating value of war-related PTSD, there are no similar statutes in England. Last year, 
Representatives Martin, Reives, Rogers, and Zachary sponsored House Bill 483 in the 
General Assembly of North Carolina. House Bill 483 is titled Veteran Posttraumatic 
Stress/Mitigating Factor, and the long title of the Act is ‘An Act to Provide that a Court May 
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Consider Posttraumatic Stress Disorder as a Mitigating Factor When Sentencing a Person 
who is a Veteran.’1199 
          House Bill 483 does what its title promises. It confers upon the judiciary, the 
discretionary power to apply PTSD as a mitigating factor in the sentencing of war veterans 
who have been convicted. The efforts by the North Carolina General Assembly, and the 
debate over waiving the death penalty for war veterans with PTSD, indicates the debilitating 
impact of this mental disorder on war veterans. 
          The debilitating impact of PTSD on veterans has been acknowledged by California’s 
legislators. In a bill similar to North Carolina’s House Bill 483, California proposed 
Assembly Bill 2098 in 2014 (the status of this bill is uncertain because as of 2018, the bill 
was sent to the governor and no subsequent updates are available).1200 The California Bill 
acknowledges that the current law permits the court to accept PTSD as a mitigating factor in 
the sentencing of war veterans. The bill would amend the Penal Code of California to permit 
considering PTSD as a mitigating factor for war veterans when considering the eligibility of a 
convict for probation.1201 
          Currently, under the California Penal Code, the courts may put off legal action in 
respect of active military personnel and veterans with PTSD or other mental health issues. 
The trial will be postponed so that the defendant receives treatment for his condition. 
However, the diversion programme requires the defendant to waive his right to a trial within 
a reasonable time, and also requires that the offence is only a misdemeanour.1202 Judges do 
have the discretion to reduce a felony offence to a misdemeanour for the purpose of inserting 
the statutory diversion programme.1203 Current military personnel and veterans with PTSD 
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convicted of misdemeanours may also receive an alternative to incarceration sentence under 
California’s Penal Code. Such alternative sentences include probation and/or treatment.1204 
          Prior to 2008, California was the first state to introduce the veterans with PTSD 
sentencing mitigation bill (1982). The bill permits a court to order alternatives to 
imprisonment in respect of past and present military personnel with PTSD.1205 However, the 
bill only applies to non-violent crimes, and the veterans must show that their criminal actions 
were linked to trauma caused by war.1206 This bill was approved by California and amended 
the Penal Code as discussed above.1207  
          Regardless, state action demonstrates that war-related PTSD is often conceded to be a 
mitigating factor. In addition, the debilitating effects of PTSD for war veterans are captured 
by the ruling of the US Court for the Ninth Circuit, which held that Vietnam veterans with 
PTSD are eligible for reduced sentences under the federal sentencing guidelines.1208 This 
ruling demonstrates how the discretionary sentencing authority can be exercised to help 
veterans with PTSD seek and receive appropriate treatment for their condition. 
Organisations such as the Armed Forces provide treatment for war veterans with 
PTSD.1209 In an amicus brief on behalf of war veterans, the Armed Forces drew attention to a 
bill passed in Ohio informing the judiciary of the requirement dictating that the judiciary 
considers military service and PTSD as mitigating factors when sentencing war veterans.1210 
This is necessitated by the fact that war veterans are typically undiagnosed and/or untreated, 
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and have a difficult time functioning productively in society.1211 Thus, it is not surprising that 
the US Supreme Court (as previously mentioned in Porter v McCollum) requires that injuries 
and mental difficulties resulting from services in the military count as mitigating factors in 
the sentencing of offenders. 
In England, an alternative to incarceration is a viable option for veterans with war-
related PTSD. The Veterans and Reserves Mental Health Programme not only evaluates 
veterans and reserves, but also provides treatment for war-related mental health 
conditions.1212 Still, the absence of a statute can be problematic in any jurisdiction. For 
example, in North Carolina, the sentencing of a veteran with PTSD led to a proposed bill for 
allowing PTSD in veterans to operate as a mitigating factor. In this particular case, the war 
veteran’s psychiatric team testified that the veteran was suffering from PTSD when he 
opened fire on police and firefighters. At the time of the offence, the veteran genuinely 
believed that he was still fighting the war in Afghanistan. Although none of the officers was 
seriously harmed, the judge still imprisoned the veteran and ordered psychiatric treatment 
while in jail. This was contrary to the psychiatric team’s advice to the court; advice that 
reflected a shortage of treatment in the state prison.1213 
Judges are clearly occasionally “sympathetic” toward veterans suffering from PTSD, 
and with or without a sentencing statute specifically aimed at veterans with PTSD, will 
sometimes exercise their discretion to be “lenient.” This discretionary leniency is illustrated 
in one particular case in North Carolina. In this case, a veteran with PTSD had violated his 
probation where he was convicted of driving under the influence. Rather than substitute 
probation for imprisonment, the judge sentenced the veteran with PTSD to one day in the 
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county jail, and was involved with his sentence, speaking with him and advising him about 
his future.1214 
In England, a Judge refused to imprison a 26-year-old war veteran with PTSD 
convicted of assault on a night out when drinking.  In this case, the judge publicly called for 
action so that war veterans can receive treatment rather than punishment.1215 It is therefore 
obvious that where a statute is lacking, judges may exercise discretion in “favour” of 
alternatives to imprisonment for war veterans with PTSD (the question of whether war 
veterans with PTSD are special is examined in Chapter Four). 
9.2.1.3. Purpose of Sentencing Statutes 
Sentencing statutes are designed to ensure accountability, proportionality, and 
consistency of treatment. Thus, it is not uncommon to find fixed sentencing, including a 
minimum and maximum range, for specific crimes. Sentencing statutes are therefore arguably 
intended to reduce judicial discretion with a view to improving “consistency” and 
“predictability” in sentencing practices. As it currently stands, the wide discretionary 
practices of judges have given way to a sentencing practice in which sentencing is both 
uncertain and unpredictable.1216 Disparity is a natural outcome of sentencing law, because 
sentencing law confronts a unique paradox. On the one hand, it seeks to issue a fair and just 
sentence that reflects the severity of the crime, and acknowledges both the vitiating and 
mitigating circumstances applicable to the offender.1217 On the other hand, sentencing law 
insists that the same punishment is meted out for the same or similar crimes.1218 
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          This disparity in sentencing, however, is consistent with the notion of fairness because 
two defendants may have committed crimes of a similar nature, but one offender may, for 
example, be much younger than the other offender. Likewise, one offender may have 
previous convictions while the other may have none. Therefore, judicial discretion is very 
important for determining what is fair and appropriate. 
          This outcome of sentencing laws and policies can only benefit war veterans with PTSD 
who commit crimes fixed by statutes. Sentencing discretion allows judges to take account of 
the individual circumstances of veterans with PTSD. Consequently, it can be argued that the 
purpose of sentencing statutes is to establish a starting framework for punishment aimed at 
deterrence. Complemented by sentencing guidelines, sentencing statutes allow for discretion 
so that offenders who could benefit from rehabilitation can be the recipients of leniency. The 
leniency envisioned by sentencing laws and policies is geared towards taking account of the 
offender’s criminal history, and the likelihood of recidivism.1219 
          Sentencing statutes are not focused on forgiving the defendant or having mercy.1220 
However, sentencing law allows for the judiciary to take account of the good and the bad 
“deeds” of offenders.1221 As a result of this approach to sentencing, the mere fact that a war 
veteran served in the military and was exposed to combat can be a mitigating factor for 
veterans. In addition, a veteran whose exposure to combat caused PTSD can have that taken 
into account by sentencing judges. This is because the overarching purpose of the sentencing 
statute is to achieve fairness and justice for all involved. 
          Studies have shown that treatment for veterans is capable of both improving their 
PTSD symptoms and reducing the risk of recidivism. As was mentioned in the preceding 
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chapters, PTSD is a major risk factor for recidivism. It is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that treatment for PTSD is beneficial to the defendant and his family. 
9.2.1.4. Sentencing Statutes in Practice  
          As established thus far, the purpose of sentencing law is to achieve justice and fairness 
for the offender, the victim, and the community at large. Sentencing statutes often fix 
mandatory sentences with a view to achieving the objective of deterrence, and to punish 
rather than seek to rehabilitate offenders.1222 These fixed mandatory sentencing regimes 
produce unfair outcomes for individuals. As a result, legislators will often introduce 
additional sentencing statutes which will achieve a fairer outcome. For instance, in August 
2010, President Barack Obama’s administration introduced the Fair Sentencing Act, which 
addressed any unfairness found in the sentencing of drug offenders under mandatory 
sentencing protocols.1223 
          Prior to the introduction of the Fair Sentencing Act 2010, an individual convicted of 
the possession of five grams of crack cocaine received the same five-year compulsory 
sentence as an individual convicted of possession of 500 grams of powder cocaine.1224 The 
Fair Sentencing Act 2010 resolved this unfair outcome by addressing the mandatory 
minimum sentence, and thereby reducing the sentence that a drug offender could receive for 
mere possession of a dangerous substance.1225 
          The operative outcome of sentencing statutes, particularly those that fix mandatory 
minimums, appears to be purely punitive and deterrent centred (this practice runs counter to 
rehabilitative intentions). The rehabilitative intent of sentencing practice in general is to 
provide the offender with a value-based change of attitude in preparation for re-entry into the 
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community.1226 When mandatory minimums are contained in sentencing statutes, the judge’s 
discretion is extremely limited. All offenders are therefore treated the same, despite the fact 
that one offender may be a good candidate for rehabilitation while another may not. In these 
circumstances, a defendant will not benefit from mitigating circumstances only in that he will 
not likely receive the upper limits of the offence. 
          Mandatory minimums do present an obstacle for offenders who might benefit from 
treatment for an underlying mental illness. Since judges are not permitted to avoid the 
mandatory minimum, a mentally ill offender may end up in prison. It is therefore hardly 
surprising that the Human Rights Watch reported in 2003 that at over 200,000 prisoners in 
the US prison system were suffering from a severe mental illness.1227 Making matters worse, 
the prison system does not have the facilities to provide adequate care and treatment for its 
mentally ill prisoners.1228 
          The problem with the removal of sentencing discretion through statutorily mandated 
fixed minimum sentences is that those with treatable mental conditions are denied treatment 
in favour of incarceration. This is highly problematic for war veterans with PTSD. A study 
conducted by Saxon, Davis, Sloan, McKnight, McFall and Kivlahan found that the number of 
veterans with PTSD in jail increases over time.1229 The solution is, therefore, a sentencing 
system that allows for adequate evaluation and treatment of PTSD in veterans rather than 
mere incarceration. The lack of treatment and the propensity for incarceration does nothing to 
prevent re-offending, because a vast majority of incarcerated veterans with PTSD would be 
better off with treatment.1230 
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          Drug statutes are especially problematic for war veterans with PTSD in practice. War 
veterans return with symptoms of PTSD that are not evaluated and not treated. Many resort to 
drugs in response to these symptoms.1231 However, due to strict drug policies and resulting 
sentencing statutes, war veterans end up in prison for drug offences.1232 
          Still, there is hope for veterans where state statutes provide for mitigation of sentences 
for veterans with PTSD. For instance, a lower court refused to apply the Penal Code in 
respect of a veteran with PTSD who was convicted of a misdemeanor assault. Since the 
veteran had not been deployed, the court found that he had not been in or near a combat 
situation, and was not eligible for a mental health evaluation under section 1170.9 of 
California’s Penal Code. However, the California Appeal’s Court did not agree and sent the 
case back for the defendant to be evaluated.1233 
          In more serious cases, however, veterans will not benefit from sentencing statutes. For 
instance, in People v Ferguson, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and 
driving while under the influence of an intoxicating substance. The veteran was suffering 
from PTSD and appealed against his sentence on the grounds that the sentencing court failed 
to give weight to this military service, pursuant to the California Penal Code. However, the 
Court of Appeal for California’s Fourth District did not agree, and affirmed his sentence.1234 
9.2.1.5. Obstacles to Achieving the Purposes of Sentencing Statutes 
          As previously established, there are two main purposes of sentencing statutes: 
“consistency” and “fairness.” The obstacles to achieving consistency are well-established in 
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the literature. Inconsistency is a natural outcome when judges are permitted to exercise 
discretion on the basis of the factual and circumstantial basis of a crime and an offender.1235 
          At the same time, the notion of fairness is compromised when sentences are fixed by 
statute, and judicial discretion is either limited or removed. Complicating matters, there are 
instances in which judicial discretion is trumped by the prosecutor who can use discretion to 
reduce a charge and allow an offender to avoid the just deserts that he should receive, or to 
increase the charge and the subsequent punishment.1236 Thus, the primary purposes of 
sentencing statutes are thwarted by both judicial and prosecutorial discretion, as well as the 
objective of deterrence.  
          The deterrence objective removes discretion in sentencing, so an individual who is a 
candidate of rehabilitation will be incarcerated rather than deservedly treated for an 
underlying condition such as PTSD (imprisonment will only make the condition worse). The 
problem is evidenced by the fact that there are higher populations of PTSD sufferers in prison 
than there are in treatment.1237 Thus, sentencing statutes that fix mandatory sentencing 
structures create obstacles for the treatment of PTSD suffers.  
Many war veterans who deserve some form of leniency due to the fact that PTSD was 
incurred from the trauma of war are denied treatment and further punished by incarceration. 
Arguably, veterans who have incurred PTSD due to exposure to combat have already been 
punished (the response to PTSD-related crime should therefore be treated). Unfortunately, 
sentencing statutes that carry a mandatory sentence systematically deny veterans with PTSD 
an opportunity to receive treatment. As a result, they may become candidates for recidivism. 
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9.2.1.6. Advantages and Disadvantages of Sentencing Statutes 
          The obvious advantage of sentencing statutes is consistency in legal practices. As 
Mallett puts it, consistency in the criminal justice system is very important.1238 When 
sentencing statutes fix a sentence for a specific offence, it creates a benchmark for ensuring 
that all individuals who commit a specific offence are treated in exactly the same way. 
However, the disadvantage is that not all offenders are the same. Some offenders can be 
rehabilitated while others cannot. Some offenders can benefit from treatment for an 
underlying mental condition such as PTSD, but on the other hand, some are persistent 
offenders. Therefore, all offenders cannot be treated in exactly the same way. In the states 
where PTSD is a statutorily mandated mitigating factor for war veterans with PTSD, they can 
finally get the appropriate help and treatment for their condition. 
          Sentencing guidelines try to respond to the tensions between consistency and fairness. 
In some cases, sentencing guidelines provide judicial discretion in taking into account the 
circumstances of an offence and an offender, and use those facts and circumstances as 
aggravating or mitigating factors. Therefore, a war veteran with PTSD can be sentenced to 
treatment rather than incarceration. 
          One of the most significant disadvantages is that very little leniency is allowed for 
violent offences (depending on the jurisdiction, for example, in Nevada, the use of violence 
prohibits eligibility). Where offences are violent, imprisonment is mandated. Although judges 
may call for treatment, treatment may not be available, and imprisonment is detrimental to 
individuals with PTSD. On the other hand, one advantage is that sentencing laws permitting 
alternatives to imprisonment for non-violent offenders (misdemeanors or felonies), allows a 
veteran with PTSD to receive treatment before his symptoms become out of control.  
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          This part of the chapter analysed sentencing statutes, their foundational concepts and 
purposes, how they are interpreted and applied in practice, the obstacles to achieving their 
purposes, and the advantages and disadvantages of sentencing statutes. The primary problem 
is mandatory sentencing statutory provisions which basically remove judicial discretion. The 
removal of judicial discretion makes it more difficult for offenders to receive treatment over 
incarceration in appropriate cases. For example, a war veteran with PTSD may become 
incarcerated for a drug or alcohol related offence, when the circumstances suggest that drugs 
were used in response to PTSD symptoms. 
          This part of the chapter also revealed that both the US and England maintain 
discretionary sentencing systems which are managed by sentencing guidelines. This is 
obviously helpful to PTSD veterans who get into trouble with the law. While a number of 
states in the US provide for the statutory sentencing mitigation of veterans with PTSD, 
England does not have a similar legislative sentencing mitigation system for them. 
9.2.2. Veterans Treatment Courts (VTCs)  
 9.2.2.1. Introduction 
          The previous chapters have established that military personnel are returning from wars 
with significant mental health problems, and are in turn experiencing difficulties reintegrating 
into civilian society, often ending up in trouble with the law. The issue for veterans returning 
from combat is important. Therefore, VTC were developed as a means of responding to the 
high rate of returning veterans getting in trouble with the law.1239 This part of the chapter 
discusses and analyses the VTC movement and its intended foundation, purpose, practice, 
and obstacles to getting treatment, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the VTC. 
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9.2.2.2. Foundational Basis of VTCs 
          It has been established, so far, that many war veterans return from war zones needing 
help and treatment (in the US, some states recognise this dilemma by creating VTC). In the 
present chapter, the establishment of specialised courts for veterans accused of non-violent 
crimes has been defined. Arguments have been presented regarding the efficiency and 
appropriateness of the US criminal justice system in managing veterans with PTSD. These 
veterans are troubled and are suffering, and VTCs may provide them with the opportunity to 
reconstruct their lives.1240 The value of VTCs was recognised by President Barack Obama 
who invested in the system to accommodate the needs of more veterans who were returning 
from war.1241 The criminal justice system responded by creating VTCs that are designed to 
offer treatment as opposed to sanctions for war veteran offenders with mental disorders 
incurred during combat service.1242 These courts deal with minor offences and are designed to 
diagnose and treat disorders before they catapult into something more serious.1243  
          The National Center for State Courts reports that the first veterans’ court started in 
2008, in Buffalo, New York.1244 The foundational basis of the VTC rests on the recognition 
that conventional criminal justice is not designed to cope with cases in which the offender’s 
behaviour is caused by a combat-related trauma.1245 Hawkins explains that the VTCs alleviate 
this burden on the criminal justice system. This is because the VTC are modelled after drug 
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courts which provide ‘early intervention and intensive supervision protocols.’1246 VTCs are 
calculated to respond to the specific needs of veterans with combat-related mental 
illnesses.1247 
          VTCs are set up as a means of rehabilitation, and offer an alternative to incarceration 
for veterans with combat-related motivations for criminal behaviour.1248 The court is built on 
the foundation of rehabilitation of those veterans with combat-related trauma, and mental 
disorders should be diverted from the conventional criminal justice system and placed in 
programmes that allow them the treatment that they need.1249 The appropriate treatment 
would include, for example, counselling, substance abuse help, and assistance with 
accommodation.1250 
 Judge Robert Russell, the founder of the first VTC, provided a rationale and 
therefore, the foundational basis for the court system for veterans. According to Judge 
Russell, many military personnel return to civilian life suffering with a number of issues, 
including substance abuse, homelessness, mental illness, and so on.1251 The need for VTC is 
increased by the fact that these issues are not addressed and therefore go untreated, so that the 
veterans end up in the criminal justice system.1252 Thus, the reasons that veterans end up in 
the criminal justice system need to be addressed more urgently than the crimes they commit. 
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The US VTC was found to be important enough for expansion throughout the US, and 
have also been recommended abroad, including in England.1253 In fact, in the UK, the 
Howard League for Penal Reform travelled to the US and examined the VTC. In its 
preliminary report, the Howard League stated that it would consider the feasibility of 
replicating such courts in the UK. The idea was prompted by the similar experiences of the 
US and UK veterans in adjusting to civilian life after deployment.1254 
There are other foundational arguments in favor of helping rather than punishing 
veterans who commit crimes. For example, Arno points out that the government is obliged to 
provide some form of alternative treatment for veterans who commit crimes because the 
government has already invested significantly in the training of veterans.1255 In addition, their 
offences are typically induced by trauma sustained in combat and ‘as a matter of equity, those 
who have served in defense of the United States may be due special consideration in light of 
their special sacrifices’ (see, further, Chapter Four).1256 
9.2.2.3. Purpose of VTCs 
          The increased criminal behaviour of veterans tipped the balance towards the creation of 
VTCs.1257 Most of the US judiciary observed that veterans returning from combat regularly 
appeared in court on charges of criminal behaviour. The judiciary, therefore, began to suggest 
that returning veterans may be dealing with baggage associated with the war or deployment 
experience. Thus, the idea for VTCs took shape, and a plan was put into action. 
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          The VTC is a “problem-solving court.” As such, its purpose is to assist returning 
military personnel in their re-entry into the community.1258 Veterans that are eligible for the 
VTCs are those who have been charged with a “nonviolent” offence.1259 The purpose of the 
VTC is to provide an alternative to prison or incarceration for service personnel who get into 
trouble with the law upon return to civilian communities. 
          In assessing the need for VTCs, the Military and Veterans Affairs Task Force National 
Conference of State Legislatures emphasised the persistent problem of PTSD among 
returning veterans.1260 In addition, The Office of National Drug Control Policy provided 
some substantive facts about veterans and the VTC indicative of the purpose of those courts. 
According to the Office, it is important to remember that veterans put their lives and freedom 
on the line for Americans, and as such, veterans are owed a debt for their military service.1261 
Even so, approximately 60% of the 140,000 veterans in prison have either a substance abuse 
or mental health problems.1262 Many of these problems originate from combat induced 
trauma.1263 
          When a veteran returns home from deployment, his struggles with reintegrating also 
impact his family members. As previously mentioned, some of the returning veterans’ 
struggles are substance abuse, mental health issues, homelessness, and unemployment (issues 
which often create tense relations for families). Therefore, the case for treating the underlying 
causative factors is important for both the veteran, his family, and the wider community.   
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Moreover, the conventional criminal justice system has been leaning more toward 
rehabilitative justice.1264 The rehabilitative approach is especially important for veterans.1265 
In the USA, veterans account for 8% of the prison population and 10% of criminal 
offences.1266 These numbers are important because the conventional criminal justice system is 
not set up to appropriately deal with veterans who commit crimes due to the trauma 
experienced in combat.1267 
The VTC is, therefore, a means by which returning veterans with mental health and 
substance abuse issues who commit non-violent offences can get the help they need. It is 
accepted that combat veterans confront a number of challenges upon returning to civilian life, 
and as a result the number of arrests have increased with the increase in returning veterans, 
consequent to the war against terrorism.1268 Returning veterans’ increased contact with the 
criminal justice system has raised concerns about the “appropriate method” of dealing with 
servicemen who struggle to reintegrate into civilian life. The primary concern is due to the 
fact that the challenges are a result of the trauma of combat. 
          Thus, the VTC is designed to provide returning veterans with ‘judicially supervised 
treatment for justice-involved veterans,’ while at the same time providing public security.1269 
The VTC also recognises a need for returning veterans to receive treatment for mental health 
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problems and substance abuse disorders.1270 Therefore, VTCs are designed to provide a 
combination of treatment and criminal responsibility for returning veterans.1271  
Another issue necessitating the need for a VTC is the fact that once a soldier 
confronts disciplinary action for behaviour that is brought on by a mental disorder, he is 
expelled from the military.1272 This is because the military has a limited choice. It can keep 
the person and subject him to treatment or expel him and focus on the readiness of the 
military. Once the soldier is expelled from the military, the soldier is on his own in terms of 
seeking treatment for mental disorders. 
9.2.2.4. VTCs in Action 
          According to Slattery, Dugger, Lamb, and Williams, VTCs provide a “circle the 
wagons” programme, in which veterans receive treatment for mental health issues, 
connections for housing facilities and work, mentoring, supervision, and accountability.1273 
The idea is to help veterans get on a better path to living a productive life in civilian 
society.1274 
For the most part, VTCs deal with veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan who have 
committed offences.1275 VTCs expect that veterans have a mental health disorder and/or 
substance abuse problem prior to their offending. At the same time, some VTCs only require 
evidence of service.  
When a veteran participates in the VTC, they are often subject to a conditional 
discharge (discharge upon the expiration of a specific time period of good behaviour), a 
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reduced charge, and a sealed criminal record.1276 A sealed criminal record is important 
because it basically removes the criminal record from the veteran’s history.1277 Veterans with 
PTSD are encouraged to receive cognitive processing therapies.1278 If the veteran 
participating in the VTC does not adhere to the treatment programme, he can be sanctioned 
by the court.1279 
In a report on the results of a survey distributed among veterans receiving treatment 
via California’s VTC, Holbrook and Anderson report significant satisfaction among the 
participants.1280 The study explains that the programme under the VTC in California is one 
that places veterans who have had run-ins with the law, under a supervisory programme with 
a judge, probation office, and case manager linked to the VA.1281 The survey results indicate 
that veterans under the court’s treatment programme who participated in the survey felt that 
the court’s supervision of the programme was a key part of the VTC programme.1282 A 
majority of the veterans participating in the survey, and enrolled in a VTC programme, were 
satisfied with the court regularly monitoring their progress.1283 
In 2015, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, a part of the Department of Justice in the 
US, carried out an online survey to determine the operational status of all drug courts, 
including all VTCs in the US.1284 At the time over 300 such courts were in operation.1285 The 
survey results revealed that approximately one-third of all VTCs do not provide defence 
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attorneys for those eligible for the VTC.1286 This is an unfortunate setback for veterans with 
PTSD, or any other mental disorder. In such a case, the defendant will not have the equality 
of bargaining position in the negotiated plea process. This is a significant flaw in the system 
since many returning veterans with PTSD will typically develop a drug or alcohol 
dependency problem.  
In a live report from a VTC in North Carolina, an interview with a representative of 
the court revealed that the court had referred 21 veterans to treatment.1287 All of the 
programmes were completed, and none of the veterans was re-arrested. It was also reported 
that this kind of outcome is similar for VTCs around the US. It was also uncovered by this 
live coverage of the North Carolina VTC that the sitting judge listens to and takes into 
account the veterans’ experiences in combat, or overseas during the course of service.1288 
          In a case study of the VTC in Colorado, four stages of the treatment are described. The 
four stages of treatment are comparable to military training, comprising of a “system of 
incentives and sanctions” calculated to “motivate” and “engagement.”1289 Since veterans, like 
anyone else, can make progress through the stages of the treatment programme, they can also 
go backwards.1290 Hence, the need for incentives and sanctions. In the first stage, the 
defendant goes through a stabilisation phase.1291 The second stage is geared toward 
reintegrating into civilian society.1292 The third stage is an independence stage in which the 
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veterans are charged with the responsibility for managing their own treatment plan.1293 The 
final stage is ‘transition, reintegration, and continuity with treatment.’1294 
          In one case, Frank Damon, a 33-year-old veteran who had PTSD linked to OIF, was 
charged with stealing, and faced five years imprisonment, a fine of US$250,000, and three 
years of supervision upon release. His case went to a VTC where he was sentenced to 
probation for four years. He was ordered to undergo treatment for PTSD and substance abuse. 
However, months after being sentenced by the VTC, he used drugs again, and his probation 
was therefore revoked, and subsequently modified at least twice. He eventually succeeded in 
completing his probation.1295 
          In another case, James Sosh, a veteran who returned from Iraq, and Mike Jones who 
returned from Afghanistan, were suffering from PTSD and subsequently committed felonies. 
Jones had threatened to kill someone, and Sosh sold illegal drugs in order to pay for his own 
habit. Jones was tried in a VTC and received therapy and is said to be recovering and living a 
normal life. Sosh was tried in a traditional court and sentenced to 20 years in jail with a ten-
year suspended sentence.1296 The difference is access to a VTC and an opportunity to 
negotiate a guilty plea to a lesser charge to bring the offence within the jurisdiction of the 
VTC. 
          It would therefore appear that so far, the VTCs throughout the US successfully treat 
eligible veterans. Peak reports that the VTCs have helped to reduce veteran recidivism.1297 
The problem might be the limitations on access created by the eligibility of veterans 
                                                          
1293 ibid 409. 
1294 ibid 410. 
1295 Gregory G. Pinski and Michael W. Cotter, ‘Federal Court Collaboration with State Veterans 
Treatment Courts’ <http://www.nadcpconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/VCC-C-4.pdf> 
accessed 30 May 2018. 
1296 Elliot Blair Smith, ‘War Heroes Gone Bad Divided by Courts Favoring Prison or Healing’ (1 
November 2012) <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Orange-VeteransTreatmentCourt-
Publicity_ikc.pdf> accessed 30 May 2018. 
1297 Chris Peak, ‘All it Took was One Judge and Two Veterans to Provide another Chance to Countless 
Soldiers’ (National Swell, 23 April 2015) <http://nationswell.com/veterans-courts-restorative-justice-
reduce-recidivism/> accessed 30 May 2018. 
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(eligibility is based on the nature of the charge and the availability of the VTC in the 
jurisdiction of the criminal charge). If veterans are only eligible for treatment if they are 
accused of a non-violent offence (felony and/or misdemeanor, depending on the jurisdiction), 
this can mean that veterans with more serious strains of PTSD who go on to commit more 
serious crimes are not receiving treatment for their condition, and are unable to obtain the 
successful treatment plan offered by the VTCs. Moreover, if a veteran with PTSD is arrested 
and charged in a state that does not have a VTC, he will not be eligible for referral to that 
court and will be tried in a conventional court. Therefore, the eligibility for treatment in the 
VTC is denied to some veterans with PTSD. 
9.2.2.5. Obstacles to Access to VTCs 
          Merriam considered the exclusion basis of the VTC system, and why it may not be a 
fair programme. To begin with, Merriam points out that the veterans treatment plan not only 
organises and activates treatment for veterans with substance abuse problems and mental 
disorders such as PTSD.1298 The VTC also makes it possible for the offending veteran to 
avoid incarceration.1299 The problem is that this programme establishes qualifications that 
exclude non-veterans and other veterans.1300  
          Therefore, a problem is created in terms of barring some veterans from the programme, 
and the fact that the programme excludes non-veterans.1301 The fact that the programme 
excludes non-veterans should not be a problem for the VTC, since there are many other 
problem-solving courts available to assist non-veteran offenders with substance abuse and 
mental health issues.1302 
                                                          
1298 Eric Merriam, ‘Non-Uniform Justice: An Equal Protection Analysis of Veterans Treatment Courts’ 




1302 Richard C. Boldt, ‘Problem-Solving Courts’ (Reforming Criminal Justice) 274 
<http://academyforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/13_Reforming-Criminal-
Justice_Vol_3_Problem-Solving-Courts.pdf> accessed 31 May 2018. 
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          Eligibility for referral to the VTC suggests that the defining issue is one’s status in 
military service.1303 Eligibility emphasises that the defendant is a veteran, indicating that his 
condition requiring treatment is only secondary to the mitigating factors constituting grounds 
for an alternative sentence.1304 The problems associated with combat-related trauma can lead 
to a dishonourable discharge which affects the status of the veteran (as discussed further in 
Chapter Four). Unfortunately, the dishonourably discharged veterans are likely to need 
treatment more often than the veteran that was honourably discharged. Therefore, the main 
concern should be the nature of the trauma, and its effect on the veteran. 
          At its First Veterans Treatment Court Summit, Illinois pointed out that while there are 
several VTCs in the US, there was a lack of harmony in terms of regulatory regimes and 
operational mandates.1305 This indicates that the application of veteran treatment programmes 
is inconsistent across the US. This can create obstacles when it comes to trust and confidence 
in their ability to rehabilitate or help veterans. Trust and confidence in any democratic 
institution is built on certainty and consistency. With irregular laws and procedures across 
states, it is difficult to imagine certainty and consistency in the manner in which justice is 
served in the VTCs. The lack of consistency is, therefore, a barrier to fair and equitable 
access to the VTC. 
9.2.2.6. Advantages and Disadvantages of VTCs 
          There are several advantages to VTCs. First, the veteran with PTSD has an opportunity 
to obtain the treatment he missed out on upon his return from deployment. In the event that 
the veteran is homeless and jobless, he has the opportunity to resolve both issues with the 
help of personnel from the VTC.  
                                                          
1303 Jones, ‘Veterans Treatment Courts: Do Status-Based Problem-Solving Courts Create an Improper 
Privileged Class of Criminal Defendants?’ (n421) 310.  
1304 ibid. 
1305 ‘Illinois Holds First Veteran Treatment Court Summit’ (M2 Press Wire, 18 May 2015) 2.  
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          From the offending veteran’s perspective, however, the greatest advantage is the 
opportunity to escape imprisonment and/or a fine. Upon the completion of the VTC 
programme, the veteran’s charges will either be reduced or withdrawn altogether. This likely 
outcome is an incentive for the veteran with PTSD to follow through with the treatment for 
their condition.  
          Overall, the treatment programmes administered within the various VTCs are 
advantageous because they are aimed at truly rehabilitating veterans who offend, putting 
them on the path to recovery. If the veteran complies with the programme, he is expected to 
be a productive member of society, and in turn, recidivism rates are reduced. 
          The greatest disadvantage for veterans who may require treatment and help from the 
VTC is that it is only available for veterans who have committed minor/non-violent criminal 
offences. Moreover, it is only available to veterans if they are charged with an offence in a 
jurisdiction with a VTC. This means that veterans with more serious mental illness, and are 
prone commit more serious offences, will be exempt from the VTC. The irony is, the veteran 
with a more serious form of PTSD is more likely to commit a violent crime. It is also likely 
that the veteran with the more serious form of PTSD has been exposed to greater trauma. 
This veteran is likely to need treatment more that the veteran who commits a mere 
misdemeanor. 
9.2.2.7. Conclusion 
          This part of the chapter has covered the VTCs. The court itself is a novel idea, and 
reflects the idea that combat veterans deserve some degree of “mercy.” Therefore, VTCs 
serve to rehabilitate, aid, treat, and at the same time enforce some degree of accountability. 
While a novel idea, the VTC can benefit from greater consistency in regulation across the 
US. There is also a need to expand the reach of the VTC beyond veterans with non-violent 
offences. In addition, countries such as England, whose veterans have shared similar 
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experiences with the US veterans, and suffer from the same coping and re-entry problems due 
























Chapter Ten: Conclusion and 
Recommendations 
 
10.1. Summary of the Findings 
This thesis has revealed that a significant number of war veterans return to civilian 
life with PTSD, and the number of veterans with PTSD is ever-increasing. Moreover, the 
research findings have revealed that PTSD is among the most contracted psychological 
disorders of war veterans, indicating that it is the most likely injury of war. This combined 
with the argument from Chapter Four that war veterans are in some sense special, suggests 
that a war veteran with PTSD who goes on to commit a crime due to war-related PTSD is 
entitled to some degree of leniency. 
The findings indicate that, for the vast majority, war veterans with PTSD would not 
have PTSD had it not been for the trauma of war. The case for leniency is strengthened when 
combined with military training. It is hardly surprising that war veterans with PTSD go on to 
commit crimes upon returning to civilian life. Research findings also suggest that it is very 
unlikely that these war veterans would have committed crimes if they did not have war-
related PTSD. Moreover, the findings discussed in preceding chapters signify that PTSD is 
not only intricately linked to offending, but also to re-offending. 
 The thesis also points to the fact that many of the war veterans with PTSD that go on 
to commit crimes are not diagnosed with this condition, nor treated for it at the time of the 
commission of the crime. When we consider the sacrifices that war veterans make when 
joining the war effort, it makes sense that we might consider criminal justice responses that 
open the door for the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD, rather than for punishment.  
Complicating matters further for war veterans is the fact that many lawyers are not 
sufficiently familiar with the effects of PTSD in order to identify it in their clients. However, 
lawyers have made use of the concept of PTSD to manage criminal cases against veterans. 
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They have attained limited success for defendants (crucially, they may be able to offer 
various defences, and may be able to mitigate sentences as discussed in previous chapters).  
The primary method of obtaining diagnosis and treatment for PTSD in the criminal 
justice system is through defence and mitigation, which can then lead to treatment. The most 
important defence and sentencing mitigation factors for PTSD sufferers, war veterans in 
particular, are insanity, automatism, self-defence, and diminished responsibility. 
Insanity, automatism, self-defence, and diminished responsibility open up 
opportunities for war veterans with PTSD to receive treatment over punishment. The research 
findings reveal that treatment over punishment is very important for lowering the risk of 
recidivism. As discovered in the research, this is the main task of VTCs and sentencing 
statutes, rehabilitation/treatment of the war veterans with a war-related mental deficit. The 
research findings also show that when a war veteran with PTSD is unable or unsuccessful in 
an attempt to obtain an excuse or a conviction of a lesser offence, he might be able to submit 
PTSD in mitigation of sentencing.  
10.2. Conclusion 
This thesis set out to address the question of how ought a liberal democratic state treat 
war veterans with PTSD who commit crimes as a result of their PTSD? In answer to this, the 
argument of the thesis is that war veterans with PTSD – whose PTSD has resulted from their 
service – are owed special regard, and, in most instances, should be diverted from the 
criminal justice system, and into treatment as an alternative. What we have seen in this thesis 
is that this does occasionally take place, but the approach is inconsistent and haphazard, not 
only as a matter of policy, but even in the application of individual defences. The thesis, 
therefore, concludes with various thoughts about how to make the approach more consistent. 
Cases such as Bratcher (as we have seen formerly), a war veteran with PTSD who 
successfully pleaded insanity due to war-related PTSD (found GBMI) gives us hope that war 
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veterans can, in appropriate cases, seek alternative outcomes to incarceration (other examples 
are the cases of Wood and Heads). Still, there are war veterans with PTSD currently on death 
row. These war veterans should not be executed because, as Giardino argues, (as previously 
mentioned), the mere trauma of war should automatically exempt such defendants from 
execution due to the fact that their condition naturally alters their criminal responsibility. 
Like Bratcher’s case, there are bound to be situations in which the defendant war 
veteran with PTSD is completely out of touch with reality, and as such cannot appreciate the 
nature of his crime. Moreover, as clarified in Chapter Five, a war veteran with PTSD can be 
in a position where he does not know that what he is doing is wrong, because he genuinely 
believes that he is still fighting the enemy in battle. Such a defendant is entitled to a defence 
of insanity. When such a verdict is delivered, the war veteran with PTSD will be treated for 
his condition rather than punished for it. However, another defence may be seen as fit, such 
as automatism, as discussed in Chapter Six, in which case the war veteran might be 
discharged altogether, and as a result, will be freed without treatment or punishment. 
A war veteran with PTSD may not always satisfy the jury that he was insane when 
carrying out the crime. In such a case, there are other feasible options that can allow the war 
veteran with PTSD to receive acquittal, rather than punishment. For example, as explained in 
Chapter Seven, the research findings indicate that defendants with PTSD are actually in a 
position to claim self-defence, in that their altered state of mind, brought on by the PTSD 
symptoms, can leave them with the genuine belief that their life is in immediate danger. 
Other defences, such as diminished responsibility, can also lead to a conditional 
discharge and an order for treatment, together with a suspended sentence. In the English case 
of Aaron Wilkinson, as we saw in Chapter Eight, the defendant’s plea of diminished 
responsibility on the basis of PTSD successfully achieved a reduction of the offence of 
murder to manslaughter, with parole within five years. Essentially, the defendant becomes 
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able to defend himself on the basis of his mental disorder.1306 
It must be noted that the most important finding in this research is that war veterans 
with PTSD who are convicted of criminal offences deserve some form of leniency due to 
their service. As examined in Chapter Four, it is therefore important that the state accepts a 
level of complicity for the war veteran’s injury, and the resulting crime, therefore, should 
treat the war veteran with PTSD some degree of leniency. Conventional wisdom dictates that 
if PTSD was caused due to military service, and PTSD is linked to criminal violence, then a 
war veteran with PTSD deserves some form of leniency when he commits a crime. After all, 
there is a good chance that the war veteran would have never broken the law if he did not 
have PTSD, and they would not have PTSD had it not been their duty carried out during their 
military service. Therefore, there is a strong argument here that war veterans with PTSD 
deserve to be included in a special category of defendants. 
Making a case for the special status of war veterans is not a difficult task. War 
veterans have made courageous and significant sacrifices for their countries. In return, many 
of these veterans were traumatised by their training and war experiences, to a point where 
they develop PTSD, which is linked to their offending. As illustrated in Chapter Four, this 
puts the war veteran in a special status compared to other defendants.  
Once incarcerated with untreated PTSD, and released into the general population later 
on, many war veterans will be on the path to re-offending. There is no reason why war 
veterans with PTSD cannot file tort suits against the state or apply their conditions to criminal 
offences as a defence. Incarcerating war veterans is not fair or justifiable because imprisoning 
anyone who is mentally damaged can be considered as inhumane in the first place. This is 
because the issue of criminal responsibility is challenged. After all, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, criminal law establishes criminal responsibility by asserting the concept of free choice. 
                                                          
1306 Hafemeister and Stockey (n21) 108. 
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When a war veteran with PTSD responds to the symptoms of PTSD, including a series of 
forced recollections while reliving the trauma of war, his ability to act freely and willfully is 
called into question. The war veteran becomes submerged in a world that is separated from 
reality. Or, as discussed in Chapter Six, this might explain why the war veteran with PTSD is 
“able” to claim automatism and obtain an absolute discharge/acquittal (see, for instance, the 
case of Lisnow). 
The state’s responsibility for the veteran’s current post-war condition is also called 
into question. When the two factors, “traumatic consequences of war” and “the state’s 
complicity,” are knitted together, there is no doubt that war veterans with PTSD are entitled 
to “special treatment,” in that they are entitled to some degree of mercy or leniency. Hence, 
from Chapter Five to Chapter Eight, defences such as insanity, automatism, self-defence and 
diminished responsibility should be extended in order to war veterans with PTSD to ensure 
that they receive their required treatment, and in turn reduce re-offending rates among 
prisoners with mental disorders (however, the question still remains as to which criminal law 
defence is appropriate in each instance). 
As pointed out in Chapter Four, we certainly owe a debt of gratitude to returning and 
injured war veterans by offering subsidies and aid for assistance and support for resettling 
back into civilian life. Again, this puts the war veteran with PTSD in a special category of 
criminal defendants. Yet, when it comes to war veterans with PTSD who commit crimes, we 
are quick to treat them as if they were ordinary citizens. By doing so, society dismisses the 
fact that PTSD is an injury of war, and it is this injury that is linked to the crime committed 
by the war veteran with PTSD.  
Yet, jurors tend to have some reservations regarding PTSD claims from war veterans. 
The greatest concern is the risk of malingering. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Smith’s study 
revealed that in most cases, jurors are apt to discount a PTSD claim by a war veteran who 
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was diagnosed with PTSD after his arrest, and more likely to accept a PTSD claim if the 
diagnosis preceded the arrest. We can, therefore, gather from Smith’s study that if the war 
veteran was diagnosed before getting into trouble, he would have a better chance of 
convincing a jury to return a verdict that would result in treatment for PTSD (the major 
obstacle is convincing a jury, but experts’ testimonies may help in such a situation). 
The results of Smith’s study present a dilemma, because there will always be cases 
where veterans only discover that they have PTSD after their arrest. This is exacerbated by 
the research findings reported in this dissertation indicating that many war veterans do not 
seek diagnosis and treatment, or they have been dishonourably discharged and do not have 
the resources for obtaining a diagnosis nor treatment. 
Obviously, there will always be those who malinger with the intention of getting away 
with criminal behaviour. However, the reality is war veterans who commit crimes are often 
first offenders with one glaring difference between their pre-war status and post-war status. 
The difference is that the war veteran did not have PTSD until after his war experience, at 
which time he committed his first crime. This fact alone should present reasonable doubt 
about the risk of malingering.  
While some war veterans and ordinary citizens with PTSD have been “able” to claim 
insanity or automatism, self-defence or diminished responsibility, just as many have not. This 
means that some war veterans with PTSD will get the treatment that they need when their 
PTSD comes to light after criminal responses to the symptoms, and other war veterans with 
PTSD will not receive treatment at all and will continue to commit crimes. It benefits no one 
to punish an offender when crime can be prevented, or recidivism avoided, by the treatment 
of the offender rather than punishment. This is especially true for war veterans suffering from 
war-related PTSD. In other words, any prisoner with PTSD that is connected to any war 
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experience should be accorded special status, so that the prisoner can be treated in or outside 
of prison. 
A successful defence also goes a long way to satisfying the needs of the victims 
and/or the victim’s family. Victims and their families are at least satisfied that the war veteran 
will suffer at least some form of consequence for the committing crime. On the other hand, 
the war veteran is able to claim some level of excuse due to the fact that his crime is a direct 
result of a mental defect contracted during service to his country. However, to get the most 
out of the defence, as analysed in Chapter Nine, war veterans with PTSD should receive 
mitigated sentences that include treatment for PTSD. Therefore, while the outcome of 
defence can be helpful in the conviction and mitigation of sentencing, it can be more 
productive should the sentence passed not only acknowledge the veteran’s services to his 
country, but also ensure treatment for his PTSD that was incurred during the war. 
The research indicates that there is a need for a uniform approach to war veterans with 
PTSD.  We owe it to our war veterans to help them adjust to civilian life after returning from 
war broken, and injured, often both mentally and physically. Thus, a uniform approach means 
providing treatment when it comes to our attention that it is needed. This should be the first 
area attempted when our war veterans with PTSD find themselves in trouble. Therefore, the 
neo-rehabilitation theory of criminal justice guides this conclusion. 
Finally, there is much work to do to in order to ensure that war veterans with PTSD 
receive treatment and leniency, as opposed to incarceration and punishment, when they go 
through the criminal justice system. To ensure that the interaction is productive, there is a 
need for cooperation between the legal and medical communities, which are considered in 






Since it is very easy for prosecutors to plant the seeds of suspicion in the jury’s mind 
about the authenticity of the war veteran’s PTSD claim, the burden of proof should be 
amended. In fact, just as a war veteran is required to prove through scientific evidence that he 
is suffering from PTSD, the prosecutor should be put to scientific proof any claimed 
malingering, as it is listed in the DSM.  
Jurors should be instructed not to consider the risk of malingering, unless there is 
proof by experts that malingering was established or reasonably established, since such a 
condition can be tested for by therapists. The burden of proof should therefore be the same 
for the defendant claiming PTSD and the prosecutor who is claiming malingering. Moreover, 
it is perhaps now time for a new universal defence tailored to PTSD, as suggested by Gover. 
Such a defence should be made “available to veterans with PTSD.”1307 
The VTCs should be altered in order to ensure that all veterans are provided with an 
opportunity for treatment. In other words, existing barriers should be modified in order to 
allow for a larger population of war veterans to obtain treatment. This would mean expanding 
the list of crimes that are permitted for consideration in VTC. 
In addition, statutory laws should be implemented that permit courts to automatically 
consider military service as a mitigating factor. Furthermore, war-related PTSD should be 
listed as a “special circumstance.” Therefore, in addition to military service acting as a 
mitigating factor, war-related PTSD should also be added. What this means is that the war 
veteran with PTSD will receive “special treatment,” and that such a defendant should not be 
treated as an ordinary citizen with PTSD. 
Ultimately, in the criminal trial there are many ways to assess criminal responsibility, 
                                                          
1307 Gover (n20) 587. 
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and the defendant’s psychological abnormalities are among them.1308 There is no reason that 
PTSD, in particular war-related PTSD, should not factor into an assessment of criminal 
responsibility. War-related PTSD raises a number of mitigating factors and call upon our 
conscience, as we are all responsible for the outcome since the veteran’s service benefits us 
all, but apparently damages the war veteran in the process. 
In England (or other countries), there is a need for statutory laws to empower courts to 
accept a PTSD defence or to accept PTSD as a plea in mitigation of sentencing (in the US, 
some states, such as California, have adopted laws regarding mitigating in a sentence). As it 
currently stands, the decision to mitigate sentencing, or to discharge war veterans with PTSD, 
is left to judicial discretion and sentencing guidelines that basically apply to all citizens.  
It is also recommended that for war veterans with PTSD, sentencing laws are passed 
that permit the court to order treatment-based on conditional discharges. This is similar to the 
English conditional discharge, where the case is eventually dismissed if the offender 
completes a set amount of community service or social work hours and does not get in 
trouble with the law during a specified period. Rather than sentence a war veteran with PTSD 
to prison, the veteran should be sentenced to a treatment programme, after which he may 
receive a suspended sentence or a conditional discharge for a fixed period of time for good 
behaviour, after which his conviction is discharged. Such sentencing should take place in an 
organised court system similar to that of the US VTCs. 
10.3.1. Legal Communities 
Ideally, legal practices should be in a position to identify and respond to PTSD 
sufferers immediately upon accepting their case. Katz and Haldar refer to “trauma-informed 
lawyering.”1309 In this kind of practice, the lawyer is trained to identify signs of trauma 
                                                          
1308 Dix (n964) 315. 
1309 Sarah Katz and Deeya Haldar, ‘The Pedagogy of Trauma-Informed Lawyering’ (2016) 22 Clinical 
Law Review 359. 
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symptoms.1310 This is important because many war veterans with PTSD go without diagnosis 
and treatment, and may have also been discharged for behaviour which was more than likely 
linked to PTSD. As a result, the war veteran with PTSD lacks the facilities to have his 
condition diagnosed and treated. This would obviously impede the ability of the defendant to 
offer his defence regarding war-related PTSD. 
When the war veteran with PTSD commits a crime and then comes into contact with a 
lawyer, it is the first opportunity for many to be diagnosed and treated, and to actually offer a 
defence. Therefore, having a lawyer who is trauma informed is important. A legal community 
that automatically refers the war veteran to a trauma informed lawyer would go a long way 
towards ensuring that war veterans with PTSD are not placed into the prison system, where 
they would end up undiagnosed and untreated. Thus, the ability to identify PTSD as a 
defence, and to use it, starts with a lawyer who can help the war veteran with PTSD argue for 
mitigation of sentence or offence, on the basis of his previous service and his resulting PTSD. 
With PTSD and military service, the defendant can argue for leniency and/or a partial or 
absolute discharge of criminal responsibility. 
In fact, the research findings indicate that when a war veteran with PTSD is placed in 
prison without treatment, his PTSD symptoms will become increasingly worse. As a result, 
the defendant is more likely to re-offend upon release. Therefore, punishing a war veteran 
with PTSD serves no real useful purpose, as it does not act as a deterrence, nor will it achieve 
retributive justice, and the offences will likely become worse as time goes on. It is, therefore, 
important for the legal community to become involved in the identification and treatment of 
war veterans with PTSD, and to improve the definition and conditions of obtaining the status 
of a veteran. Advocacy for this class of offenders will begin in the courtroom (the community 
at large must recognise that PTSD is a phenomenon that deserves attention and protection for 




war veterans).  
10.3.2. Medical Communities 
Medical communities alone cannot help war veterans with PTSD. Medical 
communities can diagnose and treat PTSD sufferers only if they voluntarily seek treatment. 
As the research findings indicate, there are stigma obstacles to diagnosis and treatment-
seeking behaviour. Many individuals with PTSD are afraid of the label associated with a 
mental illness, and will opt out of treatment even after diagnosis. The medical community 
cannot compel these individuals to seek treatment (however, a mandatory screening process 
could be useful). 
War veterans have also been found to be very averse to seeking treatment for PTSD. 
Stecker, Shiner, Watts, Jones, and Conner, carried out a study on 143 veterans from OEF and 
OIF who had PTSD but had not received treatment for their condition. The results of the 
study showed that these veterans did not seek treatment due to the fact that they were not 
emotionally ready for such treatment, could not afford it, or were not confident of the 
effectiveness of treatment.1311 
It therefore follows that medical communities should become more involved in the 
effort to ensure that war veterans with PTSD seek treatment before they end up coming into 
contact with the criminal justice system. To start with, the medical community can heighten 
awareness of the effectiveness of treatment. This effort would help war veterans with PTSD 
to come to terms with the need for treatment, and at the same time, it would help the veteran 
to prepare emotionally for such treatment.  
10.4. Suggestions for Future Research  
The results of this study have identified a number of areas where there are gaps in the 
literature requiring further research. One such gap that should attract further research is the 
                                                          
1311 Stecker and others (n494) 280. 
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effect of treatment on PTSD offenders, especially war veterans. What we were able to discern 
in this research study is that when a war veteran or an ordinary defendant with PTSD goes 
untreated, he will be more likely to commit a criminal offence than someone in the general 
population. We have also learned through this research that when the untreated PTSD 
sufferer commits a crime and is incarcerated, rather than submitted to treatment, he will be at 
a higher risk of re-offending. 
What is lacking in the literature is evidence of what happens to a PTSD patient who is 
treated, and his relationship with the criminal justice system. Further research will indicate 
whether treatment for PTSD avoids future offending. Further research will also reveal 
whether or not treatment after an initial arrest will lower the risk of recidivism.  
Further research should be conducted on the philosophical contention of the 
complicity of states in the case of a war veteran with war-related PTSD who goes on to 
commit a crime. Research should be aimed at examining the practical implications of theories 
of criminal responsibility in the case of war veterans with PTSD, and the state’s complicity 
when one examines how crime is a result of war-related PTSD. The underlying research 
question should be whether or not criminal responsibility for war veterans with PTSD should 
be lowered due to the state’s complicity in the person having war-related PTSD. 
Another philosophical question that should be further researched is whether or not 
society’s gratitude toward war veterans with PTSD, expressed through reduced criminal 
responsibility, increases the risk of malingering. The philosophical and practical arguments 
that war veterans with PTSD should receive treatment as opposed to punishment, should be 
researched in order to determine whether meaningful outcomes can be predicted. The 
research topic should focus on whether society’s debt of gratitude toward war veterans should 
be converted to leniency in the criminal justice system, and whether this gratitude should be 
manifested in the recognition that war veterans deserve treatment as opposed to punishment. 
340 
 
The research findings indicate that there is a need for further research on the 
success/ability rate of war veterans with PTSD who use insanity, automatism, self-defence, 
and diminished responsibility as defences, or in mitigation of sentence. It is also 
recommended that research on the VTCs and statutes aimed at leniency for war veterans with 
PTSD in countries other than the US be carried out. As it now stands, research on this area is 
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